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ABSTRACT 
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Many scholars view Aristotle as the source of the particularist position in modern ethics –
the view that action-guiding principles cannot capture the complexity of moral cases.  
John McDowell, Martha Nussbaum, and other particularists have developed this aspect of 
Aristotle’s ethics.  Rather than aiming to provide an account of action-guiding principles 
– the view goes – moral philosophers should provide a theory that focuses on situational 
sensitivity, judgment and moral perception.  In this dissertation, I argue that Aristotle was 
not a particularist.  While he does highlight the importance of moral perception and the 
complexity of moral cases, Aristotle’s claims are consistent with the endorsement of an 
important role for action-guiding principles in deliberation.   
The dissertation shows as much by taking a new methodological approach to the 
study of Aristotle’s ethics.  Scholars tend to focus on Aristotle’s texts alone to resolve 
interpretive questions.  I approach Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics as if it were part of a 
genre of treatises on practical sciences.  This methodological approach requires that we 
read Aristotle’s ethics in a new way, since it encourages us to see trends that stand out 
only in relief against the backdrop of Aristotle’s intellectual context.  Specifically, I argue 
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that studying the Hippocratic Corpus will help to resolve the interpretive debate about 
Aristotle’s particularism.  More generally, it will also help to resolve other outstanding 
interpretive problems concerning, for example, the technê analogy, perception of 
particulars and the status of universals in ethics. 
Thus, in my dissertation I highlight the significant thematic overlap between 
Aristotle’s account of deliberation and the Hippocratic Corpus’s presentation of medical 
deliberation.  While Hippocratic treatises express many of the same concerns and 
concepts that are found in textual evidence invoked by the particularists, they do not 
support a particularist interpretation of medical practice.  Rather, in the Hippocratic 
Corpus, general theories and principles play an action-guiding role in medical 
deliberation, and they help us to see how an analogous case may be true of ethical 
deliberation on Aristotle’s account.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
What the Phronimos Knows 
 
1  What the Phronimos Knows 
At the beginning of Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle suggests that one 
must have a mark or goal (skopos) in light of which he makes decisions.  In order to hit 
the mean (meson)(EN 1138b18-9), the virtuous person must have a standard (horos) or 
mark (skopos) with reference to which he aims (b22-3). “There is a mark to which the 
man who possesses reason looks, and heightens or relaxes his activity accordingly” (b22-
4).  Just as the doctor makes decisions about patients by consulting a standard – a 
conception of health - the virtuous person also makes decisions by consulting a standard.  
Having established that one must have such a standard to make good decisions, 
Aristotle owns that it is unhelpful only to know as much.  For if one knew only that he 
should have a standard, he would be “no clearer” about the manner in which he should 
act.  
But such a statement, though true, is by no means illuminating…. If a man had only 
this knowledge he would be none the wiser - e.g. we should not know what sort of 
medicines to apply to our body is some one were to say ‘all those which the medical 
art prescribes, and which agree with the practice of one who possesses the art’ 
(1138b26-29).1  
                                                
1All translations are from the Barnes edition of Aristotle’s works, unless otherwise noted.  
In Greek, the passage reads:  e1sti de\ to_ me\n ei0pei=n ou3twj a)lhqe\j me/n, ou)qe\n de\ 
safe/j…. tou~to de\ mo&non e1xwn a1n tij ou)de\n a2n ei0dei/h ple/on, oi[on poi=a dei= 
prosfe/resqai pro_j to_ sw~ma, ei1 tij ei1peien o3ti o3sa h( i0atrikh_ keleu&ei kai\ w(j o( 
tau&thn e1xwn.    
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If a doctor in training asked: ‘what medicine should I administer to this patient?’ it would 
be perverse for the expert doctor to reply: ‘whatever the best medical judgment would 
prescribe.’  Similarly, if a person trying to become virtuous were to ask: ‘how should I 
act in this situation?’ it would be entirely unhelpful for the moral expert to answer: 
‘whatever reason prescribes’ or ‘whatever a virtuous person (like me) would do.’  Thus 
Aristotle owns that, in claming that the choiceworthy action is determined by reason 
(orthos logos)(1138b20; b25; b29), he has not said much by way of telling us how to act.   
Since Aristotle acknowledges the unhelpfulness of these descriptions of good action  
at the beginning of Book VI, we have very good reason to suspect that he will provide an 
action-guiding account in later parts of Book VI.  Indeed, earlier chapters of the Ethics 
provide even more reason to suspect that such an account will ultimately be offered.  For 
Aristotle claims that the Nicomachean Ethics has been written in order to help us 
‘become good.’2 The ethical inquiry “does not aim at theoretical knowledge…for we are 
inquiring not in order to know what excellence is, but in order to become good, since 
toherwise our inquiry would have been of no use” (1103b27-9).  
 Does Book VI fulfill our expectations of an action-guiding account?  Yes, in some 
ways, for it explains the mechanism of decision-making and several important features of 
phronêsis.  From Book VI, we learn that: the domain of practical knowledge consists of 
matters related to the good for man (1140b5); such matters are variable and can ‘be 
otherwise’ (1139a8, a14; 1140b2-3); because they can ‘be otherwise,’ the truths of 
                                                
2 The claim that the purpose of the Nicomachean Ethics is to make us ‘become good’: EN 
II.2, 1103b27-29; Cf. II.4, 1105b9-12, X.9, 1179a33–b4. 
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practical knowledge hold only ‘usually’ or ‘for the most part’ (hôs epi to polu); 3 
nevertheless, practical knowledge admits of being true or false; practical truth is attained 
when there is agreement between reason (orthos logos) and desire (orexis)(1139a24-6); 
and the scope of practical knowledge is constrained by the fact that practical knowledge 
is in the service of action (praxis).  Thus, the need for depth of explanation of the claims 
of practical knowledge is mitigated, at least in comparison with theoretical knowledge 
(EN 1102a17-3).   
Book VI also helpfully characterizes the nature of practical knowledge in 
contradistinction to other forms of knowledge.  Practical knowledge is not scientific 
(epistêmê) (VI.3)  Scientific knowledge concerns matters that hold ‘by necessity’  
(1140b1), and practical matters can ‘be otherwise.’ Nor is it craft-like (technê)(VI.4).  
Knowledge of the standard by which we deliberate, according to Aristotle, is “not the 
object of any art (technê)” (1140a29-30).  
But none of this provides the action-guiding standard we expect to find in Book VI.  
Moreover, when we look elsewhere in the Nicomachean Ethics for an action-guiding 
standard, Aristotle’s discussion of the matter is less than clear.  The phronimos 
deliberates with reference to a conception of ‘living well’ (to eu zên)(1140a28).4  
                                                
3 Hôs epi to polu sometimes means ‘in general,’ as in ‘x is, in general, the case: EN 
1110a32, 1129a24; 1161a27; 1164b31; EE 1220b13; 1228b4; 1231a27; 1247b28.  This 
use of hôs epi to polu seems to have synonyms like epi polu: EN 1121b16; 1126b8.  
However, Aristotle also uses hôs epi to polu  as a term of art.  Hôs epi to polu is 
contrasted with ‘always’ (aei) and chance (tuche): 1247a32, a35.  It is also used to 
describe the characteristic form of knowledge in politics: EN 1094b21.  Deliberation 
(bouleusis) is directed at what happens hôs epi to polu: 1112b9. 
4 It seems that the phronimos is the person who is capable of deliberating well with 
regard to (pros) living well as a whole: dokei= dh_ froni/mou ei]nai to_ (du&nasqai kalw~j 
bouleu&sasqai…a)lla_ poi=a pro_j to_ eu} zh~n o3lwj.  For a discussion of the relationship 
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However, all people – the hoi polloi and the ‘gentlemen’ alike – identify happiness 
(eudaimonia) with ‘living well’ (eu zên) and ‘faring well’ (eu prattein) (1095a19-20).5  
Thus, to claim that one makes decisions according to a conception of living well tells us 
nothing about how we ought to live. I.e. it does not provide an action-guiding standard.   
Aristotle’s account of the kalon is far more promising in this respect.  The phronimos 
chooses for the sake of the ‘admirable’ or the ‘noble’ (kalon, EE 1230a27-35).6  The 
phronimos is thus different from other agents in that he deliberates with reference to the 
kalon.  We learn much about the kalon throughout the Nicomachean Ethics.  For 
                                                                                                                                            
between eudamonia and eu prattein, see McDowell 1988.  I agree with McDowell that it 
would be a mistake to think of eu prattein as promoting or serving as the means to 
eudaimonia.  To act well (eu prattein) just is to realize eudaimonia.  This point can be 
helpfully illustrated by a chess example.  On the one hand, there is winning a chess game, 
which is the player’s aim.  On the other hand, one moves the pieces in order to promote 
his aim – namely winning.  Of course, there is a considerable difference between winning 
the game (aim) and moving a piece (promoting the aim).  McDowell correctly denies that 
Aristotle regards eu prattein as a way of promoting eudaimonia.  Rather, each particular 
action is an instance of eudaimonia - hence, his emphasis on the equivalence between 
eudaimonia and eu prattein (90-1).  This point is significant, as we shall see later, 
because McDowell rejects Irwin interpretation of the claim that x is pros y.  For Irwin 
reads Aristotle’s pros as ‘promotes’ – as in ‘good action promotes happiness,’ according 
to McDowell:  “Irwin says that he is using “promotes” “simply to indicate the relation or 
relations Aristotle has in mind in saying that x is pros y, or that we do x heneka y” 
(McDowell 1988, 90).    
5 th_n ga_r eu)daimoni/an kai\ oi9 polloi\ kai\ oi9 xari/entej le/gousin, to_ d' eu} zh~n kai\ to_ 
eu} pra&ttein tau)to_n u(polamba&nousi tw|~ eu)daimonei=n.  This passage suggests that 
Aristotle identifies eu prattein as the goal of the virtuous and the non-virtuous alike.  
However, in NE VI, he associates eu prattein with the phronimos specifically.  For 
Aristotle claims that the telos of phronesis is eupraxia (1140b6-7).    
6 That for the sake of which (hou heneka) we choose (hairêsis) is the kalon: 1230a27 -35. 
tou~to de\ pw~j le/gomen, ei1rhtai pro&teron, o3ti e3neka& tinoj pa&nta ai9rei=sqai poiei=, 
kai\ tou~to& e0sti to_ ou{ e3neka, to_ kalo&n), dh~lon o3ti kai\ h( a)ndrei/a a)reth& 
tij ou}sa e3neka& tinoj poih&sei ta_ fobera_ u(pome/nein, w3st' ou1te di' a1gnoian (o)rqw~j 
ga_r ma~llon poiei= kri/nein) ou1te di' h(donh&n, a)ll' o3ti kalo&n, e0pei/, a1n ge mh_ kalo_n h|} 
a)lla_ maniko&n, ou)x u(pome/nei: ai0sxro_n ga&r. Thanks for the card!  You are sending 
it early, and I won't open it until the actual day arrives.  I should have left 
Auntoann's card in the envelope too. See Michael Pakaluk – p.157.  We perform 
brave (andreia) actions for the sake of (hou heneka) the kalon (1115b23-4);  
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example, in his account of the character virtues, Aristotle explains that the generous 
person will give gifts for the sake of the kalon (1120a23-6), that the magnanimous man 
will undertake large expenditures on behalf of the city for the sake of the kalon (1122b6-
7), and that the courageous person aims for the kalon attained in battle rather than staying 
alive for its own sake (1117b14).7  Thus, we see that virtuous action is motivated by a 
desire for the kalon and that to evaluate an action as ‘admirable’ is to judge it as worth 
undertaking.   
But given that an account of the kalon provides us only with the most general 
description of admirable action in various domains of virtue, it seems that Aristotle never 
provides an action guiding standard that is specific enough to guide us directly in the 
making of good decisions.  What one wants, it seems, is something like precise rules 
about conduct - for example, ‘to be magnanimous, one must finance at least one trireme 
or major public event every three years.’  Or: ‘to be generous, one ought to give gifts of 
substantial value to good friends once a year.’ To give action-guiding principles is to give 
us principles like these – namely, principles that give us specific guidance about action in 
specific situations.  
Because Aristotle does not appear to provide these kinds of principles, commentators 
have speculated about the extent to which Aristotle ever meant to suggest that moral 
                                                
7  The kalon is both a notion with which everyone would have been familiar, for it 
corresponds to the idea of the admirable, and it constitutes a reason for acting that is 
distinct from, say, the pleasurable or the advantageous.  (For Aristotle, the objects of 
choice and flight are the noble (kalon), advantageous (sumpheron), and the pleasant 
(hêdu)(the phronimos chooses the noble, presumably)(1104b30-1; 1105a1).  But the 
kalon is also up for dispute.  For example, in the Gorgias, Callicles argues that unjust 
actions are only ‘shameful’ (aischron) by convention.  In fact, Callicles claims, unjust 
actions are ‘admirable’ (kalon) if performed by powerful people (483bd).  For a 
discussion of these themes, see Michael Pakaluk 2005, ch. 5.   
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deliberation looks like rule-governed decision procedures – on the model, say, of the 
practical syllogism.  For example, they have supposed that, because Aristotle never gave 
any such standards, he meant to suggest that we do not deliberate according to any 
standards.8  Others have suggested that Aristotle does offer some definitive action-
guiding standards (e.g. do not commit adultery), and therefore that we may reasonably 
assume that he would be amenable to the idea of providing action-guiding standards 
about other matters in virtue as well.  We can guess at these standards or recover them 
from Aristotle’s discussion of the individual virtues in Books II through V of the 
Nicomachean Ethics.9  Still others have claimed that the action-guiding standards are 
ensconced in the laws or nomoi.  Since the notion of nomos encompasses both the notion 
of city laws as well as customs, it is wide enough to include norms about things like 
generosity.10  These positions raise questions about the form that phronêsis takes.  Does 
the phronimos grasp a set of principles by which he deliberates?  Does he deliberate in 
light of a theory of the good life?  Or does his conception of the good come in a form 
altogether unlike explicit knowledge or grasp of principles?   
We can distinguish two basic kinds of positions about such issues.  Some argue that 
the standard by which we deliberate takes the form of a set of action-guiding 
generalizations or principles that the agent uses in making choices.  I refer to this account 
as ‘generalism.’ Others argue that the content of the standard should not be thought of as 
a codifiable set of principles or a theory at all.  Rather, it should be represented as a 
                                                
8 Broadie 1991.  
9 Irwin 2000.   
10 Striker 2006.   
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evaluative outlook through which an agent chooses actions in particular cases.  I will 
refer to this account as ‘particularism.’ 
The goal of this dissertation is to resist the particularist interpretation of Aristotle, 
according to which ethics does not provide us with action-guiding principles by which we 
deliberate.  In this introduction, I will sketch the two positions just described in greater 
detail.  Then I explain the methodological grounds on which I present a case against the 
particularist position.  For I will make heavy use of the Hippocratic Corpus in responding 
to the particularist reading of Aristotle’s ethics, and I must explain how the Corpus can be 
used to motivate a claim about Aristotle’s ethics.  Next, I will present a sketch of the 
argument in the following chapters.  Finally, I present an account of the Hippocratic 
Corpus and the various reasons for thinking that Aristotle might have been familiar with 
it. 
2 The Standard Views about Phronêsis 
While it is clear that knowledge of the standard plays a role in deliberation, it is 
not clear how to characterize the nature of practical knowledge and its role in the 
deliberation of the phronimos.  The proper interpretation of these matters is disputed 
among contemporary interpreters.  
 For the sake of argument, we can distinguish two extreme positions in the debate.  
On the one hand, there is the particularist view according to which there are no true moral 
principles.11  For our purposes, this is the claim that there are no true action-guiding 
                                                
11 McKeever and Ridge refer to the position as “principle eliminativism” – the view that 
there are no true moral principles (McKeever and Ridge 2006, 15).  The main proponent 
of the view is John McDowell (McDowell 1998b, 148-9).  For example, McDowell 
writes: “is there any alternative to thinking of [ethical knowledge] as capable of being 
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principles.12  That is, there are no principles whose explicit purpose is to guide our 
actions in specific situations.  The particularist is often associated with sensibility theory, 
according to which ethical knowledge consists in the deliverances of a sensibility or a 
disposition to ‘see’ the good.  For the sensibility theorist claims that the agent possesses 
an evaluative outlook through which he or she decides on actions in particular cases. For 
example, the particularist or sensibility theorist will claim that one does not decide how 
to show fear on the basis of a principle about danger, but on the basis of an evaluative 
outlook – one which probably cannot be captured or translated into a set of 
generalizations or action-guiding principles about danger.13  On this view, ethical 
knowledge consists in responses to particulars, rather than judgments about particulars in 
light of concepts or universals.  
                                                                                                                                            
captured, at least in theory, by a set of principles for superimposing values on to a value-
free reality?  The upshot is that the search for an evaluative outlook one can endorse as 
rational becomes, virtually irresistibly, a search for such a set of principles: a search for a 
theory of beauty of goodness….  I have a hunch that such efforts are misguided….”  
While McDowell espouses principle eliminativism on some occasions, he also claims that 
principles have a heuristic function (McDowell 1996).  Martha Nussbaum makes a 
similar claim, adding that principles can serve as heuristics.  On her account in 
“Discernment of Perception,” they are true to the extent that they offer a “summary of 
wise decisions” (Nussbaum 1990, 69).  Compare Nussbaum 1986, 298 ff.  Following 
Nussbaum, Irwin characterizes particularism along these lines.  Rules only “summarize 
the particular perceptual judgments of virtuous agents” (Irwin 2000, 103).  The view that 
rules are summaries of wise decisions is not the same as McDowell’s principle 
eliminativism, for it allows that there are principles and that they are true, albeit in weak 
sense – only to the extent that they are associated with  virtuous decisions in the past.  For 
discussion, see McKeever and Ridge on “moral truth-makers” (McKeever and Ridge 
2004, 12-3).   
12 McKeever and Ridge define “action-guiding principles” as principles that both provide 
explanatory truth conditions and are suitable for guiding action (McKeever and Ridge 
2006, 6-7, 8-11).  
13 McDowell, 1998b, 149.   
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But, one might ask, Aristotle claims that phronêsis involves cognition of 
universals, as well as particulars.  How does the sensibility theorist address this point?  In 
order to account for the universal’s role in phronêsis, the sensibility theorist glosses the 
universal as follows.  First, the only relevant universal is the kalon.  According to the 
sensibility theorist, the kalon is the only universal in ethics.  Second, the universal does 
not take the form of a content-filled concept, as we tend to think of universals (e.g. 
‘human being’). For there is no independent and general and content-filled conception of 
the kalon, according to the sensibility theorist.  It cannot be understood as a rule or a goal 
whose content can be grasped either by the intellect or independently from the various 
motivational states which instantiate the grasp. 14 Rather, the kalon is a contentless 
principle that becomes contentful only in particular situations.  To say that someone has 
the grasp of the kalon is just to say that he or she sees the world in the way that a virtuous 
person would see the world.  
The other extreme is the generalist view that ethical knowledge takes the form of 
universals.  We can distinguish three versions of the generalist view, each distinguishable 
by its position on the form and role of universals in deliberation.  According to the first 
view, universals take the form of rules.  Deliberation is modeled in the practical 
                                                
14 There is a particularly clear expression of this point in McDowell 1996, 23.  Sarah 
Broadie does not hold this view, although in other respects, she should be understood as 
subscribing to the sensibility theorist’s reading of Aristotle.  For Broadie, one deliberates 
not in light of any general conception of the good.  Rather, one deliberates in light of 
particular aims, where we are to understand that there is no overriding notion of the way 
that these particular aims should be understood altogether – no theory, in other words 
(Broadie 1991, 234 ff.).  For the response to Broadie’s argument against the Grand-End 
view, see Kraut 1993.   
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syllogism, and these rules serve as the major premise of the practical syllogism.15  
According to the second view, universals take the form of theories of the kalon, where 
the theory is like a ‘blueprint’ that expresses a general, but determinate conception of the 
good life, replete with a mapping of the relative value or weight of an agent’s various 
commitments.16  Some commentators have claimed that there needs to be an explanation 
of the manner in which the practical reasoner moves from this very general conception of 
the good life to the selection of a specific rule to use in deliberation. Hence, one version 
of the ‘blueprint’ account intersperses a linking principle between the general conception 
of the good life and the selection of the specific rule.17  On this account, deliberation is 
modeled on the practical syllogism, where the major premise takes the form of principle 
derived from the ‘blueprint’ conception of the good.   
 A third view assimilates the ethical universal to a scientific theory.  Thus, 
according to C.D.C. Reeve, the universal in question is composed, in the first place, of 
matterless first principles – for example, ‘we all aim at eudaimonia’ and ‘every nous 
chooses what is best for itself.’18  These matterless principles explain the sense in which 
                                                
15 See Allan 1995.  For a critical discussion of Allan’s view, see Cooper 1975, 47 ff.  
16 Initially,‘blueprint’ was the negative term used by McDowell to characterize theory-
views about deliberation (McDowell 1996, 1998).  However, the term continued to be 
used in the secondary literature to denote the view because it aptly illustrates the nature 
of the position.  I follow that practice in using ‘blueprint.’ 
17 See Irwin 1998. 
18 Reeve 1995.  Reeve argues that unconditional scientific knowledge (episteme haplos) 
of ethics is possible if one considers the fact that only matter makes unconditional 
scientific knowledge impossible.  But there are immaterial principles in ethics – namely, 
nous.  We have nous of ethical first principles – for example, eudaimonia, is the activity 
of nous, claims Reeve (22-9). 
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ethics can be a demonstrative science (epistêmê haplos).  As matterless principles, they 
hold ‘by necessity’ and scientific knowledge is about what holds ‘by necessity’ (e.g. An . 
Pr. 1.13, 32b4-10).  While practical knowledge is about matters that hold by necessity, it 
also concerns things that are ‘for the most part’ (hôs epi to polu)(e.g. An Pr I.13, 32b4-
10).  Facts about such matters take the form of contingent, non-universal truths.  For 
example, ‘wealth promotes happiness’ is true, by Aristotle’s lights, ‘for the most part.’  
For it is true in most cases, but not all cases.  According to Reeve, such claims are true in 
the same sense that the facts of physics are true.  For example, it is true, by nature, that 
‘humans have five fingers’ and that ‘honey cures fever’ (Met. E. 2, 1027a22-6).  Thus, 
knowledge of ethical universals is like knowledge of the necessities that constitute natural 
laws in the physical and biological works.  If the comparison between the natural 
sciences and politics holds, knowledge of ethical universals will be like knowledge of 
scientific universals – albeit those of a natural science.19 
3  The Methodology of the Dissertation 
Interpretive debates about the merits of the particularist reading of Aristotle’s 
ethics have come to a standstill because the possible lines of interpretation have been 
developed.20  Why revisit the issue?   
I believe there are texts which are relevant to the interpretation, but which have 
been neglected – namely, texts from the Hippocratic Corpus.  For they develop the very 
themes that we find associated with particularism in Aristotle’s ethics: the complexity of 
                                                
19 Reeve 1995, 12-15.   
20 The last state of the art discussion of the issue was Irwin 2000.   
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cases and the need to deliberate about cases in the face of incomplete and imprecise 
information.  I believe that studying the Hippocratic Corpus’ treatment of these issues can 
shed light on the interpretive question about Aristotle.   
In turning to the Corpus to settle a question about Aristotle, the dissertation 
develops a distinct kind of methodological approach to the study of Aristotle’s ethics.  It 
treats Aristotle’s text as if it were an instance of a genre of a fifth and fourth-century 
Greek scientific writing - specifically, writing on the practical sciences such as medicine, 
rhetoric or politics.  I mean ‘genre’ loosely here as anything that includes the motifs or 
topoi that tend to be associated with the practical sciences.  Included in this genre are 
works like: Isocrates’ Against the Sophists, the Hippocratic treatise On Ancient Medicine, 
and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  All make mention of certain topoi which I take to 
be associated with the practical sciences.  These include discussions of: method; the 
nature of inquiry and discovery; the difficulty of acquiring a technê, the inxactness of 
practical knowledge; the high levels of variety in the phenomena with which practical 
sciences are concerned (diaphora); notions of progress and the writer’s conception of his 
place in the progress of the scientific program; the distinction between abstract and 
practical or useful knowledge; the distinction between deliberative and non-deliberative 
arts; errors in the application of the science; application of the doctrine of the mean with 
respect to particular cases, and phenomena that take place ‘for the most part.’  Some of 
these features are shared in common with all scientific texts, and not just texts on 
practical science – for example, a discussion of method.  However, many of them are 
peculiar to discussions of practical science. 
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Rather than surveying all works on practical science of the period, the 
dissertation deals with medical texts primarily.  I have focused on medical texts for three 
reasons.  First, medicine is a practical science in much the way that politics is a practical 
science for Aristotle.  Both are inexact sciences.  By ‘inexact science,’ I mean a science 
that deals with (a) knowledge that consist of truths that hold ‘for the most part,’ (hôs epi  
to polu) and with (b) perception of particulars qua particulars (i.e. rather than as 
instantiations of universals).   Second, Aristotle himself often compares political science 
to medicine, and this gives us good reason to think that medical treatises of the period 
might have something revealing to tell us about Aristotle’s ethics.21  Third, as I have 
already suggested, there are striking thematic similarities among Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics and a group of texts in the Hippocratic Corpus -particularly those on regimen.  In 
the dissertation, I focus on some of these features, including: the notion of exactness 
(akribeia) in science, the status of sciences in which claims hold ‘for the most part’ (hôs 
epi  to polu) or ‘mostly’ (polu), and consequent modes of expressing principles in that 
science.  
My methdology is to assess the merits of the particularist interpretation of 
deliberation in the light of the aforementioned parallels between Aristotle ethical treatises 
and treatises in the Hippocratic Corpus.  I provide a comparative analysis of the 
Nicomachean Ethics and the Hippocratic Corpus, showing that there is significant 
thematic similarity overlap between Aristotle’s account of deliberation and the 
Hippocratic Corpus’s presentation of medical deliberation.  I also show that, while 
                                                
21 Numerous scholars have provided a comparison between Aristotle’s ethics and the 
Hippocratic Corpus with this point in mind.  The best, I think, is Jaeger 1957.   
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treatises of the Hippocratic Corpus express many of the same concerns and concepts 
that are found in textual evidence invoked by the particularists, they do not support a 
particularist interpretation of medical practice.  Rather, in the Hippocratic Corpus, 
general theories and principles play an action-guiding role in medical deliberation, and 
they help us to see how analogous case may be true of ethical deliberation on Aristotle’s 
account.  
I supply two arguments against particularist readings of Aristotle’s account of 
deliberation.  The first presents a counterexample to the particularist’s inference from (1) 
inexactness in a science to (2) the no-principle view.  That is, Aristotle claims that (1) 
politics is not an exact science.  On the basis of this and related claims, particularists have 
inferred that Aristotle (2) denies a role to action-guiding principles in deliberation.  The 
Hippocratic treatise On Ancient Medicine provides the counterexample.  For, its author 
claims that (1) medicine is not exact.  Nevertheless, the author endorses a role for action-
guiding principles through which the doctor can deliberate about patient’s cases.  
The second argument also presents a counterexample to the particularist’s 
inference from (1) inexactness in a science to (2) the no-principle view.  On a 
particularist reading of Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, the standard (horos) in light of 
which an agent selects the mean is not constituted by principles.  Rather, it is constituted 
by a contentless conception of the good that becomes determinate only in specific 
situations.  Once again, On Ancient Medicine tells against such a reading.  For it offers an 
account of the mean very much like Aristotle’s – namely, Aristotle’s mean “relative to 
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us” (pros hêmas).  Nevertheless, On Ancient Medicine also endorses a role for 
principles in the selection of the mean.  
4  The Outline of the Chapters 
Chapters 1 and 2 present an overview of Aristotle’s account of deliberation and the main 
interpretations of the account.   
Chapter 1 shows that Aristotle does not give a full characterization of the standard by 
which the phronimos is said to deliberate.  It discusses the two main interpretive accounts 
of deliberation (bouleusis) - namely, the particularist and generalist interpretations. It 
establishes that we can negotiate between these interpretations by exploring parallels 
between Aristotle’s ethics and medical treatises of the Hippocratic Corpus.  The chapter 
also provides an introduction to the texts of the Hippocratic Corpus and explains why one 
might be warranted in thinking that Aristotle was familiar with the concerns expressed in 
the Hippocratic Corpus.   
Chapter 2 reprises much of the content of chapter 1, but in greater detail.  It gives an 
overview of Aristotle’s account of deliberation and a more detailed explanation of the 
generalist and particularist interpretations of deliberation.   It also provides an account of 
the textual evidence for the particularist interpretation, including Aristotle’s remarks 
about: ‘exactness’ (akribeia), the ‘particular’ (kath hekasta), perception, claims that hold 
‘for the most part’ (hôs epi to polu), the ‘outline’ (tupos), and ‘variation’ (diaphora). 
Chapters 3 and 4 take the textual evidence for the particularist interpretation of 
deliberation and re-position that evidence in the context of fifth and fourth century 
scientific thought.   
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Chapter 3 places the textual evidence for the particularist reading in the context of 
Aristotle’s scientific thought about the features of exact and inexact sciences.  It begins 
by offering a brief history of the term akribeia and a discussion of Plato’s likely influence 
on Aristotle’s understanding of akribeia.  It offers an analysis of three criteria Aristotle 
uses to define the exact science in the Posterior Analytics. It also shows that politics was 
not an exact science for Aristotle, and it presents an analysis of the sense in which 
politics failed to be an exact science.  The chapter concludes with a summary of the 
terminology Aristotle used to express the idea that a science was not exact – for example, 
the term ‘outline’ (tupos).  
Chapter 4 draws important parallels between the Hippocratic Corpus and Aristotle’s 
ethics.  As indicated above, the existence of such parallels grounds the methodological 
approach I bring to the question about the merit of particularist readings of Aristotelian 
deliberation. The chapter presents the following parallels. (1) Just as Aristotelian politics 
is not exact (akribeia), medicine also lacks exactness (akribeia/ atrekês).  Similarly, (2) 
just as claims in politics hold ‘for the most part’ (hôs epi to polu), claims in medicine also 
hold ‘mostly’ (hôs epi to pleiston, polu, de polu). Moreover, medical writers claim – as 
Aristotle claims about politics - that only schematic accounts of medicine can be given, a 
point they express by writing that medical claims hold ‘in summary’ (en kephalaioi).  (3) 
Finally, medical writers also appeal to ‘variation’ (diaphora) to explain inexactness in 
medicine, just as Aristotle appeals to diaphora to explain inexactness in politics.  
Chapter 5 presents a counterexample to the particularist’s interpretive claim that (1) an 
attribution of inexactness to a science can be equated with (2) a no-principle view.  The 
chapter  begins by focusing on a range of skeptical objections made to the medical art in 
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the fifth and fourth century Greece, one of which was the lack of exactness (akribeia) 
in medicine.  The chapter recalls the particularist claim that the inexact science is a 
science that does not endorse true action-guiding principles for deliberation. The chapter 
then examines the discussion of inexactness in the Hippocratic treatise On Ancient 
Medicine.  The chapter shows that, while the author claims that medicine is inexact, he 
nevertheless endorses action-guiding principles for medical deliberation. I suggest that an 
analogous point might be made about Aristotle’s account of deliberation.  That is, 
Aristotle’s claim that politics is inexact is consistent with the endorsement of action-
guiding principles for the deliberating agent.   
Chapter 6 also presents a counterexample to the particularist’s equation between (1) an 
attribution of inexactness to a science and (2) a no-principle view.  This chapter deals 
with that interpretive claim in the context of the doctrine of the mean.  The chapter begins 
with a discussion of Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean and presents the particularist’s 
reading of the doctrine of the mean.  For the particularist, the standard in light of which 
an agent selects the mean is not constituted by principles.  The chapter argues against 
such a reading by showing that On Ancient Medicine presents a very similar account of 
the mean.  Nevertheless, as the chapter shows, the standard according to which one 
selects the mean in On Ancient Medicine is constituted by action-guiding principles.  
 
5  Texts  
It is quite natural to ask about an exegetical approach that seeks to use one text to 
prove something about another text.  One what grounds might such an approach be 
merited?  As I hope to show in chapters 3 and 4 of the dissertation, there is significant 
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overlap between Aristotle’s account of practical knowledge and the Hippocratic 
Corpus’s account of medical deliberation.  As a preliminary step in establishing as much, 
it is important to explain what the Hippocratic Corpus is and why Aristotle might have 
been familiar with it.  Hence, the rest of the currect chapter presents a description of the 
Hippocratic Corpus, a summary of its contents, and an account of the various reasons for 
thinking that Aristotle might have been familiar with the Corpus and its concerns.  
The rise of rational medicine in Greece can be divided into two periods, the first 
lasting from c. 420-370.  The period can be distinguished by its departure from magico-
religious science.  Whereas previous forms of medicine resembled magic, the new 
medicine adopted the techniques and methodologies of exact sciences such as 
mathematics and geometry, which were devloping at the same time.22  Establishing 
authorship of treatises during this period has proven difficult.  Nevertheless, it is known 
that Hippocrates and his pupils at Cos were active during the period, and many of the 
core treatises of the Hippocratic Corpus were probably composed by members of the 
school.23 
Whereas there is considerable difficulty tracing works in the Hippocratic Corpus 
to any particular author, identifying particular authors is possible during the second 
period of medical history, which comprises the remainder of the fourth century.  During 
this period, it has been possible to follow the views of individual physicians, scientists 
and philosophers such as Diocles of Carystus, Mneistheus, and Praxagoras of Cos. These 
writers were regarded as working strictly within the field of medicine.  Others writers of 
                                                
22 See Nutton 2004, 103-114, and Lloyd 1987, 1-49.   
23 Jouanna 1975.   
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the period, however, also work within the field of medicine, but their works have 
tended to be regarded not exclusively as medical in theme.  Among these we might 
include: Plato (Timaeus, esp. 72d), Aristotle (History of Animals, VII, 602b12-605b21), 
and Theophrastus (On Vertigo and Dizziness).  
We have three sources for the history of medicine in the first period:  (1) the 
Hippocratic Corpus, (2) the Anonymus Londinesis and (3) doxography.  The Hippocratic 
Corpus is a body of medical treatises in which various genres are represented.  Some 
treatises are adressed to broad readership composed of both specialists and lay people;  
some are aimed at specialists; and some are notes meant to be used by the physician.  Still 
others are manuals or handbooks meant for the use of other physicians.  Most of the 
Hipppocratic Corpus is thought to have been composed in the time of Hippocrates (460-
370);  however, some are believed to have been composed after Aristotle’s time. 
The Hippocratic Corpus can be divided into three main groups of treatises.  The 
first consists of (1) a core group of writings thought to have been composed by 
Hippocrates and his circle of disciples.  These are often referred to as the Coan treatises, 
since they were composed by Hippocrates or members of his school, which was on the 
island of Cos, one of the traditional homes of the Asclepiad family (along with the island 
of Cnidus). The second is the (2) work of the Cnidian writers, a group of physicians and 
scientists thought to be affiliated with a school of medicine on Cnidus, the second 
traditional home of the Ascelpiad family.  Finally, there are (3) the treatises that were 
written outside the Coan and Cnidian schools.  This group can be divided into two sub-
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groups.  The first includes a number of treatises that were written outside the Coan and 
Cnidian circles, but under the influence of the Asclepiad teachings.24   
The (1) core group of the Hippocratic Corpus, the Coan works, includes: The 
Hippocratic Oath, Fleshes, Regimen, On Wounds in the Head, On Fratures, On Joints, In 
the Sugery, Mochlicon, Epidemics, Airs Waters and Places, The Sacred Disease, 
Aphorisms, Regimen in Acute Diseases, and Prognostic.  Some of these works are 
surgical treatises which may have been used as manuals for treatment of battle wounds.  
One group of these treatises – including works such as On Wounds in the Head and On 
Fractures – tends to be thorough and pay scrupulous attention to detail.  A second group 
of surgical treatises – including Mochlicon, for example – is less precise and reads more 
like lecture notes or summaries of more detailed works.   
Second, there is a group of works that were probably written by itinerant 
physicians.  These include the famous Epidemics, which is a summary of individual case 
studies conducted in and around Thessaly.  Airs, Waters and Places also reports the 
experience of a doctor traveling from city to city, recording the predominant medical 
conditions there, the seasons at which diseases in those regions occur, characteristics of 
the place, and other comparable features.   
Finally, there are a number of treatises which are not classifiable.  These include:  
The Sacred Disease, which gives a scientific treatment of epilepsy; Prognostic, which 
presents the famous Hippocratic facies, i.e. the facial expression indicating that death is at 
hand; Regimen in Acute Diseases, a treatise on regimen; the Hippocratic Oath, which 
records the oath taken by Hippocrates’ students at Cos; Aphorisms, a collection of 
                                                
24 I follow Jouanna’s classificatory scheme.  See Jouanna 2001.    
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unsystematic remarks about medicine – the treatise probably most read and 
commented upon by Medieval and Early Modern scholars of medicine; and last Precepts, 
a collection of remarks about prognosis, or the art of predicting the course of illness.   
The second group of Hippocratic treatises are the Cnidian works.25  These 
include: Cnidian Sentences, the preamble to Regimen in Acute Diseases, Diseases, and 
Internal Affections.  The Cnidian treatises are different from Coan treatises in several 
respects.  First, they place a greater emphasis on the importance of classification.  
Second, they place less emphasis on the recording of actual practice – the sort of 
observations that one sees in the Coan treatise Epidemics, for instance.  On the other 
hand, the Cnidian treatises describe symptoms in great detail, so it cannot be said that, in 
terms of observation, the Cnidian treatises are inferior to those of the Coan school.  Third, 
the Cnidian treatises favor treatment through purgatives and emetics over treatment 
through change in diet (regimen), perhaps prompting the observation in the Coan treatise 
Regimen in Acute Diseases that the Cnidian school does not place enough trust in 
treatment through change in diet. Finally, one does not see the remarks on method in the 
Cnidian treatises that one sees in some Coan treatises (e.g. Regimen in Acute Diseases).  
The third group of Hippocratic treatises are the works that are neither Cnidian nor 
Coan.  It is convenient to divide this group in terms of periods of composition.  The first 
of these groups of treatises are probably composed on the intellectual periphery of the 
Coan and Cnidian schools.  For they were composed in the period coinciding with the 
composition of the Coan and Cnidian groups of Hippocratic Corpus.  In some cases, they 
are reacting to ideas promoted by the Coan or Cnidian schools.  Take On Ancient 
                                                
25 For discussion of the Cnidian school, see Lonie 1965 and Lonie 1978.   
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Medicine, for example.  It was probably not composed in either the Coan or Cnidian 
schools, but the treatise is clearly written during the same time period (420-370).  
Moreover, it is written in response to ideas promoted by some treatises among the Coan 
works.   
Among the third group of treatises, some are philosophical.  By ‘philosophical,’ I 
mean that they inherit the Presocratic tradition of inquiry into the fundamental 
constituents of nature and their arrangement.  In this group are:  Fleshes, Regimen, and 
Sevens.  Regimen, for example, presents a general Heraclitean view of the body and of 
nature.  It is composed of the interaction between fire and water, extinguishing one 
another “in measures” (5).   
However, other treatises among this group are anti-philosophical.  They suggest 
that medicine is not a branch of philosophy and need not delve into the inquiry regarding 
nature.  Instead, knowledge of the human body and of the effects of various substances 
on the body is sufficient for medical practice.  One may say that this group of treatises is 
the intellectual parent to the Methodism that developed in third century ancient Greek 
medicine.  Among this group of treatises, we may include: On Ancient Medicine and The 
Nature of Man.  On Ancient Medicine will be discussed at length below.  Nature of Man, 
thought to be written by Polybus, criticizes the view that the human body is composed of 
the elements fire, earth, air and water.   
In the second sub-group of treatises in the Hippocratic Corpus, we find those that 
were composed outside of the fifth and fourth century, some of which are even thought to 
have been composed during the Middle Ages.  These include: The Heart, Precepts, 
Decorum, Physician, Affections, Anatomy, Crises, Dentition, Excision of the Foetus, 
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Eight Month’s Child, Generation, Critical Days, Diseases IV, Diseases of the Girls, 
Nature of Women, Prenotions of Cos, Superfoetation, Sight, Decree of the Athenians, 
Letters.  Sources: Anonymous Londinensis26  
Now that we have seen a description of the Hippocratic Corpus and its contents, 
we can ask what evidence there is to show that Aristotle was familiar with the 
Hippocratic Corpus.27  Aristotle was born to a medical family.  Both Aristotle’s parents 
were descendants of Ascelpius.  As a male descendant of Asclepius, Aristotle’s father, 
Nicomachus of Stagira, was a member of the Asclepiad guild.  Nicomachus served the 
Macedonian court as a physician and acted as both friend and doctor to King Amyntas of 
Macedon in the late fifth century.28  There is some speculation that Nicomachus would 
have known about the Epidemics, a collection of individual patient case studies.  For the 
first and third books of the Epidemics consist of studies from Thasos and Abdera, which 
are close to Nicomachus’ home, Stagira (Aristotle’s birthplace).  The dates of 
composition for Epidemics I and III match Nicomachus’ dates.  Therefore, it is not 
unreasonable to think that Nicomachus might have been influenced by the author of these 
treatises.29  Although Nicomachus died when Aristotle was young, Aristotle’s interest in 
biology may have been kindled by his father’s studies. 
 The Aristotelian Corpus does not contain any treatises written about 
medicine, specifically.  However, a number of sources suggest that Aristotle wrote 
treatises on medicine.  For example, Diogenes claims that Aristotle wrote the following 
                                                
26 See W.H.S. Jones’s edition of the Anonymous Londinensis (Cambridge, 1947).  
27 For further discussion of this point, see Nutton 2004, 118-120.  See also Van der Eijk 
2005, 80-3.   
28 Barnes 1995,  See Diogenes Laertius 5.1 for more on Aristotle’s father.   
29 Lloyd 1968, 3.   
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medical works:  On Health and Disease (Peri hugeias kai nosou); Dissections 
(Anatomai); Medical Issues (Iatrika); On the Failure to Generate Offspring (Huper tou 
mâ Gennan); and On Remedies (Peri Boâthâmatôn). 30.  Similarly, Galen suggests that 
Aristotle wrote a treatise called A Summary of Medicine.31  Finally, there are references to 
works on medicine in Aristotle’s own treatises, for example: On Length and Shortness of 
Life 1, 464b32; 480b22-30  and Parts of Animals II.7, 653a8. The line at 480b22-30 is 
thought to be a reference to a lost treatise, De Sanitate et Morbo.32   
 The Lyceum’s doxographical project in medicine also suggests that Aristotle 
had an interest in medicine.  The project was directed at the theoretical sciences, 
mathematics, physics and theology.  Eudemus worked on the histories of mathematics 
and theology, while Theophrastus and Meno composed the work on the physics.  Meno’s 
share in the task was a medical doxography.  The work is now lost, but a part of it –that 
which covers the views of Hippon, Philolaus and Plato – is preserved in the second part 
of the Anonymous Londiniensis papyrus.33.  Medicine is included in the doxography of 
physics, despite the fact that it has a practical component.  Some scholars surmise that the 
theoretical and practical parts of medicine could be distinguished, and only the theoretical 
part of medicine is included in the doxography  of physics.34  As Leonid Zhmud points 
out, Meno’s medical doxography neglects entirely to discuss the application of 
                                                
30 For discussion, see Van der Eijk 1999.   
31 See Galen’s commentary, On the Elements According to Hippocrates (Hipp. De. Nat. 
hom. Com.) 1. 25-6.   
32 James Longrigg 1993, 149-50.   
33 For discussion, see Zhmud 2006, 125-9 and Van der Eijk 2005, 74. We know of Meno 
only that he was Aristotle’s student.  As Galen tells us, the Iatrikâ Sunagogê is ascribed 
to Aristotle; yet it is likely to have been written by his student Meno, and hence, it is 
called Menoneia (In Hipp. De. Nat. hom Com. I, 25-6) 
34 Zhmud 2006, 127-8.   
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generalizations about medicine.  It therefore appears to treat medicine as a theoretical 
science, or to neglect that aspect of medicine which would have constituted an applied 
science.  Similarly, Meno’s work on medical doxography was confined to the study of the 
causes of diseases.  Again, this seems to indicate that Meno treated medicine as a 
theoretical science, insofar as a theoretical science would have been one that engages in 
the study of causes.  Meno would perhaps have been holding to the Academy’s definition 
of a science as that which studies first causes.  
 Finally, Aristotle’s interest in medicine is suggested by the significant 
thematic overlap between his work and the Hippocratic Corpus.  Aristotle thought the 
investigation of biology was central to the theoretical study of nature.  Indeed, his study 
of zoology alone constitutes roughly a fourth of the entire Aristotelian Corpus.  The study 
of human anatomy forms an important part of the main zoological treatise History of 
Animals (HA I.7-17).  Studies of human anatomy also form an important part of other 
treatises in the Corpus – for example, Aristotle’s writings on the causes of longevity and 
death (On Youth and Old Age, 3; PA III.5); cooking and mixture (Meteorology IV); 
digestion (On Sleep, 3; On Youth and Old Age); respiration (On Youth and Old Age, 7-27; 
On Breath); the role of heat in the body (On Youth and Old Age; Generation of Animals 
II.3 ff); blood (PA II.2-6); the brain (PA II.7) the flesh (PA II.8); vessels (PA II.9; III.5) 
and the lungs (PA III.6) 
 Consider, too, Aristotle’s treatment of specific topics in human health.35  For 
example, there are several detailed discussions of women’s bodies - topics in sex, 
                                                
35 For more discussion, see Van der Eijk 2005, 74.  See also van der Eijk 1999, 493-4 and 
1995, 452-3.   
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menstruation, pregnancy and birth (History of Animals VII and X; Generation of 
Animals I and II).  Generation of Animals deals with the various features of children that 
can be enhanced in gestation (e.g. intelligence), as does the Hippocratic treatise Regimen 
(Book I).  On Divination in Sleep and On Dreams respond to the tradition of using 
dreams to determine the best course of treatment for a patient, as does Hippocratic 
treatise Regimen (Book IV). Like several Hippocratic treatises, Aristotle associates 
longevity with moistness and fluidness, on the one hand, and dryness and fixedness with 
old age and death (On the Length and Shortness of Life). 
Now that we have considered the sense in which Aristotle’s interests were 
consistent with those of the Hippocratic Corpus, it is time to establish the most important 
grounds for comparing Aristotle’s ethics with Hippocratic Corpus – namely, the 
extensive use of the medical analogy in the ethics.36   
The medical analogy has a long history in Greek literature.37  One dimension of 
the analogy is the idea that the moral expert is like a healthy person.  Aristotle draws on 
this aspect of the analogy when he compares the healthy person’s perception of sensory 
qualities and the ideal moral agent’s perception of the morally salient features of a 
situation.  The healthy person will perceive certain things as sweet , bitter, or hot, etc.  A 
less healthy person will not perceive these things in the same way.  For example, given a 
cold, he may be insensitive to the subtler flavors of his food.  Similarly, the ideal moral 
                                                
 36 Medicine and ethics are frequently compared: NE 1104a9; 1094a8; 1096a33-4, 
1097a10; 1097a17; 1097a19; 1102a21; 1104a9; 1112b4; 1138a31;1138b31; 1141a32, 
1143a3; 1143b27; 1143b33; 1144a4; 1145a8; 1180b8; 1180b27; 1181b2; EE 1214b32, 
1216b18; 1217b39; 1218b2; 1219a15; 1220b24; 1226a37; 1236a18-21; 1237b2; 
1246b28; 1249b5, b12.   
37 For discussion, see Lloyd 2004, 183 ff. and Jaeger 1957, 54-66. 
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agent will take stock of a situation in a certain sort of way, seeing certain things as bad 
or good to a certain degree and in particular ways.   
A second important dimension of the medical analogy is the idea that moral 
excellence is like physical excellence.  Aristotle draws this point out with the well-worn 
theme that practice makes perfect.  Just as one keeps his strength or health by exercising 
and eating well, one keeps his moral virtue by performing appropriate actions repeatedly 
(1104a27b3; cf. 1106a29 ff.).38  Moral excellence and physical excellence are also similar 
in that we have control over neither contracting sickness and becoming healthy nor over 
becoming bad or virtuous (1114b30, 1115a1-2).  Finally, moral excellence and physical 
excellence are alike in their use of the doctrine of the mean.  Just as the doctor applies the 
doctrine of the mean to determine what sort of diet a patient should have, an agent applies 
the doctrine of the mean to determine how she should act (or rather, the statesman applies 
the doctrine of the mean to determine how to cultivate good citizens).39  
The primary influence on Aristotle’s use of the analogy is Plato’s development of 
the analogy.  Aristotle follows Plato’s model in some central ways.  Like Plato, he 
envisions statesmanship as an activity of caring for one’s constituents (1258a27, 
11097a11, 1287a25).40  Aristotle also treats phronêsis - at least in its guise as 
statesmanship – as a form of universal knowledge (NE X.9, 1180b21)  For entitlement to 
                                                
38 It is worth mentioning in connection with this point that, to describe the state of the 
soul, Aristotle uses a medical term for the state of the body – hexis.  For the use of the 
term in the Hippocratic Corpus, see, for example, Regimen in Acute Diseases 11.316. 
39 There is a disanalogy here, according to Lloyd, for Aristotle recognizes that there is a 
big difference between determining the amount of food that Milo ought to eat and 
determining the moral mean in any given situation.  The latter is far more complex 
(Lloyd 1968, 75). 
40 The statesman or legislator’s job is to care for the people in the city: NE 1180a25 ff.   
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act in the caring capacity is only earned through possession of a right account of the 
good.   
But there are some important ways in which Aristotle departs from the Platonic 
model.  For he regards knowledge of the good as relativized to a domain (NE I.6,  
1096a17-29).41 Just as the doctor does better to consider each patient separately, the 
phronimos does better to consider each situation in its particularity.  That is, the 
phronimos must know not only what the general rules of ethics are; he must in addition 
know about all the particular features of any given situation (NE VI.7, 1141b15-20). 
Aristotelian phronêsis also involves assessment of particular situations, in virtue of which 
he regards phronêsis as involving lack of exactness (akribeia).  Note that Plato had 
claimed that phronêsis was the least inexact of the sciences.  The knowledge required of 
the phronimos, on Aristotle’s reading, is said to be both universal and particular.  
Aristotle’s point, rather, is that phronêsis also consists in knowledge of particulars, and as 
a result, phronêsis is not an exact science like mathematics.   
Finally, Aristotle sees phronêsis as a decidedly practical activity, whereas Plato 
had only grudgingly allowed that the wise person would take part in politics.42. The 
analogy between medicine and ethics shows that ethics is a practical, rather than 
theoretical, kind of knowledge.  Plato had used the analogy to make a point about the care 
                                                
41 to_ d' a)gaqo_n le/getai kai\ e0n tw|~ ti/ e0sti kai\ e0n tw|~ poiw|~ kai\ e0n tw|~ pro&j ti, to_ de\ 
kaq' au(to_ kai\ h( ou)si/a pro&teron th|~ fu&sei tou~ pro&j ti (parafua&di ga_r tou~t' e1oike 
kai\ sumbebhko&ti tou~ o1ntoj): w3st' ou)k a2n ei1h koinh& tij e0pi\ tou&toij i0de/a. e1ti d' e0pei\ 
ta)gaqo_n i0saxw~j le/getai tw|~ o1nti (kai\ ga_r e0n tw|~ ti/ le/getai, oi[on o( qeo_j kai\ o( 
nou~j, kai\ e0n tw|~ poiw|~ ai9 a)retai/, kai\ e0n tw|~ posw|~ to_ me/(trion, kai\ e0n tw|~ pro&j ti 
to_ xrh&simon, kai\ e0n xro&nw| kairo&j, kai\ e0n to&pw| di/aita kai\ e3tera toiau~ta), dh~lon 
w(j ou)k a2n ei1h koino&n ti kaqo&lou kai\ e3n: ou) ga_r a2n e0le/get' e0n pa&saij tai=j 
kathgori/aij, a)ll' e0n mia|~ mo&nh|. 
42 For a discussion of the different ways in which Aristotle and Plato use the medical 
analogy in ethics, see Jaeger 1957 and Lloyd 2003, 184 ff.   
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of the soul and the sense in which the soul – like the body – needs to be maintained in 
health.43 Aristotle, on the other hand, uses the analogy to make clear the practical nature 
of ethical knowledge.  Just as the doctor must know about particular patients and be 
practically efficacious in actual situations, the politikos must know about particular 
situations and how to be practically efficacious in them.  For example, as Aristotle points 
out in NE I.4, the politikos does not need to know about the good in general.  Rather he 
needs to know about the good in specific contexts. Aristotle construes the good as a kind 
of opportunity (kairos) or measure (metron).  Each science of opportunity deals with a 
different sort of opportunity.  In medicine, for example, one deals with opportunity with 
respect to food. Aristotle envisions medicine as one of several sciences of opportunity 
(kairon) or moderation (metrion) (EE I.8 1217b37; NE 1096a32), and in particular, as the 
one that studies food (1217b39)  Thus, the politikos needs to know about the opportune 
(kairos) and expedient (sumpheron) in particular situations that relate to the human good, 
just as the doctor, for example, needs to know about the opportune moment with regard 
to health and particular patients (EE I.8, 1217b35-41; cf. NE I.6, 1096a32, 1096b33).  
Conclusion 
In this chapter of the dissertation, I introduced my project and its methodological 
assumptions.  I attempted to show that that Aristotle does not give a full characterization 
of the standard by which the phronimos is said to deliberate, and I discussed the two main 
interpretive accounts of deliberation (bouleusis) - the particularist and generalist 
                                                
43 See, for example:  Gorgias. 501ab; Phaedrus 270cd; Laws 857cd.  In Phaedrus, Plato 
develops the famous image of the philosopher dividing up the soul at its joints, just as the 
medical doctor divides the body up at its joints.  The comparison between the health of 
the body and soul is a commonplace.  See, for example, Isocrates, Antidosis, 183. 
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interpretations. I suggested that we can assess the merit of the particularist reading by 
exploring parallels between Aristotle’s ethics and treatises from the Hippocratic Corpus.  
I provided some reasons for thinking that Aristotle was familiar with the concerns 
expressed in the Hippocratic Corpus.   
 The next chapter deals with many of the same topics, but in a more detailed 
fashion.  It explains Aristotle’s account of deliberation and the generalist and particularist 
interpretations of deliberation.  It provides an account of the textual evidence for the 
particularist interpretation, including Aristotle’s remarks about ‘exactness’ (akribeia), the 
‘particular’ (kath hekasta), perception, claims that hold ‘for the most part’ (hôs epi to 
polu), the ‘outline’ (tupos) and ‘variation’ (diaphora).  This familiarity with Aristotle’s 
position on deliberation and the particularist reading of deliberation will help us in later 
chapters to see why the medical corpus tells against the particularist reading of 
Aristotelian deliberation.   
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Chapter 2 
Particularist Readings and their Alternatives 
 
The first step towards recognizing that Aristotle is not a particularist is to examine 
his account of deliberation.  A conception of the kalon or living well (eu prattein) guides 
the virtuous person’s deliberation.  Scholars have interpreted the content of this 
conception in multiple ways.  The most important difference in these interpretations is 
that between (a) generalists, according to whom the content of the conception is a body of 
action guiding principles, and (b) particularists, according to whom the conception is 
contentless.  With this account of the particularist reading of Aristotelian deliberaiton in 
hand, we will be well placed to see in the next chapters that the textual evidence for the 
particularist reading has been misinterpreted. 
The chapter begins with an introduction to Aristotle’s account of deliberation, or 
bouleusis.  I explain that deliberation is informed by a conception of good action (eu 
prattein) or the noble (kalon).  In the second part of the chapter, I consider in greater 
detail some of the accounts of practical knowledge sketched in chapter 1.  These include 
(1) the generalist views that the universals guiding deliberation are (a) rules or (b) 
blueprints from which rules are derived.  I also discuss (2) the particularist position that 
the conception of the good is a contentless principle that takes definite shape in only 
particular decision-making contexts.  I finish the second section of the chapter with a 
discussion of the textual grounds for ascribing the particularist position to Aristotle.   
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1  Aristotle’s Account of Deliberation 
Deliberation is the characteristic form of practical wisdom (NE VI. 1140a31).44  It 
is a form of teleological reasoning, or reasoning in light of a goal (telos). In particular, it 
is reasoning about the best way to achieve a goal.  For example, one might reason in light 
of his desire to have a vacation to Europe in the summer as follows: ‘if I save up money 
by avoiding extravagant purchases, and if I work like a demon in the month of May, I can 
afford to take the summer vacation to Europe.’  While this is a decent plan, it is not the 
best one.  An even better plan is the following: ‘if I save up money by avoiding 
extravagant purchases, and if work at a steady, hard pace for a few months in the spring, I 
can afford to take the summer trip.’  Excellent deliberation requires not merely that one 
figure out how to execute his plans.  Rather, it requires that one determine how best to 
execute his plans.  
There are many kinds of goals in light of which one might make plans, and thus 
there are a wide range of cases in which one engages in teleological reasoning.  Aristotle 
sometimes clarifies the teleological aspect of deliberation by comparing it with technical 
reasoning.  When one is wearing his doctor’s cap, he reasons in light of health.  That is, 
he thinks about the best ways to make his patients healthy.  Similarly, when one is 
wearing his rhetor’s cap, he reasons in light of persuasion, for he thinks about the best 
ways to persuade an audience.  Deliberation works in the same way.  When one is 
                                                
44 o3lwj a2n ei1h fro&nimoj o( bouleutiko&j.  
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wearing the phronimos’s cap, he reasons in light of a conception of the good life or 
good action.45 
Neither deliberation nor technical reasoning concern what is ‘about the goal’ (peri 
tôn telôn).  Rather, the end having been established (1112b15), one reasons about things 
that are towards the goal (1112b12).  For example, the doctor does not consider ‘if he 
will heal his patients’(b13).  If the doctor were considering whether he should cure a 
patient or cold-bloodedly kill the patient, he would no longer be thinking in his capacity 
as a doctor.  Rather, he would be thinking in his capacity as a villain. The doctor reasons 
only about the ‘how” and the methods or the ‘through what’ of healing.  Again, the case 
is the same with deliberation.  For one does not deliberate about whether he will pursue 
the kalon. Rather, he deliberates about how and through what methods he will pursue it.  
While there is this similarity between technical reasoning and deliberation, there 
are also key differences between the two.   First, deliberation does not concern any 
particular subject matter, but matters in general (holôs)(1141a28).46  Aristotle claims that 
the person of practical wisdom calculates “with a view to some good end which is one of 
those that are not the object of any art” (VI.5, 1140a29-30).47  By contrast, the technical 
goal is specific; it concerns a part of life (kata meros)(1140a27).  There are two ways we 
can take the disanalogy on offer.  (I do not promise to settle the matter here.)  On the 
other hand, the disanalogy may imply that health and happiness are aims of different 
scope, but that they are not different in kind.  From the perspective of the doctor qua 
                                                
45 Aristotle refers to this conception alternatively as: eudaimonia, eu prattein, the kalon, 
eupraxia, or eu zên (NE II.3, 1105a1; VI.5, 11140a28; 1140b6-9; EE 1230a27-35). 
46 poi=a pro_j to_ eu} zh~n o3lwj 
47 pro_j te/loj ti spoudai=on eu} logi/swntai, w{n mh& e0sti te/xnh 
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doctor, health is a final end; and similarly, from the perspective of the doctor qua 
phronimos, the kalon is a final end.  We might think that, from each perspective, there is 
no difference in kind here, but merely of content and scope.  However, Aristotle suggests 
that the perspective from phronêsis is the important one (NE VI.13).  If the phronimos’s 
perspective is the important one, then we see that there is a difference in kind between 
health and the kalon as aims.  For one pursues kalon with no further aim in mind, but one 
pursues health with a further aim – namely, the kalon (or eu prattein).  If this is so, then 
health and happiness may be different sorts of aims; one is absolutely final in the way 
that the other is not.48 
Second, deliberation is distinct from all other forms of teleological reasoning in 
that its goal is the kalon.  It is important to clarify the sense in which one can reason in 
light of such a goal.  In order for a process of reasoning to qualify as deliberation, it must 
link up with  a conception of goodness at some point.  That is, a general conception of the 
good must enter in one’s deliberation at some point such that the conception guides the 
                                                
48 For a discussion of these and related points, see Broadie 1991, 190-8. Broadie argues 
that Aristotle’s discussion of the craft analogy is unclear.  She raises three problems for 
the craft analogy.  First, the end of craft is determined, whereas the end of practical 
wisdom is not, by definition; but what should we make of this disanalogy? Second, what 
is the difference between ends sought in good practical deliberation and ends sought in 
bad practical deliberation?  Third, there seems to be a difference between the craftman’s 
deliberation about his end, and the craftsman’s end.  What is it?  Broadie claims that the 
ambiguous discussion of the craft analogy leaves us with two possible views of practical 
wisdom.  On the one hand, practical wisdom resembles medicine in acting and 
deliberating on the basis of a specific picture of the end.  This ethical picture figures in 
the premises of all the wise man’s deliberations about particular problems.  On the other 
hand, it may be the case that the technical picture is dispensable, since it is only a means 
to health. “On this model, practical wisdom is like the ability to balance,” according to 
Broadie (198). As Aristotle says, in practical matters, we don’t need full specification of 
the grounds on which we act.  Only minimal clarity is required.   
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decision one makes.  If this is true, an objection might go, there seem to be very few 
cases in which we deliberate.  For it seems that one seldom engages in a process of 
reasoning that brings one back to thoughts of one’s overall conception of the good.  This 
is an interesting point, for it raises a question about the range of cases in which we make 
decisions in light of our conception of the good life.  Perhaps we reason in light of an 
idea of a conception of the good seldomly – e.g. only when facing momentous decisions. 
However, it is possible to push back on this thought by considering the following.  
There is an implicit conception of the good at the back of much of reasoning, and this 
implicit conception of happiness might be invoked if the agent were pressed about her 
reasons for making certain choices.  For example, suppose that Sally decided to attend a 
friend’s wedding, despite the fact that the cost of attending would be very expensive.  
‘Why did you decide to attend the wedding, Sally?’ one might ask.  Sally answers: 
‘because I care about my friend.’  This is likely as far as she has pushed her own thought 
process, being satisfied that her care for her friend is a good enough reason to attend the 
wedding.  But she might be pushed for further reasons.  Why do you care about your 
friend?  She answers: because we have a strong friendship.  But why do you care about 
friendship?  She answers: because friendship is part of a good life.  There, according to 
Aristotle, the train of questions should end, for it does not make sense to ask anyone why 
she should care about good life.  After all, we all desire to be happy (NE I.4, 1094a20).   
Lest happiness appear to be an abstruse goal, it is important to see that, for 
Aristotle, we are not after just any old kind of happiness.  That is, we are not pursuing the 
happiness of antelopes, squirrels or bees.  Rather, the happiness in question is human 
happiness.  Just as there is some distinct notion of health for each kind of animal  - for the 
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bumble bee, a solitary life, and for the honey bee, a communal life (HA 623b6-12)  – 
so, too, is there some distinct form of happiness for human beings.  Indeed, there is a 
distinct good for all kinds of animals (NE 1141a26—34).  Deliberation will concern only 
that distinctly human happiness. We are able to get purchase on the conception of the 
good life in question by considering the function of the animal (NE I.7).  In the case of 
human beings, for example, our function is wrapped up in our identity as rational and 
political animals.  The result is that the good life for humans will involve the cultivation 
of the intellect and promoting of good political communities – and, of course, the 
realization of the kalon or eupraxia.  This sort of aim is not appropriate for living things 
that do not share the same set of of capacities.  
We have seen that the agent deliberates in light of a conception of the kalon or eu 
prattein.  This deliberation issues in choice (prohairesis) of an action in specific 
circumstances.  For Aristotle, it is not enough that one perform the correct action.  
Rather, one must perform that action with the right intention, for actions are only called 
just and temperate if they are performed as (hôs) the just or temperate person would 
perform them (NE II. 5, 1105b6-8; cf. 1105a30-1).  Prohairesis is a reasoned intention in 
the sense that it is a decision informed by the process of deliberation – hence, the 
reasoning.  The prohairesis is a voluntarily-made choice, and Aristotle claims that it is 
the best indicator of one’s character (NE III.3, 1111b5-6).   
 Prohairesis has a complicated structure.  First, it consists of an evaluation of 
particulars (1142a21-3, 1143a28-31).  Things are evaluated by the extent to which and 
the manner in which they realize the kalon.  The evaluation takes the form, roughly, of 
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the sentence that ‘x is the good thing to do, all things considered’ (where the ‘all things 
considered’ stands for the process of deliberation).  We can think of the evaluation as a 
way that a particular scene looks to an agent phenomenologically or as a characterization 
of situations, as judged by agents.  I mean to imply nothing here as to whether the 
evaluation takes the form of a perceptual judgment or a propositional judgment.  For our 
purposes, it matters only that the judgment concerns particulars.   
Thus Aristotle claims that deliberation concerns both universals and particulars 
(1141b15-6; 1180b20 ff; ).  For example, deliberation concerns both the fact that white 
meat is better for the health (the universal) and also the fact that this particular morsel of 
food is white meat (the particular)(1141b16-21).  This is what Aristotle has in mind when 
he claims that the best practitioners are those that have experience, which is knowledge 
of particulars, and knowledge (i.e. of universals).  Just as the medical doctor should have 
both knowledge of particular patients and of universals about human nature (NE X.9; I.5), 
so too must the person of practical wisdom have knowledge of both his own case and of 
universals.  
 Consider a more developed example of judging particulars. In George Eliot’s 
Middlemarch, the main character is a young, idealistic woman, Dorothea Brooke, who 
has made a bad marriage to a much older man, the Reverend Causabon.  Casaubon is 
working on a tome about the relationship between religion and mythology (The Key to All 
Mythologies), and this book is his life’s work.  Dorothea has been acting as a secretary to 
him in this work, but has increasingly little regard for the project and for her husband.  As 
her interest in both declines, Causabon discovers that he is dying, and he asks her to give 
a solemn promise to continue the project once he has passed away.  Dorothea must decide 
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whether to make the promise.  Ultimately, after a period of difficult deliberation, she 
decides that she will promise to complete the book.49    
 Dorothea’s decision is based, in part, on her evaluation of particulars.  For example, 
much of Dorothea’s deliberations in this period are marked by painful specific memories.  
She recalls with bitterness, for example, that after Causabon was informed by the doctor 
of his terminal illness, he coldly informed her of as much as they walked in the garden 
and would not take her arm.  The specific gesture of not taking her arm seems to 
Dorothea to encapsulate what has been wrong all along with the marriage: Causabon has 
never treated her as being a part of his life.50  I mention this because of the important role 
that specific pictures and images play in deliberation.  In order to understand someone’s 
reaction to a situation and the sense in which the reaction makes sense,  we may have to 
call to mind the specific images that provoke a person or make him or her regard a 
situation as being of a certain kind.  
 There are other evaluations of particulars that have bearing on Dorothea’s choice.  
For instance, Dorothea initially thinks of her future, which she imagines unhappily as a 
life toiling in her library on a project in which she finds little worth.  But other 
evaluations of particulars push her in the opposite direction.  Dorothea pictures 
Causabon’s past – the years worth of solitary and determined labor on his project.51  Her 
vivid imagining of Causabon both laboring with futility on a project bound to failure and 
                                                
49 Eliot 1981, 463.   
50 Eliot 1981, 413.   
51 “…Dorothea’s pity turned from her own future to her husband’s past – nay, to his 
present hard struggle with a lot which had grown out of that past: the lonely labour, the 
ambition breathing hardly under the pressure of self-distrust; the goal receding, and the 
heavier limbs; and now at last the sword visibly trembling above him!” (Eliot 1981, 465). 
 
 
39 
his realizing as much in the period of his impending death inspires her with a sense of 
pity.  She feels she cannot step on a “bruised heart.”  Ultimately, Dorothea decides to 
take on the project because she feels herself to be a compassionate person - the sort of 
person who acts as a vehicle for the happiness and fulfilment of others.52  These are the 
sorts of evaluations of particular features of one’s situation that have bearing on the 
deliberative process and which explain the choice that an agent ultimately makes.53   
 Note that the way the scene appears to Dorothea is closely related to her character.  
She is an compassionate, willful and idealistic person, and as a result, she evaluates 
particulars in a certain way.  A different person, for example, might have thought that 
promises were easily broken, and thus would not have been as wracked by worry as 
Dorothea in deciding whether to give her promise.  Hence, Aristotle claims that one’s 
character has bearing on the way he or she reads situations (NE 1113a30-3; cf. EE 
1229a21-6; 1230a31).54 
Note, too, that the evaluation prompts the decision.  In part, deliberation is the 
difficult process of arriving at an assessment of various elements of a decision-making 
context.  One must decide, for example: how important is compassion?  How important is 
the pain I will endure?  How important is the pain the others will endure?  There is a kind 
of balancing act between a proto-decision and one’s evaluation of one’s situation.  For 
example, at the beginning of the deliberative process, the prospect of years spent laboring 
                                                
52 “Neither law nor the world’s opinion compelled her to this – only her husband’s nature 
and her own compassion….” (Eliot 1981, 467). 
53 According to the particularist, the evaluation of particulars fully explains the decision.  
According to the generalist, by contrast, an agent’s independent conception of the good 
must also be invoked to explain the agent’s decision. 
54 For discussion, see Fortenbaugh 1964.  Fortenbaugh argues that, for Aristotle, moral 
virtue helps the agent judge (krinein) the morally salient particulars.  
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on the failed book project appears entirely unappealing to Dorothea.  However, upon 
reflection, this prospect comes to seem less important than other commitments.  We 
might read Dorothea as having re-evaluated the particulars of the situation so as to bring 
her evaluations more closely in line with one’s projected choices: e.g. ‘the work on the 
book project will not be so bad.’  Through reiterations of this process, one might bring 
evaluation fully in line with the choice.55 
In its directedness towards particulars, prohairesis is not merely evaluative.  It is 
motivational as well.  To see this, it is helpful to constrast Aristotle’s position with a 
Humean account of motivation. According to a basic Humean view of moral motivation, 
it is possible to make the evaluation that ‘x is the appropriate thing to do’ or that ‘x is 
good’ without thereby being motivated to do x.  For example, one can recognize that 
there is a reason for doing something - one ought to keep promises to the people to whom 
one has made promises - without having the corresponding desire (I want to keep the 
promise).  The lack of appropriate desires is to be explained by a failure of habituation or 
moral cultivation. 
 On Aristotle’s account of prohairesis, there can be no breakdown between the 
evaluation that ‘x is the good thing to do, all things considered,’ and the desire to do x. 
Thus, we cannot ask of a person who has made a prohairesis to do x –yes, but will he try 
to do x?  He will most certainly carry out his plan, provided that the agent is not akratic 
                                                
55 In some cases, we can imagine that people are not really free to choose, such that they 
are forced to bring their evaluations into line with the ‘choice,’ since no other option is 
fully available to them.  This is arguably what we do when we rationalize.  
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and provided that nothing happens to intefere with her plans.  We can see an example 
of such a case in Dorothea’s situation.  She fully intends to make the promise to complete 
Causabon’s book.  But in an implausible instance of good timing for Dorothea, Causabon 
passes away just before she is about to utter her promise.   
Prohairesis has the interesting property of being both an evaluative state – i.e. 
knowledge – and an impulse.  It is an evaluative state in the sense we have just seen.  But 
it is an impulse or motivational state in distinct sense.  There are other kinds of impulse: 
epithumia and thumos among them.  Prohairesis differs from epithumia and thumos (NE 
III.2, 1111b16-8) in that it requires rational capacities. Thus, the animals also have 
epithumia and thumos, but they do not have prohairesis (1111b12-3).  
This point brings us to the second aspect of proharesis – namely, the fact that 
prohairesis is carried out in a context of considerations or facts that one might take into 
account as one deliberates.  They might be thought of as constituting the realm of 
relevant facts in light of which one deliberates. The context of considerations includes 
human affairs (1112a28; 1141b8-9).  As before, we rule out matters such as: bee affairs, 
and elephant affairs and other such matters, for these do not concern us as human beings.  
While deliberation concerns human affairs, it does not concern all human affairs.  For we 
deliberate about only those human affairs which are directly relevant to to our own cases. 
For example, the Spartan does not deliberate about the Scythian constitution (1112a28-9).  
He may entertain some speculation about the Scythian constitution, but this speculation is 
not the same as deliberation. On the other hand, the Spartan might deliberate about his 
own constitution, provided that he is in the position to have some effect on its 
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amendments.  If he were to speculate about how it could be improved without being in 
the position to change it (e.g. through voting), he would not be deliberating about the 
constitution.  A Spartan helot, then, does not deliberate about Spartan affairs, though he is 
a Spartan.  For he is not a citizen and thus not in the position to endorse rules of self-
government. 
Part of the reason for the restriction of deliberation to relevant matters is that 
deliberation is practical.  Recall that deliberation concerns what is up to us and doable 
(eph’ hemin) (1112a31; cf. 1141b10-11).  One cannot deliberate about something that he 
has no power to effect or which is unrelated to him. The deeper point may be that, when 
we think about matters the outcome of which bear on us directly – not just in any way, 
but insofar as our goodness as people is concerned - we bring to bear on our thoughts a 
certain kind of urgency and need to interfuse our values with our actions.  This quality is 
probably lost from the distant and casual theoretical reflection that, as a Spartan, one 
might have about the various pros and cons of the Scythian constitution.  After all, 
something is really at stake in deliberation – one’s own good or advantage. 
The idea that deliberation concerns knowledge that is relevant to us brings up a 
second point.  For knowledge of our own particular cases might be thought to be the 
most relevant to us.  Aristotle claims that phronimos is someone who is good at 
determining what good and expedient with regard to human affairs, but more particularly 
with regard to himself (ta heautô agatha kai sumpheronta) (1141b30; cf. 1140a26-7).56 
We might reasonably conclude from this claim that deliberation concerns thoughts about 
                                                
56 fro&nhsij ma&list' ei]nai h( peri\ au)to_n kai\ e3na 
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one’s own welfare, specifically.57  But even if this were an apt interpretation, it is a far 
cry from the idea that the phronimos pursues his own self-interest and can be 
characterized as someone who is very good at determining how best to serve naked self-
interest.  As we saw in chapter 1, the phronimos’ deliberation is guided by a notion of the 
‘admirable’ (kalon).  The phronimos is motivated by a desire to realize the kalon.  Thus, 
we can think of the kalon as regulating the one’s deliberation about his own affairs.  
While it may be true that the phronimos takes into consideration his own affairs, in 
particular, it is also the case that his thoughts about promoting his ends are governed by a 
a desire to realize the kalon.  
Because deliberation is directed at matters that are relevant to particulars – such 
as the features of our specific lives - it is deemed as taking place ‘usually’ or ‘for the 
most part’ (hos epi to polu)(1112b8-9).58  The idea is that whatever patterns human life 
might exhibit, they are subject to exception and a great deal of ‘variation’ (diaphora).  
For example, it is ‘usually’ (hos epi to polu) the case that wealth contributes to 
eudaimonia (NE I.4, 1094b18-9).  However, it is sometimes the case that wealth does not 
promote eudaimonia.  Imagine, for example, the case in which wealth made a person 
unusually jealous of his money so that, instead of making him better off,  it makes him 
only more miserly than he would have been otherwise.   
                                                
57 For the distinction about phronesis as it applies to the city and as it applies to one’s 
own private life, see Isocrates To Nicocles. For a comparable distinction, see NE VI.8, in 
which Aristotle claims that there is political wisdom about the state, or statesmanship, 
and practical wisdom about one’s own affairs and that these are the same hexis, but 
different in ‘being.’  
58 to_ bouleu&esqai de\ e0n toi=j w(j e0pi\ to polu&, a)dh&loij de\ pw~j a)pobh&setai, kai\ e0n 
oi[j a)dio&riston 
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Hos epi to polu might refer to one of two things.  On the one hand, it might 
refer to statistical frequency, i.e. the frequency with which certain events take place.59  
For example, ‘the nine o’clock train to New York is on time, for the most part.’  In such 
cases, we mean that, nine times out of ten, the nine o’clock train happens to be on time.  
(Suppose that the railroad engineer prided himself on getting the train to the station 
promptly at 9:00 am.)  
Hos epi to polu might also be a reference to the frequency with which natural 
phenomena take place in accordance with nature (kata phusin).60  For it is not always the 
case that natural phenomena happen as they ought.  That is, it is usually the case that 
natural norms hold, but not always.  By ‘natural norms,’ I have in mind the idea that 
nature exhibits certain patterns.  For example, humans typically have five fingers; mares 
reproduce; and bats echolocate.  It is almost always the case that nature successfully 
delivers five-fingered humans, reproducing mares and echolocating bats.  However, 
sometimes nature delivers “monstrosities” (terata).61  For example, human children are 
sometimes born with six fingers on each hand, rather than five; mares might be barren; 
                                                
59 See Chisholm 1966 for this view. 
60 For the association between hos epi to polu and kata phusin, see GA 777a17-21; PA 
663b28; Meta. 1027a8-28.  For discussion of this interpretation of hos epi to polu, see 
Judson 1991, Winter 1997, and Irwin 2000.   
61 Aristotle has very interesting things to say about the various types of cases in which the 
natural has has not been realized.  On the one hand, there is the ‘incomplete’ animal 
(ateles) that has yet to mature – e.g. the child is an ‘incomplete’ human being in this 
sense.  On the other hand, the ‘limited’ animals (peiromata) will never mature.  They 
possess some defect or deformity that prevents them from attaining the correct form.  
There are two main types of peiromata.  There the terata, or ‘monstrosities.’  For 
example, a mare that cannot reproduce congenitally is a peiromata and para phusin in 
this sense (GA IV.4, 770b9).  But even normal and reoccuring features of nature can be 
peiromata.  For example, females are peiromata in this sense because females are 
undeveloped males (GA II.3 737a27).  See Hicks for these helpful distinctions as they 
apply to the De Anima’s discussion of incomplete animals (415a27, 425a10, 432b22-4).  
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and the bat’s sensory machinery might on occasion be impaired.  These must be 
congenital problems to count as indications that natural phenomena hold ‘hos epi to 
polu,’ since the bat’s failure to echolocate because of an injury or the mare’s forced 
sterilization does not show a failure of nature, per se.  Rather, it shows that some other 
factor has compromised the animal’s functioning.   
On this view of hos epi to polu, it may in fact be the case that, statistically 
speaking, claims that hold hos epi to polu are stastistical norms.  However, for Aristotle, 
something stronger is meant by hos epi to polu, as the association between hos epi to polu 
and kata phusin shows.  For claims that hold ‘for the most part’ are claims that are almost 
always true just because nature makes it so.  In this regard, the phenomena that are 
caused by nature should be contrasted with those that happen by luck (tuche), or by skill 
(technê), or because of the failure of matter (hule), as is the case with Aristotle’s 
monstrosities (terata).   
It is important to see that biological norms are teleological, for Aristotle – i.e. they 
tend to promote certain ends.  For example, self-preservation is one of the goals of the 
human being, and the design of human fingers comes in very handy in this regard.  For 
the various configurations that the fingers can adopt make the human being adept at tool 
use and weaponry, which in turn promotes self-preservation (687b2-22).  Similarly, the 
perpetuation of one’s species is the aim of all animals, according to Aristotle (Physics 
VIII).  Reproductive abilities promote the perpetuation of the species.  Thus, we say, 
these norms are norms because they tend to promote the goals of the species.  
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But why does any of this make ethical norms like biological norms?  The 
teleological dimension of biological norms helps us to see why ethical norms are 
anything like biological norms.  Ethical norms are norms in virtue of the fact that they 
tend to promote human goals.  Thus, Aristotle claims wealth is usually condusive to 
happiness (NE 1094b18-9).  For most of the time, being wealthy helps with happiness; 
yet, sometimes it compromises happiness. 62  Similarly, as Aristotle points out in the 
Eudemian Ethics, the external goods that men strive for are naturally good (agatha 
phusei, 1248b28).  However, they are not good for everyone, since they are of limited or 
incorrect use for the intemperate and unjust.  They are good or bad according to one’s 
character (dia tas hexeis)(1248b27-30).63  The point is that, just as five fingers promote 
self-preservation for humans, wealth and other external goods tend to promote happiness.   
The final part of the structure of prohairesis is the end or standard (telos, skopos, 
horos)  in light of which we deliberate.  The telos is a goal in light of which one 
deliberates.64  There is a particularly clear statement of this point in the Eudemian Ethics: 
But since the doctor has a standard (horos) by reference to which he distinguishes 
(krinein) what is healthy for the body from what is not, and with reference to 
(pros on) which each thing (hekaston) up to a certain point (mechri) ought to be 
done and is healthy, while if less or more is done health is the result no longer, so 
in regard to actions (praxeis) and choices (haireseôs) of what is naturally good 
(phusei) but not praiseworthy, the good man (agathôn) should have a standard 
                                                
62 Indeed, modern psychological has established as much!  Studies show that, if wealth is 
pursued with the right sorts of aims – namely, utilitarian goals such as helping one’s 
family, enhancing one’s ability to pursue other aims – wealth does, indeed, make people 
happy.  By contrast, pursuing wealth as an end in itself – studies show – tends to produce 
unhappiness.  
63 ta_ ga_r perima&xhta kai\ me/gista ei]nai dokou~nta a)gaqa&, timh_ kai\ plou~toj kai\ 
sw&matoj a)retai\ kai\ eu)tuxi/ai kai\ duna&meij, a)gaqa_ me\n fu&sei e0sti/n, e0nde/xetai d' 
ei]nai blabera& tisi dia_ ta_j e3ceij 
64 For discussion, see Broadie 1991, ch. 4, passim.   
 
 
47 
(horon) both of disposition (hexeôs) and of choice and avoidance with regard to 
excess or deficiency of wealth and good fortune, the standard being…as reason 
(logos) directs; this corresponds to saying in regard to diet (trophê) that the 
standard should be as medical science and its reason direct (1249a21-b5)65 
The doctor has a notion of health according to which he administers to a patient either a 
stronger or a weaker diet (e.g. of wine, say).  He prescribes less or more, any deviation 
from the appropriate mean results in a loss of health.  In the same way, the good man 
(agathôn) deliberates with reference to a standard “of disposition and of choice both 
concerning both avoidance and use of wealth, poverty and good fortune.’66  This standard 
is ‘as reason [directs]’ (to hôs logos).  In the case of human being’s deliberation, the telos 
is eu prattein, or more specifically, the kalon in the case of the virtuous person.  That is, 
one deliberates in light of a goal of living or acting well and a notion of the sorts of 
dispositions and choices that promote such a goal.   
As we saw earlier, there are a number of determinants of the conception of kalon  
or eu prattein.  First, a human being deliberates in light of the specifically human good, 
and not the good of any other being – e.g. the bumblebee.  As such, the telos must 
express the fact that man is a rational and political.  Consequently, a person ought not to 
                                                
65 e0pei\ d' e0sti/ tij o3roj kai\ tw|~ i0atrw|~, pro_j o4n a)nafe/rwn krinei to_ u(gieino_n 
sw&mati kai\ mh&, kai\ pro_j o4n me/xri posou~ poihte/on e3kaston kai\ eu} u(giai=non, ei0 de\ 
e1latton h2 ple/on, ou)ke/ti: ou3tw kai\ tw|~ spoudai/w| peri\ ta_j pra&ceij kai\ ai9re/seij 
tw~n fu&sei me\n a)gaqw~n ou)k e0painetw~n de\ dei= tina ei]nai o3ron kai\ th~j e3cewj kai\ 
th~j ai9re/sewj kai\ [peri\] fugh~j kai\ peri\> xrhma&twn plh&qouj kai\ o)ligo&thtoj kai\ 
tw~n eu)tuxhma&twn. e0n me\n ou}n toi=j pro&teron e0le/xqh to_ w(j o( lo&goj: tou~to d' 
e0sti\n w3sper a2n ei1 tij e0n toi=j peri\ th_n trofh_n ei1peien w(j h( i0atrikh_ kai\ o( lo&goj 
tau&thj. 
66 I have provided my own translation here, since the Barnes translation obscures the 
point I wish to emphasize in the passage – namely, the content of the horos according to 
which the good person deliberates.   
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adopt as an end a solitary life outside of the city (Pol. 1253a2-4)67 or a life spent 
mindlessly in the pursuit of the next pleasure (NE 1095a8; 1095b19-22).  Similarly, the 
person deliberates in light of the the good in his or her own case – i.e. her own personal 
good.  For example, Dorothea Brooke deliberates in light of the human good, but in light 
of her own personal goals as well – namely, commitments to compassion and to the 
project of helping others achieve their aims.  In this way, Aristotle helps us understand 
how the conception of one’s ends might take shape.  
2  Interpretations of Deliberation 
It is quite natural to ask for more detail about the end or standard in light of which 
we deliberate.  How, precisely, it is structured?  Does it take the form of a theory of the 
good life or of good action?  Might it take the form of a set of lexically ordered 
principles?  Might it have far less content than that?  In this section of the chapter, I will 
consider several interpretations of the content of the telos that guides the deliberative 
process.  First, I present (1) the generalist views that the universals guiding deliberation 
are either (a) rules and (b) blueprints from which rules are derived.  Then I present (2) the 
particularist position that the conception of the good (the kalon) is a contentless principle 
that takes definite shape in only particular decision-making contexts.   
1a.  Rules 
According to the rule-case interpretation of deliberation made prominent by D.J. 
Allan and followed by Gauthier and Jolif, practical reason posits or ‘determines’ 
                                                
67 fanero_n o3ti tw~n fu&sei h( po&lij e0sti/, kai\ o3ti o( a1nqrwpoj fu&sei politiko_n zw|~on, 
kai\ o( a1polij dia_ fu&sin kai\ ou) dia_ tu&xhn h1toi fau~lo&j e0stin, h2 krei/ttwn h2 
a1nqrwpoj.  
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(horidzesthai) rules as expressions of good action (eu prattein).  For example, a 
woman might determine that fulfillment of one’s duties as a wife is an expression of eu 
prattein. Once the relevant rule has been determined, it is applied to a particular situation 
and results in a choice (prohairesis) to perform an action in particular circumstances.  
Then practical reason issues an ‘order’ (keleuei, epitattei) to the appetitve faculty.  If 
desire obeys, it is desire that converts the judgment about the good action into a wish 
(boulêsis) to perform a specific action.68  
Two scenarios might prevent this process from taking place.  First, the rule 
determined by practical reason may be general.  If this is the case, practical reason 
subsumes particular cases under rules.69  The result is a decision about what to do now, 
and again, reason issues an order to desire in order that a wish for the action be formed.  
Second, the rule determined by practical reason may be sufficiently precise, but it may 
not be clear how to execute the rule.  For example, it may be clear that Hamlet should 
accuse his stepfather Claudius of murder, but it may be unclear how, when, and in what 
manner he should make this accusation.  In this case, practical reason engages in 
instrumental reasoning and determines the manner in which best to perform an action.  
                                                
68 See Allan, 74-5.   
69 In designating this form of reasoning ‘rule-case’ reasoning, I am following McDowell 
1998. While the rule-case account of deliberation is associated with D.J. Allan (Allan 
1953) a version of the rule-case interpretation of deliberation was also popularized by 
Gauthier and Jolif, but in terms of the efficient and formal causes (Gauthier and Jolif 
1970).   They characterize the roles of the practical intellect in terms of the formal and 
efficient causes of deliberation.  As a formal cause, deliberation involves the specification 
of ends.  It posits general rules.  Practical wisdom also determines the conformity of 
particular goals to those rules. As an efficient cause, deliberation involves the 
specification of means by which to achieve the end.  
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Again, the result of this process of reasoning is a judgment that one should perform x 
action now.  
Two notions of ‘determination’ (horidzesthai) might be in use here.  One the one 
hand, consider the sense in which the Secretary of the Treasury determines the interest 
rate.  The Secretary is, in effect, creating what was not already there.  This is to be 
contrasted with the sense in which the astronomer determines the distance between the 
moon and the Earth.  In this case, there is a fact about the distance, and the astronomer is 
ascertaining the fact.70   
As D.J. Allan claims, rule-case deliberation involves determination in the former 
sense – namely, in the sense that the Secretary of the Treasury determines the interest 
rate.  Moral rules, on this conception of practical reasoning, are produced by the practical 
intellect rather than ascertained by the practical intellect as if they were objectively 
existing objects of thought.  Moreover, they are construed independently of desire, 
according to Allan.  On his account, deliberation is not a process of discovering that one 
has deep-seated desires for certain ends.71  For example, deliberation is not the process of 
discovering that one does really, in fact, care about being a vehicle through which others 
can fulfill their projects, rather than pursuing one’s own projects.  Instead, deliberation 
operates independently of desire in its rule-setting stage, determining rules to which one 
should be committed, desired or not.   
                                                
70 Allan 1953, 75.   
71 As Allan remarks, “it can hardly have been [Aristotle’s] view that reason merely lights 
up the scene in order to reveal an end which has already been effectively, thought blindly 
and instinctively, chosen by desire” (Allan 1953, 76). 
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Once one has determined the general rule that ought to be followed, there is the 
project of determining whether specific and relevant action types fall under that rule.72  
For the deliberative process must be made relevant to an agent’s own case.  So, for 
example, Dorothea might ask whether the keeping of promises to a husband (a specific 
action type) falls under the more general rule that one fulfill one’s duties as a wife.  If it is 
determined that the rule does subsume the action type, then one has a rule to follow that 
is directly relevant to her own case – namely, that one ought to keep promises to a 
husband,  Following  this specific rule is an expression or instance of good action, rather 
than a means to fulfilling one’s telos, according to Allan.73   
Once the appropriate relevant rule has been determined, the reasoner must 
determine how to realize the rule – i.e. through means-ends reasoning.  So, it may be the 
case that, though Dorothea knows that she should keep the promise, she has yet to 
determine how precisely she should express as much.  When will she do it?  Where? 
How?  These sorts of questions are addressed during the stage in which the agent engages 
in means-ends reasoning about the realization of the rule.   
To illustrate these points in the moral case, consider Dorothea from Middlemarch 
again.  In the process of deliberation, her faculty of practical reason performs the three 
functions sketched above.  First, it posits the following as an expression of eu prattein: 
‘fulfill one’s duties as a wife.’ At this stage, Dorothea has only acknowledged that this is 
                                                
72 I use the idea of action types to describe Allan’s view.  However, this is a bit of 
overinterpretation for the sake of clarity, since Allan does not distinguish between action 
types and instances of action in his account of Aristotelian deliberation (Allan 1953, 
1955) 
73 For a discussion of the distinction between means and instance and its role in Allan’s 
interpretation, see Sorabji 1973, 202-4. 
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a good action or an expression the good.  She believes that fulfilling one’s duties as a 
wife is the right thing to do, whether she personally desires to do this or not.  Indeed, in 
reflecting about the matter, she naturally refrains from confusing thoughts about what she 
wants and what is right.   
After determining that fulfilling one’s duties as a wife is the right thing to do, 
Dorothea reflects that this is an extremely general judgment and not very helpful, as far 
as action-guiding considerations go.  For example, while she recognizes that it is good to 
fulfill one’s duties as a wife, she is not sure if sacrificing one’s own projects for a 
husband’s project counts as an instance of fulfilling one’s duties as a wife.  But the 
question about her own projects weighed against her promises to a husband is the very 
dilemma that Dorothea faces.  Thus her faculty of practical reason must undertake a 
second task – namely, figuring out whether particular instances of actions fulfill the rule 
in question.  Does promising to finish the book count as an instance of the rule that fulfill 
one’s duties as a wife? Ultimately, Dorothea concludes that the act of promising to 
complete her husband’s project does, in fact, fall under the rule that wives fulfill duties to 
husbands.  Her deliberation thus issues in the conclusion that she make the promise.   
Finally, there is a question about the manner in which Dorothea should make this 
promise.  After all, Causabon is ill and only, at times, able to entertain sustained 
conversation.  So, Dorothea has to think about the means by which she might make this 
promise.  Through her faculty of practical reason, Dorothea determines that she should 
approach Causabon during his afternoon walk in the garden on the forthcoming day.  
Reason orders the appetitive faculty to form the wish to take up this action in pursuit of 
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the goal of fulfilling her duties to her husband.  If Dorothea is not akratic, she will 
form the desire.   
The most important result of the widespread adoption of the rule-case 
interpretation has been to introduce the debate that has proved to be a central one about 
practical reason in the latter half of the twentieth century – as Allan himself put it: “what, 
in [Aristotle’s] system, is the part played respectively by reason and desire in the 
formulation of the end or good for man?”74  While commentators have subsequently 
demurred from accepting the view that practical reason “determines” the end – in the 
strong sense that Allan conceived of “determination” – they have nevertheless taken 
seriously the idea that reason plays a prominent role in the determination of ends.  This is 
certainly a reversal from the main view promulgated in first decades of the 1900’s, 
according to which practical reason played no role in setting the ends for man (since 
virtue did this).75  Most commentators now accept the view that reason plays a role in 
setting ends. 76  
The interpretation of deliberation as relevant to the agent’s case has not been 
universally accepted.  For example, John Cooper objects to the idea that rule-case 
reasoning terminates in a decision about an action in a particular situation.  Rather, 
Cooper suggests, the purpose of deliberation is to arrive at the rule which can be used, 
subsequently, as the major premise of the practical syllogism.  Thus, deliberation issues 
                                                
74 Allan 1973, 72.   
75 See Burnet, Walter and Zeller for this reading. 
76 Sorabji 1973.  Sorabji argues, for example, that commentators have tended to minimize 
the role that intellect plays in moral reasoning. In response, he points out that the intellect 
plays a prominent role in three areas: prohairesis, phronêsis and moral education. 
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in choices of action types, rather than particular actions.77  That is, deliberation issues 
in the subscription to the specific rule  ‘one ought to keep promises to husbands’ rather 
than in the choice that ‘I, Dorothea Brooke, ought to keep my promise to my husband 
Causabon, and I ought to do this by discussing the matter with him in the garden 
tomorrow during his daily stroll.’  
Cooper’s objection targets the assumption that deliberation is incomplete until the 
agent can hit upon an action he can immediately perform.78  According to Cooper, a close 
reading of Aristotle’s discussion of practical perception in NE VI.9 shows that practical 
perception is not perception of particulars.  Instead, according to Cooper, these passages 
from NE VI. 9 show only that deliberation involves consideration of action types – i.e. as 
opposed to particulars. Commentators develop a false contrast between universal and 
particular in these passages (1141b14-23, 1142a11-23). They assume that the term often 
translated as ‘particular’ (to kath’hekaston) and the term for ‘this’ in those passages refers 
to individual objects.  However, it can be shown that, while Aristotle sometimes uses the 
term “this” as a reference to particulars, Aristotle does not always use the term in this 
way. Sometimes he uses the term to reference particular kinds: e.g. man, horse, as 
opposed to animal.79 
                                                
77 Cooper 1975, 23.  “Aristotle only requires that deliberation issue in a decision to 
perform an action of some definite, specific type, and it is a matter of indifference to him 
whether the time for implementing the decision is the time at which it is made, or 
somewhat later on..  And even in the case where the time for action coincides with the 
time of decision, deliberation’s work is done as soon as an action of a suitable specific 
type is hit upon as a means of achieving, or beginning to achieve, the end in view.”  
78 Ibid.  
79 Ibid, 28-9. 
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What is the motivation for this revision of the standard view about 
deliberation? The issue is about the proper characterization of the deliberative process.  Is 
it a process through which one thinks generally about the sorts of actions which count as 
good?  Or is it a process through which one determines how, specifically, one ought to 
act in the circumstances in a way that depends heavily on moral perception?  Cooper 
favors the former interpretation for the following reasons.  First, we might want to resist 
the view that the practical syllogism forms part of the process of deliberation and thus the 
idea that deliberation is syllogistic in form.  According to a standard reading of Aristotle, 
the practical syllogism is the last part of the deliberative process.  Deliberation is not over 
until the agent arrives at an action he can perform.  This is the picture suggested by 
Aristotle’s remarks in NE III, which can be naturally read as the point that the agent 
arrives at a decision only after he has considered whether the action captured by the 
decision is practicable.  For Aristotle claims that deliberation concerns what is up to us 
and doable (peri tôn eph hêmin kai praktôn) (1112a31; 1141b10-11).  Most 
commentators take Aristotle to mean that deliberation must establish, in part, that the 
means needed to carry out the decision are available.  Hence, the thought that deliberation 
partly involve perception.   
But we might want to resist this account of deliberation on the grounds that it 
gives a phenomenologically false picture of deliberation.80   According to Cooper, the 
standard account assumes that the we are interested in carrying out the decision right then 
and there.  However, we often postpone carrying out our decisions.  To see Cooper’s 
objection, consider the following example.  Suppose that you have a bad headache, but 
                                                
80 Ibid, 26-7.  Cf. 51-2.   
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you decide to take aspirin, rather than migraine medicine, which would alleviate the 
pain better, but would also make you sleepy.  Need it be the case that, in the course of 
deliberation, you establish what it would take actually to have the medicine in your 
mouth?  No, according to Cooper.  “He knows where the aspirin is and what it looks like, 
so he does not need to “bring the starting-point back to himself” by noting that there 
(mentally pointing) is the bathroom or (once standing before the open medicine-chest) 
that that is the aspirin, or that this (an act of grabbing) is taking.”81   These additional 
thoughts are not part of deliberation.  Rather, they are the work of perception.   
A second reason to resist the idea that deliberation involves means-ends reasoning 
is that it pushes us to think that deliberation is characterized by moral perception, rather 
than, say, reflection on the rules that we think are indicative of good action.  Recall that 
the earlier stages of Dorothea Brooke’s deliberation about promises and husbands.  Her 
reflection was quite general, for it concerned the question: what is right, in general?  That 
is, Dorothea reflected on the nature of relationships generally and the extent to which the 
husband-wife relationship called for sacrifices of one of the partner’s projects.  She 
thought generally about the gravity of making a solemn promise to a dying person.  By 
contrast, her reflection about the terms under which she should actually make the promise 
and her specific grounds for making the promise reflected considerations about her own 
life: the degree to which Causabon had cut her out of his life, the degree to which he was 
a sensitive man in need of compassion, the degree to which she personally had a 
commitment to compassion for others and to helping others realize their projects.  Then, 
of course, there is the quotidian reflection about the actual means by which to realize 
                                                
81 Ibid, 23.   
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one’s decisions – e.g. by waiting to discuss the promise until tomorrow in the garden 
during a daily stroll.   
Suppose that, as a commentator, one wants to highlight the sense in which moral 
reflection concerns the former stage – namely, the stage in which one thinks about what 
is right.  Suppose too that one wants to drive a wedge between relfection about what is 
right and moral perception of the kind that the particularist emphasizes.  If so, one might 
want to follow Cooper’s lead and interpret deliberation as a process that does not involve 
means-ends reasoning and that just involves a stage of reflection on moral problems 
during which we consider what is right.   
1b.  Blueprint 
The next main interpretation of deliberation is one according to which the 
phronimos has a filled-out conception, theory, or blueprint of the good that guides his 
decisions.  By ‘blueprint’ or ‘plan,’ one should understand, at the very least, a 
determinate and well-defined plan of the good life – one that takes the form of basic 
principles which are lexically ordered with respect to one another.  For example, one’s 
plan for life might include both commitment to career and to one’s children, but in such a 
way that the commitment to career is weighted more heavily than the commitment to 
one’s children.  Cooper describes the plan as follows:   
The life defined by such a plan – ends together with weights or other ordering 
principles – would be regarded as a single comprehensive end which one has 
constantly in view and which one is seeking to realize in each and every decision 
one makes” (Cooper 1975, 96).  
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This blueprint or plan is acquired through habituation, first of all, but is later enhanced 
by knowledge of the grounds according to which some values are privileged over 
others.82  To make eu prattein a plan is to pursue a second-order end that one’s plan be 
effected or that one’s life realizes a plan – hence Aristotle’s requirement that one pursue 
an ultimate end as his single object of pursuit.83 
Terence Irwin subscribes to a blueprint picture of deliberation. According to 
Irwin, the conception of happiness (H) is arrived at by “considering myself and my life as 
a whole, since the final good has to be something whole and complete….” (65).  Included 
in “myself and my life as a whole” are the multiple stages of life, one’s capacities, desires 
and aims (65).  The phronimos takes an impartial position in deliberating about his life, 
according to Irwin.   
“The fact that I am now at this particular stage of my life, and the fact that I am 
especially interested in this particular project or aim, will not be allowed to warp 
my conception of myself as a whole extended both over different times and over 
different desires and capacities.  Other people fall short of the holism and 
impartiality of the wise person’s point of view” (66).   
 
The problem with the others who cannot sustain impartial reflection on their lives is that 
they are susceptible to false notions of the good life.  Granted, these conceptions may be 
holistic.  However, their general and holistic conceptions of life are dominated by 
immediate goods – e.g. sex or pleasure.  Such people tend to oscillate between life 
pictures that are dominated by these immediate goals – whatever they happen to be at that 
                                                
82 Sarah Broadie describes the picture in the following way: “a wished for end on which 
deliberation focuses is a comprehensive panorama of the good in which the agent’s 
values and priorities are all subsumed or represented, either in terms of some 
interminably complex state of affairs to be brough about or in terms of some action to be 
done providentially designed to take care of them” (Broadie 1991, 234).  
83 For the idea that desire that the plan be fulfilled as a second-order desire, see Cooper 
1975, 96-7.   
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moment - and life pictures in which the desirability of the immediate goals are 
tempered by long-standing or enduring goals.  In addition, such people fail to see that the 
oscillation in ends at which they aim is caused by the deeper structural problem of having 
both the short-term and the long-term goals (66). 
Irwin argues that, since the general conception of happiness is so general, 
additional linking devices are needed to explain how one can move from the general 
conception of eudaimonia to the major premise (a rule) that informs the practical 
syllogism.84 For Irwin, the process of deliberation is envisioned syllogistically, and to the 
extent that deliberation is a syllogism, there is a question: how does one select the 
relevant major premise in any given situation?  Indeed, how does one go from the 
conception of happiness to the major premise?  The explanation is a linking device. The 
linking device is an end that I pursue on a particular occasion.  For example, I may 
pursue generosity in a particular situation.  However, my pursuit of generosity, as a 
matter of course, can be derived from my conception of happiness.85  If agents accept that 
a general conception of happiness is their end, they also allow that this conception of 
happiness should determine the end in the particular situation.  This end – say, 
generosity, determines which major premise I should adopt in the situation – for example: 
choosing to give money over not giving money.  Ends and major premises should 
                                                
84 See the interchange between Irwin 1988 and McDowell 1988.  Irwin introduces the 
linking principles, technically, to explain the possibility of akrasia. McDowell has 
worried about this conception of linking rules; he complains that there is no evidence for 
any such thing in Aristotle’s texts. 
85 “To claim that H should determine R is to claim that the end I rationally aim at on a 
particular occasion should be, or should be ultimately derived from, the end I recognize 
as my ultimate good.” (Irwin 1988, 65). 
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preserve that impartial quality of the conception of happiness.  They should represent 
particular aims and rules that the agent would endorse from an impartial perspective. 
They will also agree that these should be the principles that guide action (66-7).   
Two points should be noted in order to avoid misunderstanding.  First, all 
reasoning in practical decision-making can be traced back to that conception of 
happiness.  Nevertheless, it is not required, on this picture, that one consciously reflect on 
the conception of one’s end in every deliberative situation.  Rather, it is required merely 
that one be able to justify his or her decision in light of the plan.  Second, though one 
pursues a single plan of life, on this reading, that single plan may have a variety of ends – 
some political, some philosophical, some personal.  Hence, in pursuing the single plan, 
one is not necessarily in the grip of the pursuit of a single kind of life or single kind of 
goal.  In this way, the blueprint account of deliberation is not tied to value monism. 
Some critics of the blueprint model of deliberation have focused on the sense in 
which this account of eu prattein resembles a technical conception. For commentators 
who accept the analogy between craft (technê) and phronêsis, there will be a something 
like a ‘technical picture in phronêsis, just as there is one in technê. That is, those who 
accept the analogy between craft and phronêsis also accept the idea that phronêsis has 
something like a technical picture, just as craft does.  For example, Sarah Broadie –
referring to  ‘blueprint’ or “picture” has in mind the sort of organized body of knowledge 
that constitutes a craftsman’s training. 86  Consider, for example, the theory of health in 
                                                
86 For a description, see Broadie 1991.  “The wished for end on which deliberation 
focuses is a comprehensive panorama of the good in which the agent’s values and 
priorities are all subsumed or represented, either in terms of some interminably complex 
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the case of medicine.  The theory of health consists of the tried and true observations 
that one finds in a doctor’s textbook.  This is the ‘technical picture’ to which a craftsman 
appeals.   
One might criticize the blueprint model on the grounds that it makes deliberation 
too easy.  As Sarah Broadie points out, we can imagine a rich and complex moral theory 
from which one might arrive at choices about particular situations.  But such an account 
is implausible if it is meant to account exhaustively for all forms of moral reasoning.  For 
it means that deliberation takes the form of deductive reasoning, thus placing all the 
burden or difficulty of moral reasoning on the conjuring of the right moral theory.  Once 
the right theory is in place, deduction happens as if an afterthought.   
A number of additional objections can be made.  First, the blueprint model does 
accomodate revision as a matter of course. But it seems unlikely that one would arrive at 
an unchanging moral theory.  We frequently revise our values or goals on reflection. Not 
only is it improbable that anyone might have an unchanging plan for the good life, it may 
not be desirable to have such a plan.  There are certainly important virtues associated 
with the person who admits ignorance about what is good – for example, humility in the 
face of a truly difficult question.  Similarly, there may be vices associated with the 
possession of a well-defined plan for life (self-righteousness, a tendency to be judgmental 
and dogmatic). Moreover, on some conceptions of good life – those which emphasize the 
importance of experience and experimentation, say - having a well-defined plan of life is 
undesirable.   
                                                                                                                                            
state of affairs to be brought about or in terms of some action to be done providentially 
designed to take care of them” (234).   
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2  Particularism 
The third account of deliberation to consider is the particularist’s.  According to the 
particularist’s interpretation of deliberation, eu prattein is a content-less conception of the 
good, and this conception simply amounts to the sum total of propensities to read or 
perceive particular situations in light of the kalon.  These can be thought of as the 
deliverances of a perceptual faculty, or perceptual scenes.  Because the deliverances of  a 
perceptual faculty are so fine-grained and variable, there can be no set of rules to which 
they neatly correspond. Phronêsis, on this reading, involves perception of particulars.  On 
this view, Aristotle means to say that decisions (prohaireseis) issue solely from 
perceptual judgments.  No further processing – in the form of consultation of principles – 
is necessary.   
The particularist rejects the view that moral reasoning resembles theory building and 
deductive reasoning – the sort of account we have just seen in the blueprint and rule-case 
models of deliberation.  The central feature of those models to which the particularist 
objects is the idea that deliberation resembles deductive reasoning. 87  That is, one 
possesses a correct theory of the good – say, a sort of blueprint or plan according to 
which various goals are represented and ranked in order of importance.  Once one is 
acquainted with the non-moral facts of particular situations, one is in the position to make 
the required deduction.  E.g. (1) My theory of the good requires that I fulfill my duties to 
my husband; (2) here is an opportunity to fulfill those duties; and (3) therefore, I should 
fulfill them.  The particularist argues that, on this conception of deliberation, too much 
work goes into the theory-building or rule-casting aspect of deliberation and not enough 
                                                
87 McDowell 1998, 27-8. 
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into the difficult weighing of various alternatives against one another and the seeing of 
the morally salient features of the situation.   
The particularist will also object to the blueprint and rule-case interpretations of 
deliberaiton on the grounds that, first of all, Aristotle often claims that there are not 
universal truths in ethics (cf. 1009b12-23).  Hence, it is unclear why the other 
interpretations help themselves to numerous universal – like entities (i.e. rules) in ethics.  
Second, the others account cannot make sense of Aristotle’s remarks about the role that 
perception plays in phronêsis.  According to the blueprint account, the function of 
perception in phronêsis is to acquaint the agent with his surroundings and then to use the 
deliverances of perception to decide which rule to invoke.  The same goes for the rule-
case interpretation.  As McDowell puts it, “ in the “rule”-“case” picture, the most obvious 
role for perception is to contribute awareness that certain conditions, which are in fact the 
conditions specified in a rule, are satisfied.”88   
There are two problems with these readings of the role of perception in moral 
reasoning.  First, Aristotle seems to be suggesting that moral perception plays a far more 
robust role than merely acquainting agents with the fact that the right conditions hold for 
the application of a rule.  Rather, Aristotle seems to be suggesting that moral agents see 
situations in different ways, depending on their characters. (Aristotle says that things 
appear differently to people, depending on their character.89)  If this is so, then perception 
                                                
88 McDowell 1998a, 28. 
89 For discussion, see Woods 1986 and Loudon 1991.  For the relevant texts in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, see: III.4, 1113 a15-31; III.5, 1114 a31-b8; X.5, 1176 a3-30. 
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acquaints agents not merely with non-moral facts, but with moral facts as well, and 
thus that moral perception plays all the difference in motivating good conduct.  
While the sensibility theorist’s account is motivated by a rejection of the blueprint 
model, it is also motivated by a reading of certain passages about inexactness and 
perception. Particularist readings are persuasive on the following textual grounds:  
1  First, Aristotle claims that the subject matter of ethics is inexact.  The subject 
matter (hulê) of politics is human good (ta anthropina agatha), and about such matters, 
there is much variability (diaphora)(1094a16).  According to Aristotle, matters 
concerning the human good are either good or bad, depending on the situation.  As a 
result, we should not seek the same exactness (akribeia) in politics as we might in other 
sciences.90  For matters in politics hold only ‘for the most part’ (1094b21).  As a result, 
we must indicate the truth ‘in outline’ (en topoi) (e.g. 1094b11-27).  These passages have 
been taken to indicate that Aristotle views the subject matter of ethics as too fluid and 
variable to admit of codification, as the particularist suggests.91 
2  Second,  Aristotle claims that phronêsis involves perception, and he insists that 
phronêsis involves perception of particulars.92  Since phronêsis is practical (praktikê), 
and practice is concerned with the particular (kath hekasta), phronêsis involves 
                                                
90 Ethics is inexact (1094b13; 1104a1-9; 1141a16-19). The educated person 
(pepaideumenos) knows as much and does not seek the same exactness (akribeia) of 
expression in politics that one seeks in the demonstative sciences (1094b13; 1104a1-9; 
1141a16-19). The educated person does not require a demonstrative proof from a 
speechmaker (NE 1094b11-27). 
91 This is the view developed by John McDowell (McDowell 1979) and Martha 
Nussbaum (Nussbaum 1990). 
92 II.9, 1109b20-4; III.5, 1114a31-b8; VI. 5, 1126b3-4; VI. 11, 1143a35-b5; VI.8, 
1142a18-30.  Practical knowledge concerns both universals and particulars (1141b; cf. 
1142a13; 1142a22-4).  Judgment (krisis) is in perception (1142a23-30).   
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perception of particulars (1141b15, b16).  Familiarity with particulars comes from 
experience (1142a13).  The result is that learned people are not necessarily wise, for they 
may lack experience (empereia)(1141b3-5).  Similarly, while young people can be good 
at math and such things, they cannot be wise, for they lack experience (1142a15-9).  The 
emphasis on the perception of the particular suggests that practical knowledge is 
expressed through perception of the morally salient features of a situation, rather than 
through any expressible or contentful claims.  Similarly, the image of the phronimos as 
experienced in life suggests that phronêsis cannot be expressed in terms of knowledge or 
contentful claims.  For it is strange to imagine that the experienced person is wise 
because he or she knows some rules by which to live.  Rather, the experienced person 
seems simply to get it naturally – i.e. without overthinking things.    
3  Finally, Aristotle distinguishes phronêsis from technê and epistêmê.  One might 
take this to mean that practical reasoning is neither technical or scientific reasoning.  If 
one assumes that both technical and scientific reasoning can be modeled syllogistically, 
one might construe Aristotle’s point as a denial of the claim hat practical reasoning is a 
form of syllogistic or deductive reasoning.  The apparent absense of any such rules in the 
discussions of deliberation seem to underline the suggestion that deductive reasoning is 
not part of the paradigm of practical reasoning (NE III.5, VI.4).   
How does the particularist account for the role of rules given his account of 
ethical knowledge?  Rules are summaries of wise decisions or generalizations from past 
decisions.93 They summarize, in particular, wise decisions – for example, that such and 
                                                
93 Irwin 1988, 101.  
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such a thing was expedient in such and such a case.  What I have in mind here is 
something like a football team’s play book.  The playbook show how the ball should be 
moved down the field.  It specifies what each player is responsible for, and how each 
maneuver is supposed to work.  Notice that these playbooks can be very precise.  
Suppose, for example, that the Arizona Cardinals football team has drawn up a set of 
tactical principles that have helped them win against the Philadelphia Eagles in the past.94  
The idea is that a rules summarize wise decisions just just as the playbook summarizes 
the successful past plays.   
The function of rules is heuristic for the particularist95 They aid in the decision 
making process, but they do not necessarily determine what one should do.  For one can 
disregard the advice of my rules just as one can disregard the advice of a trusted 
councilor.  The mere fact of disregarding the advice is not wrong.  It is just that, on some 
occasions, a person seem to know better.  Let me provide an example of the way we 
might understand heuristic here.96: Consider the Arizona Cardinals’ list of tactical 
maneuvers again.. Suppose that Kurt Warner realizes on the third down that, by 
                                                
94 The inspiration for this example is Irwin 1988, 123.  
95 The view not mentioned here is that the function of rules is justificatory; they justify 
individual decisions, or they serve as the authorities against which individual decisions 
are judged.  (One could also say that, on this view, particular judgments are correct to the 
extent that they conform to rules.)  For example, on this view, I would describe my 
decision not to lie in such and such a case as correct just because I have adopted the rule 
that it is wrong to lie.  That rule, in my mind, serves as a justification of my decision.   
96 Irwin claims to give a formal definition in the following statement, but it seems less 
than satisfactory, since “priority of perception” is defined as a thesis about the function of 
rules, rather than a thesis about the function of perception in moral judgment: The dispute 
seems to be about…theoretical normative priority.  Are the true principles true to the 
extent that they summarize the particular perceptual judgments of virtuous agents, or are 
the particular judgments correct in so far as they conform to true general principles? 
(Irwin 1988, 103, 124).  For discussion of Irwin’s notion of ‘priority of perception,’ see 
McKeever and Ridge 2006, 12-4.  
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disregarding the principle that the quarterback should not run, the team can get a first 
down.  He disregards the rule, seeing that another strategy will work well here.  He 
makes the renegade play and gets the first down.  The coach does not give much thought 
to the fact that Warner has disregarded the playbook.  He is pleased that the play worked, 
and thinks to himself: that Kurt Warner.  He’s an inspired quarterback – the idea being 
that Kurt Warner is the kind of person who knows when to use the play book to make a 
call and when to use his own discretion.  Thus, by heuristic here, I mean to capture the 
idea that we are morally permitted to disregard rules if our perception of particular 
situations prompts us to act differently.97  Rules are only aids to good decision-making, 
but not definitive of good decision-making. 
We should attempt to avoid misunderstandings and caricatures of this position 
about rules.  First, one might think that, according to the particularist, moral expertise is 
the art of knowing when to make exceptions to the rule – i.e. the art of an unprincipled 
person.  Given the degree to which we are prone to self-deception, does it not seem on 
the whole better for us not to be allowed to decide, perhaps whimsically, or in a self-
serving manner, when we feel like we know better than the rules?  Thus, an objection to 
the particularist’s construal of rules might go: is this process of seeing a kind of free-for-
all, haphazard and unprincipled act of pure discretion?  If so, it’s not for me.  Here, the 
particularist may respond that the act of perceptual discretion that is called for is 
undergirded by a set of emotional propensities.  In the ideal case, these are habituated 
correctly.  If habituated correctly, the person wil feel the appropriate emotions, 
motivations and responses to situations.  
                                                
97 Irwin 2000, 124.   
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A second possible misunderstanding is the idea that the moral expert either 
follows the rule book or he throws it to the wind, using his own expert discretion. That is: 
whenever our principles seem to fall short, we ought to use perception to settle the 
situation. This is a false dichotomy where the particularist’s expert is concerned.  The 
agent is not to be conceived as someone who, in grasping that the rules do not cover his 
case, says to himself: aha!  I will now use perception to settle the matter.  That is, he is 
not to be regarded as employing either rules or discretion to make decisions.  Rather, 
each process is to be envisioned as informing the other.98 Consider, for example, the way 
that the practically wise person simultaneously makes use of both rules and particular 
features of a situation.  
The basic feature of the particularist’s account, for our purposes, is the rejection 
of the idea that deliberation appeals to action-guiding principles.  As we have seen, the 
particularist accepts that deliberation may appeal to action guiding principles as heuristic 
devices.  But these principles are not definitive of good decision-making.  Their role in 
decision-making is always secondary to moral perception, or the seeing of the morally 
salient features of the situation.  In future chapters, I will question the extent to which this 
account of deliberation maps on to Aristotle’s account of deliberation.   
Conclusion 
This chapter presented an overview of Aristotle’s account of deliberation, an account of 
the generalist and particularist interpretations of deliberation.  We saw that the generalist 
                                                
98 For discussion, see Nussbaum 1990, 78-9.  For a full account of this position, see 
Barbara Herman’s account of ‘reason-responsive desires’ in Herman 1993.  See also 
McDowell 1996.  
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appeals to action-guiding principles for deliberation and that the particularist allows 
only that such principles play a heuristic role in the decision-making process.  We also 
briefly considered the textual evidence for the particularist reading of Aristotle’s ethics.  
The evidence included Aristotle’s remarks about ‘exactness’ (akribeia), the ‘particular’ 
(kath hekasta), claims that hold ‘for the most part’ (hôs epi to polu), the ‘outline’ (tupos) 
and ‘variation’ (diaphora).   
The next chapter will reposition that textual evidence in the context of Aristotle’s 
scientific thought about exact science.  I will show that the evidence can be usefully 
repositioned in a debate about the status of the various sciences in ancient Greek thought.  
Some were considered more science-like than others because they had the properties 
associated with the ‘exact’ (akribeia) sciences such as geometry and arithmetic.  
Repositioning the textual evidence for particularist readings of Aristotle’s ethics will help 
us to see why that evidence does not, in fact, support the particularist interpretation.   
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Chapter 3 
Exact Science in the Nicomachean Ethics 
 
In the previous chapter, we saw that there is a question about the extent to which a 
conception of the good informs the choice of action in a particular situation.  I sketched 
several explanatory accounts – among them, the particularist account, according to which 
the conception of the good that guides deliberation takes shape only in particular 
situations through a process of grasping the morally salient features of the situation.  We 
saw that the reading of Aristotle as a particularist is based on Aristotle’s claims that 
politics lacks exactness; that the subject matter of politics is human good; and that there 
is much variability about such matters.  Indeed, matters in politics hold only ‘for the most 
part.’ As a result, we must indicate the truth ‘in outline.’  The particularist uses these 
passages to suggest that Aristotle views the subject matter of ethics as too fluid and 
variable to admit of codification.  
In this chapter of the dissertation, I would like to place Aristotle’s remarks about 
these features in their broader context as a feature of scientific discourse in fifth and 
fourth-century Greece.  In the period’s literature on technê, there was widespread 
agreement that exactness was the mark of a true technê.  In turn, exactness was associated 
with measurement, method, rigorous proof and mathematical abstraction.  By contrast, 
the inexact sciences were associated with the lack of these features.  Indeed, the natural 
sciences like medicine and political science dealt with matters that were not easily 
codifiable in mathematical terms.   
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The first part of this chapter describes the history of the exact sciences in 
Aristotle’s era and the influence of Plato’s late philosophy on Aristotle’s understanding 
of exact science.  The second part of the chapter provides a discussion of three criteria 
that Aristotle uses to define the exact science.  In the third part of the chapter, I discuss 
the sense in which political science fails to be exact. Aristotle’s claims about exact 
science and politics and his explanation for the lack of exactness in politics.  I also 
discuss a possible link between exact science and the notion of ‘difference’ (diaphora) 
that we find in Aristotle’s works.  I conclude the chapter with a brief summary of various 
terms Aristotle uses to convey the idea that a science was inexact.   
1  The Exact Sciences 
The term ‘akribês’ has a pre-philosophical origin.  It was related to the technai involving 
carpentry or sculpture.99  The word was used to indicate that the craftsman’s project 
showed a great degree of finish or detail.  For example, in Aristotle’s De Caelo, the term 
is used to compare the sphere that composes the material world with the celestial world.  
Aristotle claims that the matter from which this sphere is composed does not have the 
same “regularity and finish” as the enveloping, celestial matter (287b19).  This use of 
akribês to mean careful craftmanship is also seen in the Nicomachean Ethics.  Aristotle 
claims: 
Wisdom in the arts we ascribe to their most finished (akribestatois) exponents, 
e.g. to Phidias as a sculptor and to Polyclitus as a maker of statues, and here we 
mean nothing by wisdom except excellence in art (NE VI.7, 1141a9-11).   
                                                
99 For discussion of the term ‘akribês,’ see Schiefsky 2005, 13-4.  For discussion of the 
notion of exact science, see Lloyd 1999.  Lloyd argues that, while the model of exact 
science – in particular, the notion of demonstrationwas one of the great achievements of 
Greek science, it was also problematic in that it encouraged dogmatic over-
mathematization of phenomena. “Time and time again, Greek scientists interpret their 
subjects as far as posible as branches of pure mathematics” (Lloyd 1999, 121). 
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As Stewart points out, the use of akribestatois here is synonymous with wisdom.  Any 
craftsman – e.g. carpenter, sculptor, poet or musician – who excelled in his art was also 
referred to as wise or sophos.100  As the passage goes on to suggest, the most exact 
craftsman is excellent insofar as he has a grasp of the fundamental principles of his craft.  
Or, as Aristotle puts it, the wise person has not only knowledge of the first principles 
(archai), but also of the truth of the first principles (a17-8; cf. a19).  Hence, wisdom 
(sophia) is the “most finished” (a16-7) of the forms of knowledge.101 
But, in its main use, the term ‘akribês’ applies to the well crafted speech or 
argument.  This sense of the term can be seen in Aristotle’s Rhetoric.  There, Aristotle 
claims that the written style of rhetoric tends to be ‘more finished’ (akribesteron, 1413b 
9; cf. 1355a25). The sense of craftedness here sometimes refers particularly to 
discussions that include thorough explanations or great detail.  The defendant’s speech 
that gives more thorough argumentation or evidence of a point would have been 
‘finished’ (Antiphon, Third Tetralogy, 4.3.1).  But in this latter context, the word had 
both a negative and a positive connotation.  For it is possible to give a sketch of one’s 
argument – a sketch that gets the basic point across  all the while recognizing that the 
subject deserves a more detailed, fuller treatment.  So, for example, in Plato’s Statesman, 
Socrates contrasts a discussion that has been ‘sufficient’ with one that is truly exact 
                                                
100 Stewart 1892, 54.  Aristotle’s explanation of the sense in which a technê is exact is 
clearly idiosyncratic.  Lear discusses this passage and suggests that the sculptor’s art is 
exact to the degree that the sculptor adeptly realizes form in the marble – hence, the 
relationship between form and akribês (Lear 2004, 111).  Lear is right to doubt this 
reading, for Aristotle identifies akribês with knowledge of causes, as I suggest below.  
101 Stewart suggests that the sophia of an artist such as Phidias of Polyclitus (NE VI.7, 
1141a10-11) would have used “technical skill guided by artistic ideals which the artist’s 
own genius supplies” – his gloss on ‘hosper kephalan exousa’ (a19).   
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(284d)102  But it is also possible to go into too much detail and obscure the main lines 
of one’s argument.  Indeed, this can be done purposefully, in the manner of a sophist.  
Hence, Isocrates writes in his speech To Philip that one can best understand the 
willingness of a city to go to war if one reviews “neither in general terms nor yet with 
excessive detail the principal facts in their present situation” (To Philip, 46).  Similarly, in 
the second Tetralogy, Antiphon suggests that ‘subtlety’ of argument indicates that a 
speaker is engaging in sophistry.  
Akribês was often associated with measurement.  Thus, in Plato’s Philebus, 
Socrates ranks the technai by the exactness each can achieve in measurement (55d-56c).  
Some are more closely related to knowledge, and others are less so.  For example, the 
technai more closely related to knowledge are ‘purer’ (55d).  Those less closely related to 
knowledge are less so.  The former are futher characterized as being the sciences of 
arithmetic, measurement and weighing (55e).  These are contrasted with the sciences 
which operate by conjecture and through experience, perception, and knack (55e).  
Achievement in these arts is gotten through practice and toil (55e).  For example, music 
might attain harmony through guesswork, rather than through measurement (56a).  The 
result would be lack of clarity about the pitch, rather than certainty (56a; cf. 59c).103    
Sciences which proceed in this manner, according to Socrates, include: medicine, 
music, farming, navigation and generalship.  All are less mathematical and precise.  The 
real technai are those that use measurment and tools, all of which give it certainty and 
make it more like genuine knowledge (epistêmê) than the other arts.  These crafts 
                                                
102 For a similar use of the idea of akribês, see Historia Animalium, 487a12.   
103 to_ su&mfwnon a(rmo&ttousa ou) me/trw| a)lla_ mele/thj stoxasmw|~ 
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include: shipbuilding, housebuilding, building, and carpentry.  They use tools of 
measurement like the compass, rule, and the line (56c).  With the distinction between the 
mathematical and non-mathematical sciences in mind, Socrates proposes that the arts be 
divided into two classes: those that are more exact like building, and those that are less 
exact, like music (56c).       
 In a more limited use – one that is derived from Plato’s works  akribês was 
associated with the objects of study themselves. The nature of the object of study made 
the science exact or inexact.  For Plato, the stable structures behind apparent change are 
the proper objects of study.  Hence, in the Philebus, Socrates suggests that some 
properties make an object the proper study of an exact science: purity (59c), an unmixed 
quality (59c), absence of inequality (anisos), and ‘reality’ (59c; cf. Republic, 522c-
531c).104  
Plato’s remarks are a reprise of the familiar position that the most true and the 
best sciences study what really exists, rather than what is merely apparent.  In the 
Philebus passage, for example, Socrates claims that arithmetic should be distinguished 
into two kinds.  The first form is for the people, and the second, for the philosophers.  
The former calculate with unequal units like armies and oxen.  The latter deal only with 
units that are identical to all other units.  With this distinction in mind, arithmetic and 
measurement used for practical purposes is unlike philosophical geometry.  For 
arithmetic, as philosophers practice it, is ‘more clear’ in that it has the higher amount of 
exactness (57c; cf. 58c).  
 
                                                
104 a)ei\ kata_ ta_ au)ta_ w(sau&twj a)meikto&tata e1xonta 
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2  Aristotle and the Criteria of Exact Science 
The influence of Plato’s notion of an exact science as one that studies what really 
exists can be seen in Aristotle’s understanding of the exact sciences.  Aristotle also uses 
the term akribês to distinguish the exact sciences from the inexact sciences.  Every 
science deals with a particular subject matter or studies a particular kind of object, 
considered in a certain respect or aspect (Meta M.3, 1077b33).  Like Plato, Aristotle 
conceives of the most exact sciences as those that study the ontological entities that are 
most real.  
Aristotle provides three defining criteria for the exact science in the Posterior 
Analytics.105  He writes: 
One science is more precise (akribestera) than another and prior to both (1) if it is 
at the same time of the fact (tou hoti) and of the reason why (di hoti) and not of 
the fact separately of the science of the reason why; and (2) if it is not said of an 
underlying subject and the other is said of an underlying subject (e.g. arithmetic 
and harmonics); and (3) if it depends on fewer items and the other on an 
additional posit (e.g. arithmetics and geometry) (I mean by an additional posit, 
e.g. a unit is a positionless substance, and a point a substance having position – 
the latter depends on an additional post.) (Posterior Analytics, I.27, 87a31-36). 106  
 
The three criteria show us that an exact science: (1) studies explanations in addition to 
facts; and (2) studies objects in abstraction from their matter.  Finally, an exact science 
studies objects (3) stripped of most of their properties – matter and others.   
                                                
105 For discussion, see Lear 2004, 109 ff.  
106 Akribeste/ra d' e0pisth&mh e0pisth&mhj kai\ prote/ra h3 te tou~ o3ti kai\ dio&ti h( au)th&, 
a)lla_ mh_ xwri\j tou~ o3ti th~j tou~ dio&ti, kai\ h( mh_ kaq' u(pokeime/nou th~j kaq' 
u(pokeime/nou, oi[on a)riqmhtikh_ a(rmonikh~j, kai\ h( e0c e0latto&nwn th~j e0k prosqe/sewj, 
oi[on gewmetri/aj a)riqmhtikh&. le/gw d' e0k prosqe/sewj, oi[on mona_j ou)si/a a1qetoj, 
stigmh_ de\ ou)si/a qeto&j: tau&thn e0k prosqe/sewj. 
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According to the first criterion, an exact science studies facts through their 
explanations rather than by simply studying the facts.107  For example, one may know 
that ‘the sky is blue.’  But it is an entirely different matter to know that ‘the sky is blue,’ 
all the while knowing, in addition, why it is blue.   
To see Aristotle’s meaning fully, it is necessary to review the distinction between 
understanding the fact  the ‘that’ (hoti)  and the explanation  the ‘because’ (di hoti).108  To 
grasp the ‘because’ (di hoti) is to have the ability to demonstrate the fact (hoti) from prior 
and immediate facts (An. Post. 71b21).  Priority is a reference to causation and, in 
particular, the relationship of causes to one another.  A cause is prior to another if it is the 
cause of another.  For example, if a is the cause of z, then a is therefore prior to z.  
Immediacy is also a reference to relationships among causes and in particular, the 
proximity of causes to some result.  A cause is relatively proximate to a result, if it is 
more directly the cause of that result than some other cause.  For example, a, b and c 
might all be the causes of z, and a the cause of b, b the cause of c, and so on. .  In this 
case, c is more directly the cause of z than a or b.  Thus, c is the proximate cause of z 
with relation to a and b.  
An example will illustrate the nature of Aristotle’s claims about priority and 
proximity.  Suppose that you use a telescope to observe that the planets are near to the 
Earth. With your naked eye, you observe that they do not twinkle.  You also suppose that 
the two phenomena are related – i.e. the fact that the planets do not twinkle and that they 
                                                
107 Barnes rightly notes that Aristotle’s concern in the chapter is not between 
understanding a fact and an explanation, but rather between understanding a fact through 
its explanation and understanding a fact, but not through its explanation (Barnes 1993, 
155).  
108 For discussion of the distinction, see Posterior Analytics, I.13. 
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are also near.  But there are several questions to ask about the way in which these two 
phenomena might be related.  First of all, what is the order of explanation?  Do planets 
fail to twinkle because they are near to the Earth?  Or is it the case that they are near to 
the Earth because they do not twinkle?  As it turns out, planets do not twinkle because 
they are near.  For Aristotle, getting the order of explanation correct is identifying the 
right ‘middle term’ of a demonstration (78a23-b33).  Aristotle frames this point in 
another way by noting that a science like harmonics, which deals with actual chors and 
sounds, does not provide explanations of the phenomena that it studies.  Instead, 
arithmetic provides those explanations (Post An, I.13, 79a1-7; cf. Post An I.7; I.10).  That 
is, both study relations among numbers, but arithmetic concerns itself with the 
explanations of chords and sounds (79a3-7).  It is only qua knower of arithmetic that the 
phenomena of harmonics can be explained (cf. Post An I.10, 76b4).   
Second, what is the most direct cause of the planets’ not twinkling?  Planets do no 
twinkle because they are near – this is true.  But is there some explanation that has more 
explanatory power?  We might say – supplementing the Aristotelian account  that the 
better explanation is the following.  If a relatively large amount of light from a source 
reaches the eye reaches the eye, the source does not appear to twinkle.  If a small amount 
of light from the source reaches the eye, the source appears to twinkle.  Since the planets 
are close to the Earth, a relatively large amount of the light rays reflected from their 
surface reach the Earth.   Thus, nearness does explain why the planets do not twinkle, but 
is not nearness per se that explains the lack of twinkling.  Rather, it is the amount and the 
velocity of light rays, or the intensity of light given from a source that indicate whether 
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something will twinkle. Hence, we might say that light intensity, rather than nearness, 
is the proximate cause of the planets’ twinkling (or failure to twinkle).  
With these two ideas in hand –  priority and proximity – we are in a position to 
see the nature of the exact science.  An exact science is one that provides both the prior 
and proximate causes of the phenomena in question.  It would be a science, in effect, 
which provided an explanation of the fact that the planets’ not twinking, and it would 
explain this fact by appealing to the most helpful (or proximate) explanations – namely, 
the fact that the intensity of light rays reaching the eye accounts for the extent to which a 
source may or may not twinkle.  
 
The second criterion for an exact science is that the science is not “said of an 
underlying subject” (hupokeimenon).109  Aristotle refers here to a distinction between 
sciences that study objects qua enmattered objects – thus having a hupokeimenon - and 
those that study objects abstracted of their form.  For example, a biologist studies plant 
and animal life, all of which exhibit shapes, quantities, relations of numbers, and so on.  
The mathematician studies the same objects, but without taking into account the matter of 
these things.  The mathematician is not interested in real, enmattered spores in nature, as 
the biologist might be.  Rather, he is interested only in the properties of the spore that can 
be abstracted from its matter – namely, its spherical shape (Met. XIII.3; (Post An I.13, 
79a8-12).  Similarly, the biologist might be interested in pinecones and the material 
which allows them to best serve as seed transporters.  By contrast, the mathematician 
                                                
109 Reeve reads Aristotle’s claim here as being a point about matter.  The criterion “states 
in other terminology – matter is the underlying thing to which it refers – that exactness in 
a science is a function of its level of abstraction from matter” (Reeve 1995, 140).   
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might be interested only in the fact that the pinecone displays the pattern of the 
Fibonacci series.  For Aristotle, sciences like mathematics  which study objects abstracted 
from their matter  are more exact than those which do not (De Cael, 306a27; Met. 
995a15-6).  
According to the third criterion for exact science, a science is more exact if it (a) 
“depends on fewer items and (b) “posits few principles.”  To claim that an exact science 
depends on fewer items means that an exact science deals with objects that have 
relatively few properties.  In the Metaphysics, Aristotle refers to this state as ‘simplicity’ 
(to haploun)  simplicity is the state of the object having the fewest properties.110 To the 
degree that we deal with things that are prior in formula and simpler, knowledge has 
greater accuracy, i.e. simplicity.  Aristotle goes on to define simplicity in terms of 
abstraction of magnitude, movement, and, in particular, irregular motion.   
A science which abstracts from the magnitude of things is more precise if it 
abstracts from movement, but if it take account of movement it is most precise if 
it deals with the primary movements, for this is the simplest (haploustatê), and of 
this again uniform movement is the simplest form (Met. XIII.3, 1078a10-14).111   
 
The object of study may be ‘without magnitude’ (cf. Met. 1025b26-1026a).  The object of 
study may be with or ‘without motion.’  The object can be not only motionless, but it 
may have uniform motion of the kind that is primary.  What sort of objects does Aristotle 
                                                
110 This claim may be related to Plato’s remarks about purification in the Philebus (55e). 
111 ai\ o3sw| dh_ a2n peri\ prote/rwn tw|~ lo&gw| kai\ a(plouste/rwn, tosou&tw| ma~llon 
e1xei to_ a)kribe/j (tou~to (de\ to_ a(plou~n e0sti/n), w3ste a1neu te mege/qouj ma~llon h2 meta_ 
mege/qouj, kai\ ma&lista a1neu kinh&sewj, e0a_n de\ ki/nhsin, ma&lista th_n prw&thn: 
a(plousta&th ga&r, kai\ tau&thj h( o(malh&. o( d' au)to_j lo&goj kai\ peri\ a(rmonikh~j kai\ 
o)ptikh~j: ou)dete/ra ga_r h|{ o1yij h2 h|{ fwnh_ qewrei=, a)ll' h|{ grammai\ kai\ a)riq- to_ 
yeu~doj. a1rista d' a2n ou3tw qewrhqei/h e3kaston, ei1 tij to_ mh_ kexwrisme/non qei/h 
xwri/saj, o3per o( a)riqmhtiko_j poiei= kai\ o( gewme/trhj. e4n me\n ga_r kai\ a)diai/reton o( 
a1nqrwpoj h|{ a1nqrwpoj: o( d' e1qeto e4n a)diai/reton, ei]t' e0qew&rhsen ei1 ti tw|~ 
a)nqrw&pw| sumbe/bhken h|{ a)diai/retoj. o( de\ gewme/trhj (ou1q' h|{ a1nqrwpoj ou1q' h|{ 
a)diai/retoj a)ll' h|{ stereo&n. 
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have in mind?  Mathematical objects serve as one likely category.  As items of 
thought, mathematical objects lack dimension and motion.  But Aristotle also has in mind 
items like planets.  They are in motion, but in regular or circular motion.  Hence, the 
study of the planets (e.g. through astronomy) is more exact than the study of physics 
since the latter studies objects that exhibit irregular motion.112  
Aristotle also claims that an exact science posits relatively few additional 
principles.  The meaning here can be clarified by considering a distinction between mixed 
and pure definitions.  In Metaphysics 1030b15, Aristotle refers to the distinction between 
mixed (ek prosthesiôs) and pure definitions (ex aphaireseôs) (cf. Cael. 299a17).  A mixed 
definition is one in which the definiendum cannot be defined without reference to the 
special sort of thing in which they inhere. So, for example, snubness can be only in a 
nose.  But whiteness can be in a man, a plant, an animal, etc.  Hence, ‘snubness’ will 
yield a mixed definition, while ‘whiteness’ will not (Met. VII.5, 1030b14-27; cf. Cael. 
299a17). ‘Mixed’ here means something like ‘parasitical,’ for there can be no concept of 
snubness without the prior concept of a nose.  Similarly, there can be no science of 
geometry without the prior notion of number.  In hypothesizing that there is magnitude – 
or numerous spatial units – geometry presupposes that there is number.  Yet, number is 
hypothesized by arithmetic.  Hence, geometry is parasitic on the arithmetic. Again, we 
see that geometry is less exact than arithmetic. 
Before moving on to the next topic, it is important to see that an exact science is 
not just one category of science types among others for Aristotle.  Rather, it is the 
quintessential form that science takes.  The best sciences or the most scientific sciences 
                                                
112 For discussion, see Ross, Commentary on the Metaphysics, 417.   
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are the exact sciences.  For the most exact sciences are those that deal, most of all, with 
the first principles (Met. I.2, 982a25).  The science that deals with the first principles is 
the most knowable (982b1-2), and the most knowable thing is the knowledge pursued for 
its own sake (982a30-1).  While the science that studies first principles is therefore the 
least necessary, it is also the best (983a10-11).  To the fullest extent, this science is first 
philosophy, or theology.   
3  Politikê as an Inexact Science 
We have seen that Aristotle uses the term akribês to capture the notion of an exact 
science – namely, a science which focuses on first principles and studies phenomena in 
such a way as to abstract from them as many qualities as possible.  But Aristotle also uses 
the term to reference other, related ideas as well.113   
First, Aristotle sometimes writes as if cognitive states were inexact or exact. For 
example, the states associated with perception are relatively inexact, while those 
associated with epistêmê and reason are more exact.  Similarly, Aristotle claims that there 
can be greater exactness in theoretical statements than in the statements of perceptual 
facts.  “We ought not to require the same accuracy (akribeian) in theory as in the facts 
given by perception” (Pol. 1328a20).  In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines 
wisdom as the “most finished” (akribestaton) kind of knowledge (NE VI.7, 1141a 16).  
                                                
113 For the association between non-deliberative sciences and exact sciences, see NE III.3.  
(“In the case of exact and self contained sciences, there is no deliberation” (NE III.3, 
1112b1 ff.).)  For a discussion of the various kinds of measurement, see Met. X. 1, 1053a.  
For more on the idea that mathematics is the most exact science, see Met. 995a; De 
Caelo, 306a27.  For the use of akribês as acuteness in sense perception, see e.g. De 
Anima, 421a20; History of Animals 494b16.  For the idea that excellence is more exact 
than any art, see NE II.6, 1106b14.  For more on the ways that the sciences and their 
objects are distinct – e.g. mathematical versus natural science – see Met. 1025b7, 1064a7.   
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Finally, in the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle claims that nous is the most precise 
(akribestaton) state of understanding, for it exceeds epistêmê in accuracy and truth (Post 
An II.19, 100b8).  
 
Exactness also refers to written accounts (logoi) (HA 753b14-8; Pr. A, 46a29; 
24b14; EE II.10, 1227a11; NE 1174b2; Topics 153a11; cf. Phy. I.9, 192a35). Consider 
the following passage.  
The whole account of matters of conduct must be given in outline (tupôi) and not 
precisely (akribôs), as we said at the very beginning that the accounts (logoi) we 
demand must be in accordance with the subject matter; matters concerned with 
conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any more than 
matters of health.  The general account being of this nature (katholou logou), the 
account of particular cases (ho peri ton kath hekasta) is yet more lacking in 
exactness (t’ akribês); for they do not fall under any art or set of precepts, but the 
agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion, 
as happens also in the art of medicine or of navigation (NE II. 2, 1104a1-8). 114 
 
Two accounts (logoi) are mentioned here: (1) the ‘general account’(katholou logou) and 
(2) the account of particular cases (ho peri ton kath heksta logos).  Aristotle claims that 
neither is exact (1104a6-7).  The first account’s lack of exactness explains the second 
account’s lack of exactness: “the account of particulars is even less exact because the 
account of the universals is inexact” (1104a5-7).  Logos, notoriously, can mean many 
things (e.g. speech, the written word).  However, the use in this passage seems to refer to 
the account of politics itself  i.e. the lecture addressed to those who are “hearing” or 
learning about political science (I.4, 1095b5-6).    
                                                
114 o( peri\ tw~n praktw~n lo&goj tu&pw| kai\ ou)k a)kribw~j o)fei/lei le/gesqai, w3sper 
kai\ kat' a)rxa_j ei1pomen o3ti kata_ th_n u3lhn oi9 lo&goi a)paithte/oi: ta_ d' e0n tai=j 
pra&cesi kai\ ta_ sumfe/ronta ou)de\n e9sthko_j e1xei, w3sper ou)de\ ta_ u(gieina&. toiou&tou 
d' o1ntoj tou~ kaqo&lou lo&gou, (e1ti ma~llon o( peri\ tw~n kaq' e3kasta lo&goj ou)k e1xei 
ta)kribe/j: ou1te ga_r u(po_ te/xnhn ou1q' u(po_ paraggeli/an ou)demi/an pi/ptei, dei= d' 
au)tou_j a)ei\ tou_j pra&ttontaj ta_ pro_j to_n kairo_n skopei=n, w3sper kai\ e0pi\ th~j 
i0atrikh~j e1xei kai\ th~j kubernhtikh~j. 
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Such passages strike me as significant because they suggest that Aristotle is 
referring to his own account.  I refer to this literary phenomenon as authorial self-
reference.115  By this, I mean the author’s reference to himself as a writer and the 
reference to his work as a written work.  There are several common examples of authorial 
self-reference – first, the case in which the author directs a reader to some other portion 
of the text.  The author may say, for example: “as I wrote earlier” or “as I explain 
elsewhere.”  Another example is the case in which the author explains that or why 
something is not addressed.  The author may say: “this is not worth writing about.” 
Finally, the author may refer to his achievement in writing something.  For example, he 
may write: my predecessors have neglected the issue, but in writing this, I will ameliorate 
the situation.  Such phrases foreground the author’s conception of himself as a writer and 
his conception of his work as a written work.   
An important case of authorial self-reference, insofar as our analysis of Aristotle 
is concerned, is that in which the author claims that the account given in writing is 
schematic.  By ‘schematic,’ I mean that the account is unfinished, lacking in detail, or 
leaving out some information.  For example, in giving directions, one might say: “go 
straight for about a mile until you see a McDonalds; then, turn right.”  The phrase “about 
a mile” is not exact.  One could make it exact by saying: “1.2 miles.”  Consider a second 
example: the dictum that you should return what you’ve borrowed.  What if you have 
borrowed a knife from a person who has turned out to be a maniac?  Should you return it?  
                                                
115 For a discussion of authorial self-reference, see Lloyd 1987.  Lloyd focuses on the 
tendency of Hippocratic writers to distinguish themselves from the predecessors in the 
proem of a treatise with the use of the first person pronoun.  For a similar treatment of the 
issue, see Dean-Jones 2003, 113-4.  
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No, but in other cases, you should return what you’ve borrowed.  What other cases?  It 
would be an arduous task to discuss them all.  So, we keep the simple dictum: return what 
you have borrowed.  But we recognize that the dictum, as stated, leaves out information.  
So, by ‘schematic,’ I mean to imply nothing about the nature of the information in 
question and whether it could, in principle, be set out.  That is, it could, in principle, be 
written down, but it may take too long to do so.     
We can find references to schematic accounts in the Hippocratic Corpus.  These 
are passages that make reference to the wealth of cases to discuss and the prospect of 
writing about all these cases.  Time and efficiency do not permit that all the cases can be 
addressed. Therefore, the reader must make inferences based on the material provided.  
Consider, for example, On the Sacred Disease, the Hippocratic treatise dealing with 
epilepsy.  The author claims that the manifestations of epilepsy are too numerous to 
describe. “Many other instances, of various kinds [of cases of epilepsy], could be given, 
but time does not permit us to speak of each separately” (On the Sacred Disease, 1).116 
He therefore discusses only a few such cases, and these are supposed to be representative 
of the many.  
Similarly, the author of On Joints reports that he can give only a schematic 
account of the wiring or threading together of a broken jaw. The reader must form a 
general sense of the procedure from the text, with the understanding that he will only 
truly learn how the operation works when he performs it.  The text explains that, if the 
jaw is broken across completely, one should adjust or realign the jaw, and then the teeth 
should be fastened together.  To do this properly, the teeth must be fastened together with 
                                                
116 Consider also and On Breaths, 15 and On Fractures, 31.   
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a thread.  While a gold thread is best, a linen thread is adequate.  The thread should be 
tied at the ends and left on the jaw until the bone heals (32-3).  The reader must operate 
from the description of the operation in these two chapters.  The author owns that a more 
detailed description might be wanted, but that it would be impossible to give.  “It is not 
easy to give exact (atrekês) and complete details of an operation in writing (en graphê); 
for the reader should form an outline (hupotupeisthai) of it from the description (ek tôn 
gegrammenôn)” (On Joints, 33).117  Presumably, the meaning is that operations, in 
particular, are difficult to describe fully and a manual about operations can give only an 
incomplete account. 
This foray into the idea of a schematic account helps us to read the passage from 
the Nicomachean Ethics above.  When Aristotle claims that the account of the universals 
and particulars lacks exactness (1104a6-7), he means that the accounts in question are 
schematic.  Indeed, the account of the particulars is more so.  Recall that Aristotle 
explains the lack of exactness in the account of particulars by saying that the particulars 
“do not fall under any art or set of precepts, but the agents themselves must in each case 
consider what is appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the art of medicine or of 
navigation.” This explanation bears a great deal of resemblance to the idea that, when 
following dictums, one takes the dictum to be a general rule – i.e. one that needs to be 
thought about in light of a specific situation.  Thus, you generally return what you have 
borrowed.  But if you have borrowed a certain kind of thing (a weapon) from a certain 
kind of person (bloodthirsty), it may be best not to return what you have borrowed.   
                                                
117 See Littré 1839-1861,vol. 4,  71-2.   
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We have just seen that exactness is a term of description for accounts. Let us 
now consider the various reasons why an account might not be exact.  Aristotle has two 
answers to this question.  First, the precision of the account must be consistent with the 
aim of the account.  If the aim of the account is practical, less precision is demanded.  
Second, the precision of the account must be consistent with the subject matter of the 
account.  If the subject matter is inherently variable – as the subject matter of politics is – 
then we can expect that the science which studies this subject matter is less exact than 
other sciences.  Aristotle states:   
We must also remember what has been said before, and not look for precision in 
all things alike; but in each class of things such precision as accords with the 
subject matter and so much as is appropriate to the inquiry.  For a carpenter and a 
geometer look for right angles in different ways; the former does so insofar as the 
right angle is useful for his work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort 
of thing it is (ti esti) for he is a spectator 118 of the truth.  We must act in the same 
way, then, in all other matters as well, that our main task may not be subordinated 
to minor questions.  Nor must we demand the cause in all matters alike; it is 
enough in some cases that the fact be well established, as in the case of the first 
principles (NE I.7, 1098a20-b2). 119 
 
Let us first consider the claim that the precision of the account should be consistent with 
the aims of the inquiry.   
Accounts take their form based on their various purposes.  That is, the same 
information can be explicated in different ways or adjusted to different purposes.  For 
                                                
118 Rep. 475e.   
119 Perigegra&fqw me\n ou}n ta)gaqo_n tau&th|: dei= ga_r i1swj u(potupw~sai prw~ton, 
ei]q' u3steron a)nagra&yai….memnh~sqai de\ kai\ tw~n proeirhme/nwn xrh&, kai\ th_n 
a)kri/beian mh_ o(moi/wj e0n a3pasin e0pizhtei=n, a)ll' e0n e9ka&stoij kata_ th_n u(pokeime/nhn 
u3lhn kai\ e0pi\ tosou~ton e0f' o3son @1oi0kei=on th|~ meqo&dw|.kai\ ga_r te/ktwn kai\ gewme/trhj 
diafero&ntwj e0pizhtou~si th_n o)rqh&n: o4 me\n ga_r e0f' o3son xrhsi/mh pro_j to_ e1rgon, o4 
de\ ti/ e0stin h2 poi=o&n ti: qeath_j ga_r ta)lhqou~j. to_n au)to_n dh_ tro&pon kai\ e0n toi=j 
a1lloij poihte/on, o3pwj mh_ ta_ pa&rerga tw~n e1rgwn plei/w gi/nhtai. ou)k 
a)paithte/on d' ou)de\ th_n ai0ti/an e0n a3pasin o(moi/wj, a)ll' i9kano_n e1n tisi to_  
o3ti deixqh~nai kalw~j, oi[on kai\ peri\ ta_j a)rxa&j. 
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example, one might present Aristotle’s ethics in the form of an introductory book for 
undergraduates whom one hoped to improve morally through the presentation.  By 
contrast, one might present the same information, but in serious scholarly monograph, 
where there is no hope of moral improvement.  Consider another example.  Suppose that 
we were charged with giving a lesson about the right angle.  If our audience were 
composed of builders or carpenters, we should present information that is useful with 
respect to their work.  But if our audience were composed of geometers, we would aim 
for a very different kind of account.  Namely, we would tell the geometers ‘what right 
angle is’ and ‘what sort of thing it is’ (ho de ti estin ê poion ti).  
One might think that the two types of accounts introduced in the examples map 
onto Aristotle’s distinction between the practical or theoretical sciences, but I want to 
keep the notion of an account and its aim distinct from the notion of a science and its aim.  
The examples given above help us see how we can keep these apart.  One can give a 
practical account of the nature of right angles to builders.  But one can also give a 
theoretical account of the right angle to geometers.  Similarly, one gives a theoretical 
account of a practical science when one writes a scholarly monograph.  But one gives a 
practical account of a practical science when one addresses undergraduates with the hope 
of improving them morally.  The contents of a practical science can be relayed with either 
a practical or theoretical aim in mind.  It depends on the audience and the purpose of 
giving the account in the first place.   
If the Nicomachean Ethics were to fall into the category of practical or theoretical 
account  it is likely that Aristotle regards it as an account of the builder’s sort – namely, 
one that imparts information in a way that is useful for the work, for he states on 
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numerous occasions that the purpose of the Ethics is practical (NE II.2, 1103b26-9; EE 
I.5, 1216b16-25).  Though, this is not to say that it falls squarely in the same camp as the 
builder’s account, since the aim of politics is good action (eupraxia), rather than products 
such as speeches, health or houses.  That is, a distinction should be drawn between 
political science, which has eupraxia as its aim, and productive sciences such as rhetoric, 
medicine and housebuilding, which all aim at the production of things – speeches, health 
and houses, respectively.  When I use ‘practical’ from here on, I shall mean practical in 
that former sense in which political science is practical.   
 How is information presented in the practical versus the theoretical accounts?  
The Eudemian Ethics provides two important points of guidance about this point – more 
than that offered by the Nicomachean Ethics.  As we learn from the Eudemian Ethics, 
first of all, knowledge of the nature of virtue is insufficient to make one good.  While it 
may be the case that one becomes a geometer upon learning geometry, one does not 
become virtuous upon learning about virtue (EE I.5, 1216b4-10).  There is a disanalogy 
between the theoretical and practical sciences in this regard.  While it is true of the 
theoretical sciences that one acquires the relevant virtue in learning about the associated 
definitions, it is not true of practical disciplines.  As Aristotle claims, “we do not wish to 
know what bravery is but to be brave, nor what justice is but to be just….” (b21-23).120 
While the practical and theoretical accounts are different in this last respect, the 
accounts (logoi) in practical and scientific inquiries alike should be given 
‘philosophically’ (philosophôs)(EE I.6, 1216b35-6).  By ‘philosophical,’ I mean that the 
                                                
120 ou) ga_r ei0de/nai boulo&meqa ti/ e0stin a)ndrei/a, a)ll' ei]nai a)ndrei=oi, ou)de/ ti/ e0sti 
dikaiosu&nh, a)ll' ei]nai di/kaioi 
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inquiry must always provide an explanation for phenomena. That is, it should provide 
not merely the facts, or what is apparent, but the ‘because’ (dia ti, b37-8).  As mentioned 
earlier in the chapter, the ‘because’ refers to the direct and prior cause of a phenomena.  
For example, the reason for the planets’ failure to twinkle is the nearness of the planets.  
The planets do not twinkle because they are near.  But if it is true that both practical and 
theoretical accounts must be philosophical, we can draw the interesting conclusion that 
the practical account need not be intellectually or scientifically uninteresting – quite the 
opposite.  Aristotle means that, in order to be practically effective, one must know the 
‘because.’121  
But what does this mean for Aristotle’s claim that the precision of the account 
must be consistent with the aim of the account?  For one, it does not mean that the 
practical account can neglect explanations.  But what type of explanation does Aristotle 
have in mind?  Will we find the same reasons in a practical account that we find in a 
theoretical account?  I suggest that the Eudemian Ethics passage we have been 
considering provides us with a clue.  The context of the Eudemian Ethics passage shows 
that Aristotle’s worry is about types of arguments.  He aims to show that not all points 
                                                
121 There are a number of passages which seem to be in conflict with this point.  First, 
note that the EE prologue passage which may seem to suggest that Aristotle draws a 
stronger distinction between theoretical and practical sciences, such that the latter have 
no need of theoretical knowledge (EE I.1, 1214a8-14).  A second apparent conflict is 
more easily dispatched.  Aristotle claims that the starting points (archai) in ethics are the 
facts (NE I.4, 1095b7).  He also claims that politics is concerned with the to_ o3ti.  Both 
passages thus seem to suggest that politics is not concerned with the di hoti.  But I 
suggest that we read both passages as referring to starting points (archai), rather than 
arguments from starting points.  It is perfectly admissible that the starting points of a 
science be to hoti, since they are supposed to be indemonstrable.  The question is about 
the arguments that follow from those starting points.  Are there any such arguments?  The 
EE I.5 passage suggests that there are in practical accounts.  
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must be argued for with a reasoning argument (meta logou, 1217a2).  “For there are 
some who, though thinking it to be the mark of a philosopher to mark no arbitrary 
statement but always to give a reason, often unaware give reasons foreign to the subject 
and idle” (1216b40-1217a3).122  In some cases, the argument from perception (tois 
phainomenois) is sufficient (a13).   
In saying this, Aristotle probably means the following.  First, some make the false 
assumption that the philosophical method the giving of rational arguments for all claims.  
Hence, Aristotle claims that there are some who think that it is the mark of a philosopher 
not to speak in a ‘likely way’ but always to give an argument (legein alla meta logou, 
1217a1-2).  But some arguments may be based on perception.  Indeed, some arguments 
should be based on perception, rather than reason.  For both the argument from 
perception and from reason may end up with the same conclusion.  But the argument 
from reason will have reached the conclusion in the wrong way.  
Aristotle may be making the very sound point that arguing for some things in 
ethics – though one may be able to present a good argument and though ones argument 
may be true – is inappropriate and shows a lack of sense.  Philosophers are quite guilty of 
this.  For example, suppose some philosophers are talking about ‘love,’ and one claims: 
“I cannot say that I am in love until I know the definition of love.”  This is true, in a 
sense.  One cannot truthfully utter “I am in love” without knowing what she means.  
However, this also represents an overextension of the theoretical stance.  There is 
certainly a sense in which one can fall in love and truthfully utter “I am in love,” without 
ever knowing the definition of love.  Indeed, Aristotle’s point seems to be that the person 
                                                
122 ou) dei= pa&nta toi=j dia_ tw~n lo&gwn, a)lla_ polla&kij ma~llon toi=j fainome/noij 
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who insists on having the definition has missed something.  As he would say, the 
person is uneducated or uncultured (1217a8).    
If practical accounts rest on facts of perception, as the Eudemian Ethics passage 
suggests, then we have an explanation for the relative inexactness of practical accounts.  
Recall that Aristotle regards some cognitive states as being less exact than others.  For 
example, states of perception are less exact than states of knowledge.  Recall the 
following claim: “we ought not to require the same accuracy (akribeian) in theory (epi 
tôn logôn) as in the facts given by perception (tôn gignomenôn dia tês aisthêiôs) (Pol. 
1328a20). I leave it to another paper to determine what Aristotle meant in claiming that 
the facts of perception are less exact than those associated with logos.   
 
4  Diaphora and Akribeia 
 
Now that we have considered one explanation for the lack of precision in a 
philosophical account, let us consider a second explanation for the lack of precision.  As 
Aristotle claims, precision should be sought in accord with the subject matter 
(hupokeimenên hulên) (1098a a27-29, 1104a3, 1094b13).  So, in order to establish why 
political science might be lacking in exactness, we should inquire about its subject 
matter.  How does Aristotle mean to characterize the subject matter of political science 
such that it makes political science inexact?  
According to some commentators, the fundamental explanatory features here are 
matter (hulê) and ‘for the most part.’    Matter explains why political phenomena are only 
‘for the most part’ – the latter being a locution for the idea of (a) statistical frequency or 
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(b) natural necessity.123  Generalizations, and therefore arguments, in politics hold only 
hos epi polu because they concern entities that are enmattered.  Numerous passages 
throughout the corpus support this point (e.g. GA 763b25 ff.; Met 1025b26 ff.).  Recall 
that we have some evidence that Aristotle viewed enmattered-ness as an obstacle to exact 
science.  For example, in the Metaphysics, he claims that the accuracy (akribeia) of 
mathematics can be achieved only in “the case of things which have no matter” (Meta, 
II.3, 995a).  Similarly, in the Meteorology, he argues that disorganized and relatively 
formless kinds of matter – e.g. flesh and fire – are especially difficult to define accurately 
(IV.12, 390a19). 
Granted, the fact that the objects of political science are enmattered explains why 
political science is not exact.  But it is not the whole explanation.  We ought also to pay 
attention to the idea of diaphora, or variation.  Diaphora, in the sense I will describe 
here, is variation, and in particular, the individuating features of an entity.  This can be 
represented as variation along a set of categories: what, where, why, whom, to what 
extent, etc.  I would like to argue that diaphora too, can explain why political science 
lacks precision.  That is, political science seems to be inexact in that it depends on 
variation (diaphora) – i.e. individuating features of a person’s condition and 
environment.  
First, let me distinguish the use of diaphora above from the more conventional 
notion of diaphora that Aristotle uses in his logical works.  Aristotle uses the term 
diaphora in a technical sense, where it means the distinguishing feature of a species (i.e. 
differentia). For example, the human being is an animal, but the feature that distinguishes 
                                                
123 For discussion of hos epi to polu, see Reeve 1995, 17-22.  
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it from other animals is its ability to reason.  Any definition consists of the genus plus 
a differentia.  Hence, in the History of Animals, Aristotle writes:  
Variations (diaphora) are manifested in modes of subsistence, in habits, and in 
actions as follows: some animals live in water and others on land.  And of those 
that live in water some do so in one way, and some in another: that is to say, some 
live and feed in the water, take in and emit water, and cannot live if deprived of 
water, as is the case with the great majority of fishes; others get their food and 
spend their days in the water, but do not take in water but air, nor do they bring 
forth in the water…. (Historia Animalium, I.1, 487a14-22; cf. Met X.3, 1054b-
1055a; cf. Met. VII.12).   
 
In this passage, Aristotle explains that an animal may be analyzed according to certain 
categories, including: subsistence, habits, actions, and habitat.   
There is another way in which Aristotle uses the term diaphora, where it means, 
in a related but more general sense, ‘individuating feature.’  What I have in mind by 
‘individuating feature’ can be illustrated by the following example. Suppose that you are 
given a loan.  In general, we tend to think that one ought to pay back a loan.  Your 
intention, in keeping with the norm, is to pay back the loan.  But what if you have a 
conflicting duty?  Suppose, for example, that your father is about to lose possession of his 
house to mortgagers, and you are in the position to help him regain possession of his 
house through supplying some of your loan on his behalf.  Would it be appropriate to pay 
back the loan speedily?  The decision presents some difficultly because one wants to 
fulfill both obligations.  But in the end, it is probably best to postpone payment of the 
loan. The right thing to do is to use the money to fix the problem for your father.  
There are two things to notice about this scenario.  First, when deliberating about 
situations that present conflicting duties, one considers multiple claims: duties to lender, 
duties to the father and duties to oneself.  One needs to ask: what duties do I have here?  
 
 
94 
To whom do I have the duty?  How can the claims of these duties be compared? 
Second and obviously, decision-making is difficult because one has multiple and possibly 
conflicting obligations to weigh against one another.  
We are now in a position to see what diaphora as ‘individuating feature’ may 
mean.  I have in mind the idea that a situation will have particular features that a decision 
maker must take into account.  The decision maker in the story above, for example, must 
take into: the duty to repay the loan, the person to whom the duty is owed, the amount of 
the loan, the circumstances under which the loan was given, and so on.   
Aristotle uses diaphora in this sense in the following passage from the 
Nicomachean Ethics: 
Surely all questions are hard to decide with precision (akribôs).  For they admit of 
many variations (diaphoras) of all sorts in respect both of the magnitude of the 
service and of its nobility and necessity. 
 
He explains the case in the following manner: 
 
But that we should not give the preference in all things to the same person is plain 
enough; and we must for the most part (hôs epi to polu ) return benefits rather 
than oblige friends, as we must pay back a loan to a creditor rather than make one 
to a friend.  But perhaps even this is not always true; e.g. should a man who has 
been ransomed out of the hands of brigands ransom his ransomer in return, 
whoever he may be (or pay him if he has not been captured but requests 
payment), or should be ransom his father?  It would seem that he should ransom 
his father in preference even to himself.  As we have said, then, generally 
(katholou) the debt should be paid, but if the gift is exceedingly noble or 
exceedingly necessary, one should defer to these considerations (NE IX.2, 
1164b28-1165a4; cf. EE 1244a).   
 
In this passage, Aristotle explains that, as a general rule (katholou), one ought to repay 
one’s debts.  However, there are cases in which one has a conflicting duty, such that 
paying one’s debts is not the thing to do.  For example, suppose that your father were 
abducted and his captors demanded a ransom.  Would you, having earlier secured a loan 
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from the bank, opt to pay the bank back rather than using the loan to pay the debt?  
Certainly you would not.  Hence, there are cases in which paying back loans is not the 
right thing to do, even though it is generally (katholou) the right thing to do.   
What does it mean to claim that there are variations (diaphorai) in terms of 
magnitude of the service, nobility and necessity?  Stewart suggests that the reference to 
kalon and anankê stands for the claim that the moral ideal versus that of material 
necessity.  The final lines of the passage show that the gift (i.e. the loaned amount) may 
be more or less noble.  It is the noble thing to do, for example, to ransom one’s father 
before oneself.  Similarly, one’s circumstances may be more or less dire.  It may not be 
possible to pay back the loan immediately, if the situation is dire enough. It is in this 
respect that the loan can present questions of nobility or necessity.   
The lesson of such cases is twofold.  First, it is not possible to state unequivocally 
whether a loan ought always to be repaid.  In general, it is not possible to achieve 
certainty about any of these rules, where “feelings and actions” are concerned: 
“discussions about feelings and actions have just as much definiteness as their subject 
matter (NE IX. 2, 1165a5-14). This is a reprise of Aristotle’s earlier methodological 
remarks (1094b11-27; 1098a26-33).  Second, the reason for the difficulty, according to 
this passage, is diaphora, or the fact of particular and individuating features of a case.  As 
Aristotle goes on to explain in more detail, these features take the form of questions about 
the person to whom one repays the loan or gives the gift: 
That we should not make the same return to every one, nor give a father the 
preference in everything, as one does not sacrifice everything to Zeus, is plain 
enough; but since we ought to render different things to parents, brothers, 
comrades, and benefactors, we ought to render to each class what is appropriate 
and becoming (NE IX.2, 1165a14-7; cf. NE III.1, 1110a27-35).   
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We should not avoid the task of giving an account in each case, according to Aristotle, 
but do the best we can (1165a35).   
 I want to suggest that diaphora in this second and looser sense as ‘individuating 
feature’ explains Aristotle’s remark that the subject matter of political science makes it 
unapt for exact science.  Diaphorai are those variations between paying a father’s ransom 
versus paying a friend’s ransom (to whom?), between paying back a generous loan versus 
a smaller loan (what quantity?), and so on. These sorts of things must be brought to the 
table when deliberating about what to do.  I believe that Aristotle thought of these 
features as the very features which prompt him to say that matters in political science 
hold only ‘for the most part.’  In the next chapter, I develop this idea in more detail, 
explaining what those individuating features of a person’s condition and environment 
might be and the way in which we can find the same account of deliberation and 
diaphora in the Hippocratic Corpus.    
 We have now seen ways to explain why an account of politics might be inexact.  
First, the account has a practical aim, rather than a theoretical aim – namely, to make 
people good.  The result is that less precision is required from the account.  But this lack 
of precision should not be envisioned as a relaxing of explanatory standards.  That is, 
even the person giving the practical account must provide a ‘because’ to back up his 
claims.  However, the explanation in question may rely upon facts of perception, rather 
than rational arguments.  Since the former are less exact than the latter, Aristotle will 
claim that the practical account is relatively inexact.   
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 Second, the account of politics is inexact because of its subject matter.  Most 
commentators explain this point by appealing to matter (hulê) – i.e. enmattered objects 
are prone to variation and the breaking of patterns determined by form.  While I do not 
think that this is incorrect, I believe it is not the entire story.  Aristotle also appeals to the 
notion of diaphora to characterize the nature of the subject matter of politics and the 
sense in which politics is inexact.  Diaphora refers to the variations or individuating 
features of a situation that are introduced into the deliberations of agents.  They include 
matters such as: to whom? How much? To what extent? How long? And so on.   
5  Terminology for Inexactness 
With this explanation of the inexactness of politics in hand, we can move on to 
consider briefly the various artful ways of communicating the fact that the account in 
question is not exact.  One such idea is that of the outline, or tupos.  For example, 
Aristotle claims that the “whole account of matters of conduct” must be given in outline 
(tupôi) and not precisely (akribôs).” Tupos originally referred to a ‘blow’: hence, its 
related meanings: impression, mould, engaving, or sculpture.  For example, Aeschylus 
uses the term to describe the appearance of Argonaut women in Suppliant Women.  They 
appear to have the “Cyprian impress” that craftsman give to their images of Cyprian 
women.  Similarly, Plato sometimes refers to the idea of the soul as being a mould on 
which a stamp can be imprinted (Th. 191d, Rep. 377b). 124 
                                                
124 The references to ‘tupos,’ in particular, are numerous.  Aristotle uses the term in the 
dative: ‘in outline’: De Anima, 413a9, 416b30, 424a16.  Politics, 1276b19; 1302a19; 
1323a10; 1335b5.  Topics 101a18, 101a22, 103a1, a7; 105b19; The uses in the 
Nicomachean Ethics are especially numerous (at eleven). In some cases, Aristotle means 
‘for example’ (tupôi, Cat. I.1, 1b28; I.10, 11b20). 
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Aristotle uses tupos to refer to an outline.  Because detail would be contrary to 
the purpose of the inquiry, an outline of the idea is sufficient.  Hence, in the Topics, 
Aristotle writes that only an outline of deduction is needed.  He contrasts an outline of the 
definition with a more precise definition.  The outline, according to Aristotle, is sufficient 
for our ability to understand what follows.   
The foregoing must stand for an outline (tupôi) of the species of deduction.  In 
general, in regard both to all that we have already discussed and to those which 
we shall discuss later, we may remark that that amount of distinction between 
them may suffice, because it is not our purpose to give a precise definition (akribê 
logon) of any of them; we merely want to describe them in outline (tupôi): we 
consider it quite enough from the point of view of the line of inquiry before us to 
be able to recognize each of them in some sort of way (Top. I.1, 101a18-24).   
 
The purpose of the treatise is to get at the nature of dialectical deduction (110a23).  
Hence, the discussion of deduction, at large, takes one away from the purpose of the 
inquiry.  With that in mind, Aristotle defines deduction; the two kinds of deduction, 
demonstration and dialectical deduction; and fallacies briefly (100a25-101a17).  Each is 
the subject of its own inquiry in other treatises.  Epistêmê is the subject of Prior Analytics 
and of Posterior Analytics, insofar as they are treated as one work (Pr. An. I.1, 24a10-
11).  Deduction is the subject of the Prior Analytics.  Aristotle claims that it must be dealt 
with before proceeding to a discussion of demonstration, since demonstration is a kind of 
deduction (Pr An, I.4, 25b27-31). Demonstration is dealt with in the Posterior Analytics. 
Fallacies are treated in Sophistical Refutations.  Of course, dialectical demonstration is 
the subject of the Topics.  Aristotle’s claim in the passage, then, can be read as the point 
that, in effect, ‘this is the subject of another work.’ 
A second reason for giving an outline is to offer a summary of the text to come.   
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For example, Aristotle writes in an introductory section of Historia Animalium that his 
aim, so far, has been only to convey a summary of the topics that will be dealt with in the 
rest of the treatise:  
These preceding statements, then, have been put forward in outline (en tupôi), as a 
kind of foretaste (geumatos) concerning the number and sorts of things we will 
consider (theorein), because we will speak with more precision (akribeias) about 
them later, so that, to begin with, the variations (diaphora) and common 
properties (sumbebekota) will come into view (my translation) (Historia 
Animalium, I.6, 491a7-10).  
 
These sorts of remarks are also often accompanied by a promissory note.  The outline 
will be filled in later in greater detail (Historia Animalium, 487a12, 491a8), by others 
(NE I.7, 1098a25), or in a more appropriate place (De An II.6, 416b30).   
A term closely related to tupos in its use is graphos or perigraphos. Both graphos 
and perigraphos have the connotation ‘picture’ or ‘sketch.’ Aristotle uses graphos and 
perigraphos to capture the idea of a sketch that can be filled in or made more detailed.  
Hence, he writes: 
Let this service as an outline (perigraphos) of the good, for we must presumably first 
sketch (hupotupesthai) it roughly, and then later fill in the details (anagrapsai).  But it 
would seem that anyone is capable of carrying on and articulating what has once been 
well outlined (perigraphos)….(NE I.7, 1098a20-4; cf.  1113b21, 1113a15-6).  
 
Similarly, in Generation of Animals, Aristotle explains the order in which different parts 
of the body are generated in an embryo using perigraphos as a metaphor.  He claims that 
the upper half of the body develops first, then the lower half.  Each organ, meanwhile, 
takes on the inchoate shape it will more definitely adopt later.  Aristotle compares this 
process with that of the artist who first draws his main lines, only later filling in the 
colors.  
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All the parts are first marked out in their outlines (perigraphais) and acquire 
later on their color and softness or hardness, exactly as if nature were a painter 
producing a work of art, for painters, too, first sketch (hupograpsantes) in the 
animal with lines and only after than put in the colors (Generation of Animals, II. 
6, 743b20-22). 
 
A rendition of a thing in broad brushstrokes can be either good or bad, to the artist’s 
purpose or not.  It can enhance the important aspects of an image; but it can also obscure 
important information.  Aristotle takes the latter view when he remarks in the 
Metaphysics that an outline of the nature of substance shows that it is not predicated of a 
subject, but it is that of which other things are predicated (VII.3, 1029a7-8).  The account, 
as it stands, is unclear (1029a8).  Moreover, the account in outline form suggests that 
substance is matter.  Further reflection shows that the latter point is unacceptable: 
substance should be separable and individual, but matter is neither (1029a27-8).   
Conclusion 
In the previous chapter, we saw that the particularist interpretation of Aristotelian 
deliberation is based on Aristotle’s remarks about inexactness and exactness, the 
variability in the subject matter of politics (1094a16), the claim that politics hold only 
‘for the most part’ (1094b21), and the idea that principles in politics can be expressed 
only schematically, or in ‘in outline’ (e.g. 1094b11-27).  According to the particularist, 
these passages show that, for Aristotle, there are no principles according to which we 
deliberate about ethical matters.   
In this chapter of the dissertation, I have attempted to place Aristotle’s remarks 
about akribeia in the context of scientific thought in Aristotle’s time.  We saw that 
Aristotle associated exactness with a class of sciences that are characterized by simple 
and abstract objects of study.  We also saw that politics is not an exact science for 
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Aristotle,  and we considered some of the reasons why this might be so.  The 
Nicomachean Ethics presents a practical account of politics, and the degree to which 
precision can be achieved in such an account is small; similarly, the subject matter of 
politics makes any account of politics imprecise.  I suggested that diaphora, or variation, 
might play an important role in explaining why politics is inexact from the perspective of 
the deliberating agent.  This chapter should have shown that the texts to which the 
particularist appeals take on a different guise when viewed in the context of Aristotle’s 
thoughts about exact science.  
In the next chapter, we will see that many of the same ideas and concerns were 
echoed in the Hippocratic Corpus.  Medical writers also claimed that medicine lacks 
exactness.  They insist that claims in medicine also hold ‘mostly’ and that only schematic 
accounts of medicine can be given.  For medical claims hold ‘in summary.’  Medical 
writers also appeal to ‘variation’ to explain why medicine lacks exactness.  These are 
important parallels between Aristotle’s ethics and the Hippocratic Corpus.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Inexact Science in the Hippocratic Corpus 
 
In the past chapter, we saw that exactness was a scientific ideal for Aristotle and that 
politics fell short of that ideal.  Aristotle expresses this fact by claiming that politics is not 
‘exact’ (akribês) and by calling attention to the fact that matters concerning the human 
good hold ‘for the most part’ (hôs epi to polu).  Because politics has these features, one 
can give only a schematic account of politcs  a sketch or ‘outline’ (tupos).   To explain 
why politics is inexact, Aristotle invokes the notion of ‘variation’ (diaphora).  
 The purpose of the current chapter is to show that important parallels can be 
drawn between the aforementioned aspects of Aristotle’s account of politics and the 
Hippocratic Corpus.  (1) Just as Aristotelian politics is not exact, medicine is also 
described as lacking exactness.  Similarly, (2) just as claims in politics hold ‘for the most 
part’ (hôs epi to polu), claims in medicine also hold ‘mostly’ (hôs epi to pleiston, polu, de 
polu.  Moreover, medical writers claim – as Aristotle claims about politics  that only 
schematic accounts can be given of empirically messy phenomena, and they express this 
idea by writing that medical claims hold ‘in summary’ (en kephalaioi).  (3) Finally, 
medical writers also appeal to ‘variation’ (diaphora) to explain inexactness in medicine, 
just as Aristotle appeals to diaphora to explain inexactness in politics.     
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 The first part of the chapter shows that medical writers describe medicine as 
inexact and that they use several important terms and related ideas to do so: akribeia and 
atrekeia.  The second part of the chapter charts the use of ‘for the most part’ claims in the 
Hippocratic Corpus.  It also presents the Hippocratic equivalent of Aristotle’s notion of a 
schematic account of principles – the account given ‘in summary’ (en kephalaioi).  In the 
third section of the chapter, I discuss possible causes of medicine’s inexactness – for 
example, the complexity of cases and the extent to which success with patients depends 
on the patient’s report of his or her own condition.  The fourth part of the chapter shows 
that, just as Aristotle explained inexactness by appeal to ‘variation,’ medical writers also 
explained inexactness by appealing to ‘variation.’  
1  Inexactness in Medicine 
 
Just as Aristotle describes politikê as inexact, ancient medicine was also described as 
lacking in exactness.  Moreover, several of the features associated with the inexact 
science – namely, variation among cases (diaphora), phenomena that hold only ‘for the 
most part’ (hôs epi to polu), and the outline form (tupos) are also alluded to in the 
Hippocratic Corpus.   
In the Hippocratic Corpus, akribês has much the same meaning it has in 
Aristotle’s works, for it refers to the idea of precision.125  In some cases, it refers to the 
idea of a careful diet or therapeutic procedures (Aphorisms, I.4, I.5, I.6; De Aff. 13; 
Vectiarius 35; De Fract. 8, 26).  In some cases, it refers to the idea of well defined 
                                                
125 For references to akribeia, or the lack of it, see:  Prog. Ch. 20 L II 168.16 ff, Fract. 
Ch. 7, L III 440.2 ff., Art. Ch. 69, L IV 286.7 ff, Morb. I. ch 16, L VI 170.2 ff.  Vict. I 
ch.2, L VI 470.13 ff.  Vict. III ch. 67, L VI 592.I ff., 594. I; VM ch. 9-12; CMG I, I 41.20.   
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periodicities in diseases (De Morbis, I.2).  It is also related to the precision of one’s 
knowledge (VM 9.14; 20.13; De Diatae in Morbis 6). 
According to some treatises of the Hippocratic Corpus, medicine lacks exactness.  
For example, the author of Regimen writes that, to the extent that health consists in a 
balance between good eating habits and exercise, a balance between eating and exercise 
cannot be achieved.  The balance cannot be struck with ‘nicety.’126  Here, the use of 
akribês is in reference to precise measurement. 
As I have said above, it is impossible to treat of the regimen of men with such a 
nicety (akribeian) as to make the exercises exactly proportionate to the amount of 
food (III.67.1-5).127   
 
The basic methodological principle of regimen is that health can be controlled by diet.  
But Regimen adds successive layers of complication to that principle.  The regulation of 
food, by itself, is insufficient to maintain health (I.2).  It is also necessary to take 
exercise.  Food and exercise have opposite effects on the body.  The exercise ‘uses up’ 
the materials in the body.  By contrast, food makes the body grow.  Health is constituted 
by the correct balance between food and exercise (III.69).  If food overpowers exercise or 
if exercise overpowers food, the patient becomes ill.  The regimen for restoring the 
balance involves alterations to diet, to exercise patterns, abstinence, sexual intercourse, 
vomiting, extra walks and baths.  But adjusting the amount of food needed to the amount 
of exercise taken is not a straightforward matter.   
                                                
126 Compare the notion of balance here to that of ‘kata logon’ in Prohhretic II.23 (cf. 
Prorrhetic II.1)   
127 Unless otherwise noted, all translations of the works of the Hippocratic Corpus are 
from the Loeb series, with the exception of On Ancient Medicine, for which I use 
Schiefsky’s commentary.  The Greek here is:  Peri\ de\ diai/thj a)nqrwpi/nhj, w3sper 
moi kai\ pro&sqen ei1rhtai, cuggra&yai me\n ou)x oi[o&n te e0j a)kribei/hn, w3ste pro_j to_ 
plh~qojtou~ si/tou th_n cummetri/hn poie/esqai tw~n po&nwn: 
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Other passages explain why it is difficult to find the precise balance between 
food and exercise.  As might be expected, finding the balance requires knowledge of the 
strength of the exercises and the right relationship between food and exercise.  But the 
doctor must know much more than the mere facts about food and exercise – namely, the 
constitution of the patient (phusis), his age, the season of the year, how the wind behaves 
where the patient lives, and other features of the place in which the patient abides.  To 
discover the precise relation of food and exercise for any individual patient, all of this 
must be known. 
However, there are many obstacles to knowledge of these things, such as variation 
among patients’ constitutions, ages, places, seasons, times of year, and so on.  There are 
also variations among food.  
As I have said above, it is impossible to treat of the regimen of men with such a 
nicety (eis akribeiên) as to make the exercises exactly proportionate to the amount 
of food.  There are many things to prevent this. First, the constitutions of men 
differ (hai phuseis tôn anthrôpôn diaphoroi) dry constitutions, for instance, are 
more or less dry as compared with themselves or as compared with one another.  
Similarly, with moist constitutions, or with those of any other kind.  Then, the 
various ages have different needs.  Moreover, there are the situations of districts, 
the shiftings of the winds, the changes of the seasons, and the constitution of the 
year.  Foods themselves exhibit many differenes; the variations between wheat 
and wheat, wine and wine, and those of the various other articles of 
diet….(III.1).128 
 
                                                
128 Peri\ de\ diai/thj a)nqrwpi/nhj, w3sper moi kai\ pro&sqen ei1rhtai, cuggra&yai me\n 
ou)x oi[o&n te e0j a)kribei/hn, w3ste pro_j to_ plh~qojtou~ si/tou th_n cummetri/hn 
poie/esqai tw~n po&nwn: poulla_ ga_r ta_ kwlu&onta. Prw~ton me\n ai9 fu&siej tw~n 
a)nqrw&pwn dia&foroi e0ou~sai: kai\ ga_r ai9 chrai\ au)tai\ e9wutw~n pro_j au)ta_j kai\ 
pro_j a1lla ma~llon kai\ h{sson chrai\, kai\ u(grai\ w(sau&twj, kai\ ai9 a1llai pa~sai: 
e1peita ai9 h(liki/ai ou) tw~n au)tw~n deo&menai: e1ti de\ kai\ tw~n xwri/wn ai9 qe/siej, kai\  
tw~n pneuma&twn ai9 metabolai\, tw~n te w(re/wn ai9 metasta&siej, kai\ tou~ e0niautou~ 
ai9 katasta&siej: au)tw~n te tw~n si/twn pollh_ diafora& puroi/ te ga_r purw~n kai\ 
oi]noj oi1nou kai\ ta1lla o3sa diaiteo&meqa, pa&nta dia&fora e0o&nta a)pokwlu&ei mh_ 
dunato_n ei]nai e0j a)kribei/hn cuggrafh~nai. 
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The factors discussed here can be grouped conveniently into ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
obstacles to knowledge.  The internal are those that manifest themselves in the patient – 
for example, age and constitution.  The doctor must know whether the patient’s 
constitution is dry or wet.  In connection with this point, it is worth mentioning that the 
patient’s constitution might have been difficult to discern, based as it is on internal 
features – hidden from the doctor’s view – of the patient’s body.  The doctor would thus 
have relied on signs (semeia) to determine a patient’s nature.  There are also relevant 
external factors.  These include location, winds affecting the location, and season. 
Finally, there are also external factors related to food and drink.  The author claims that 
food and drinks themselves have many variations.  
Variation among all these things, the author concludes, “prevent its being possible 
to lay down rigidly exact rules in writing” (III.1).  In the Greek, ‘eis akribeiên’ functions 
as an adverbial clause modifying the sungraphanai.  Hence it refers to the written 
account of medicine, rather than the subject matter.  The author likely means that, given 
both the multitude of factors affecting the proper balance of food and exercise for any 
given patient and the range along which any of these factors might be relevant, all of the 
rules of determining the balance of food and exercise cannot be written down.  For 
example, once it become imperative to make different versions of a rule for each age – 
young, adult, elderly – one can see that the number of written rules would grow by three 
times its original size.  When we consider the prospect of doing the same for each of the 
categories mentioned above – constitution, age, time of year, winds, places – we can see 
that the number of written rules would grow exponentially.   
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 In addition to akribês, the Hippocratic Corpus also uses atrekês to express the 
notion of exactness.  The term atrekês is closely related to akribês but different in that it 
more frequently refers to accuracy in counting.129.  Hence, Herodotus uses atrekês to 
capture the idea of an accurate count (arithmos) of the people in Xerxes armies (7.187; 
cf. 7.60).  He also uses atrekês to refer to the length of time needed to make a journey – 
for example, whether it will take twenty days or twenty-one days (5.54).   
In the Hippocratic Corpus, atrekês is quite commonly used to express the idea of 
precise measurements of length of time.  For example, in Prognosis, the author writes 
that acute diseases tend to heal in certain intervals of time: typically, intervals of four to 
twenty days.  But, the author writes, it is difficult to calculate the length of time in terms 
of whole days.    
So in the most acute diseases, keep on adding periods of four days, up to twenty, to 
find the time when the attacks end.  None of them, however, can be exactly (atrekeôs) 
calculated in whole days (Prog. 20 L II 168.16; cf. Fleshes,19).130 
 
This passage refers to crisis theory.  This is idea that diseases displayed patterns of 
development with critical moments at which the disease would change – for better or 
worse – happening at particular intervals.  The passage explains that attacks in acute 
diseases take place a regular intervals.  These intervals may not be given in full days (e.g. 
four days), but rather in fractions (e.g. four and a half days).   
Atrekês is also used in the Hippocratic Corpus to capture the sense in which a 
time interval could be exact or inexact. For example, in Fractures, the author writes that  
                                                
129 For an excellent summary of the distinction between these terms, see Schiefsky 2005, 
203-205.   
130 Au{tai me\n ou}n e0k tw~n o)cuta&twn noushma&twn dia_ tessa&rwn e0j ta_j ei1kosin e0k 
prosqe/sioj teleutw~sin. Ou) du&natai de\ o3lh|sin h(me/rh|sin ou)de\n toute/wn @1  
a)riqme/esqai a)treke/wj.   
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It takes about thirty days altogether as a rule for the bone of the forearm to 
unite.  But there is nothing exact (atrekes) about it, for both constitutions and ages 
differ (diaphora) greatly (On Fractures. 7).131 
 
According to the author, the forearm typically heals in thirty days.  But depending on the 
constitution of the patient, there may be some variation (diaphora).  The passage suggests 
that, if the patient is especially old, for example, a broken arm may take longer to heal.  If 
the patient is young and fit, the arm may heal more quickly. Atrekês can also attach to the 
notion of time intervals, but in the sense of knowledge of time intervals.  For example, the 
author of De Morbis writes that it is difficult to know exactly the period within which a 
patient will die, even to the extent that it is difficult to determine whether the period will 
be long or short (Morb. I. 16).   
2  ‘For the Most Part’ claims in the Hippocratic Corpus 
A number of other terms alert us to the presence of uncertainty or inexactness in 
medicine, including hôs epi to polu.132  So, for example: 
(1) Those who have frequent dislocations of the shoulder are usually (hôs epi to 
pleiston/ polu) able to put it in for themselves (On Joints, 2).133 
 
(2) To sum up – dislocations and slipping of joints vary among themselves in amount 
and are sometimes much greater, sometimes much less.  In cases where the 
slipping or dislocation is greater, it is, in general (de polu) harder to reduce (On 
Joints 59). 
 
Hôs epi to polu is used in these passages to announce the status of a generalization about 
phenomena.  It refers to generalizations to which there may be exceptions.  For example, 
                                                
131 En trih&konta de\ ma&lista th|~si cumpa&sh|si kratu&netai (5)o)ste/a ta_ e0n tw|~ ph&xei to_ 
e0pi/pan: a)treke\j de\ ou)de/n. ma&la ga_r kai\ fu&sij fu&sioj, kai\ h(liki/h h(liki/hj 
diafe/rei. 
132 See Von Staden 2007. 
133 Osoisi me\n ou}n pukina_ e0kpi/ptei o( w}moj, i9kanoi\ w(j e0pi\ to_ plei=ston au)toi\ 
sfi/sin au)toi=sin e0mba&llein ei0si/n 
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consider the claim above that patients who frequently dislocate their shoulders can 
often (hôs epi to polu) put their shoulder joints back into place.  The author is saying, in 
effect: patients usually put their shoulders back into place.  In some cases – the relatively 
rare ones – patients are not able to fix their own shoulders.  Similarly, consider the claim 
that the larger the dislocation, the greater the difficulty of replacing the joint.   The author 
means that, in most cases, a greater dislocation makes replacement of the joint more 
difficult.  However, there is the unusual case in which it does not.   
Notice that the claims above are probably not merely backwards-looking.  That is 
to say, they do not merely describe what the doctor has observed in the past.  Rather, the 
claims apply to future treatment as well and can be useful in future treatment.  For 
example, it is useful for a doctor to know that patients who frequently dislocate their 
shoulds are usually able to put them back into place.  One might surmise, moreover, that 
the purpose of noting that something happens ‘for the most part’ is not to indicate that, in 
the past, the doctor has noted that, nine times out of ten, patients can replace their own 
shoulders.  Rather, the purpose is to alert the doctor to the reliability of that claim as 
advice for future treatment.  It says, in effect, that if you are the doctor, know that this 
almost always works, but sometimes it does not.  
Hôs epi to polu occurs in other contexts as well.  It acts sometimes as description 
of location.  For example,  
(1) Even when you expect bones to come away you should use in all such cases the 
method of separate bandages, as I said, beginning generally (hôs epi to polu) with 
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the middle of the bandage as when an under-bandage (hupodesmis) is applied 
from two heads (On Fractures, 32).134  
 
(2) Regulate the process with a view to the shape of the wound that it may be as little 
as possible drawn aside or averted by the bandaging… (On Fractures, 32).  
 
In this passage, the author recommends that the bandage interfere with the wound as little 
as possible.  To accomplish as much, he recommends that the bandage be applied, one 
side starting from the left side of the arm, the other from the right (the method of separate 
bandaging).  The hôs epi to polu applies to the place from which the bandaging should 
start.  The practitioner should start from ‘about’ (hôs epi to polu) the middle of the 
bandage, so that the sides can be applied equally.  The author seems to be referring to the 
same set of considerations we adopt when lacing shoes – i.e. start lacing so that there are 
roughly equal lengths on both the right and left sides of the laces. 
Another important term for indicating the distinction between precision and 
imprecision is ‘in summary’ (en kephalaioi).  It can mean giving a summary or the main 
point.  Hence, in the Laws, the Athenian makes several particular statements about the 
proper education for children (643bd).  At the end, he says in reiteration of his guiding 
thought, that ‘first and foremost’ (kephalaion) education consists in guiding a child 
towards the occupation he will one day master (643d).  Kephalaios can also refer to 
giving a general idea, as opposed to a specific one.  Hence, Xenocrates contrasts the term 
with the term ‘clear’ (saphes)  in Cyropaideia.  A soldier reports to Cyrus that he 
attempted to find an accurate (saphes) count of soldiers in the enemy’s army (6.3.18).  
Cyrus replies that he wants a ballpark figure (to plêthos …en kephalaion).  In this vein, 
                                                
134 Xrh_ de\, kai\ h2n me\n e0lpi/zh|j o)ste/a a)posth&sesqai, tw|~ tro&pw| tw~n o)qoni/wn e0pi\ 
pa~si toi=si toioute/oisi th_n e0pi/desin poie/esqai, e0k me/sou tou~ o)qoni/ou a)rxo&menon 
w(j e0pi\ to_ poulu_, w(j a)po_ du&o a)rxe/wn u(podesmi\j e0pidei=tai: 
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the term can be contrasted with akribeia and compared to tupos.  Hence, Aristotle 
writes that he means only to give a brief discussion of liberality, with the intention of 
filling in his remarks later.  He writes: 
At present we are giving a mere outline (tupôi) or summary (epi kephalaiou), and 
are satisfied with this; later these states will be more exactly (akribesteron) 
determined (dihoristhêtai) (NE II.7, 1107b14). 
 
In the Hippocratic Corpus, kephalaios refers to giving the general idea, as opposed to a  
specific one.  So, for example: 
Speaking generally (en kephalaion) all parts of the body which have a function if 
used in moderation and exercised in labors to which each is accustomed, become 
thereby healthy and well-developed, and age slowly (On Joints 58; cf. On Fractures, 
45; 43). 
 
In the passage, describes specific cases in which overuse or underuse of a limb causes its 
atrophy – for example, the joints of the hip bone.  If they are dislocated and left 
unreduced, the leg atrophies from misuse and lack of proper exercise. “If, then, the 
displacement is unreduced, the thigh bone gets short and the whole leg deteriorates, and 
becomes much more undeveloped and devoid of flesh because it gets no exercise” (58).  
The author concludes with a statement of the general principle this case instantiates.  He 
claims that the parts of the body have a use, and function well in that use, provided that 
they are not overused or neglected.135  One can observe the same use of the term, but at 
the beginning of the passage, where it indicates that the specific information to follow 
fills out the general claim (On Fractures, 26; cf. 31.14). Synonyms for kephalaios 
include (1) sumpan, where it can mean ‘in general’ or ‘as a whole’ (On Joints, 13.15); 
and (2) epipan, which means ‘on the whole’ or ‘in general’ (On Joints, VII.3; for an 
                                                
135 This use is similar to that we see in the passage from Plato’s Laws above. 
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example that follows the use in Cyropaideia).  We also see the use of the general, as 
opposed to the specific, idea in On Fractures (7.6, 14.18, 31.16, 33.11). 
 
3  The Causes of Inexactness 
 We have seen that the Hippocratic writers acknowledged a certain amount of 
uncertainty in their prescriptions, and that in expressing the idea that medicine was not 
exact, they used terms and ideas much like those Aristotle uses to capture the idea that 
politics is inexact.  But to what did they attribute the cause of the inexactness?   
One reason is that there were so many stages of the treatment during which the people 
involved – both the patient and the physician - could make a mistake.  Consider, for 
example, one particular case: the procedure that would have lead to the healing of a 
broken arm.  In On Fractures, the author claims that fractures usually heal in thirty days, 
but that there is nothing ‘exact’ (atrekês) about this number.  He cites the difficulty in 
prediction as being related to the ‘variation’ (diaphora) among the patient’s cases.  We 
will come back to the term diaphora in a moment.  But in the meantime, let us consider 
the obstacles to making such a prediction. 
Many circumstances will affect the rate at which the arm heals.  The opening chapters 
of the treatise convey the difficulty of getting the initial stage of the bandaging for a 
broken limbs correct.  It is very important to make the initial set of bandages in a natural 
position for the arm – i.e. so that none of the bones will be in a distorted position (3.33).  
The experienced doctor will be able to detect as much (3.52).  The bandaging process 
itself requires that the linen bandage be applied so that the patient’s hand is a little higher 
than the elbow.  Differential pressure should be applied at the wrappings for each part of 
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the arm.  Finally, another set of bandages should be applied from either the top of the 
arm to the bottom, or the bottom to the top of the arm (4).   
Whether this has been done correctly will depend on the report of the patient.  The 
patient should report that, for the first few days, the pressure of the bandage feels as if it 
increases, rather than decreases.  This is a sign of due measure (5.7).  The patient’s hand 
should begin to swell a little (5.9) – another sign of due measure.  Hence, the author 
writes: 
If any of the said conditions are lacking, you may conclude that the bandaging was 
slacker than the mean (metriou)… and if you first bandaging hit the proper mean, this 
one should be a little tighter. (On Fractures, 5)136 
 
The writer does not remark that the doctor’s dependence on the patient’s report 
compromised his case.  However, the fact that doctors depended on patient’s reports of 
their conditions was an important consideration for several Hippocratic writers in 
assessing the degree to which doctors could have exact knowledge of patient cases. (On 
Ancient Medicine, 1, 9; Morb. I. ch 16, L VI 170.2 ff.) 
On the third day, the pressure should decrease and the bandages should loosen.  If this 
does not happen, the doctor can conclude that the bandaging was in deficiency of the 
mean (5.17-8), and the next round of bandaging should be made tighter.  Similarly, if the 
bandage was too strong to begin with, the next round of bandages should be looser (5.20-
2).  This careful attention to the tightness of the bandaging (5) and the position of the 
bandages (6) continues until a splint is put on the arm (6).  Splints should be left on the 
                                                
136 This is one of several passages in On Fractures which refers to the idea of the mean.  
In general, the treatise is excellent as an example of the doctrine of the mean put to 
scientific use.  It uses terms related to the mean, such as: metriotates, meso(i), epikairos 
and kairos.  
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arm for approximately twenty days (7.1-4).  During this period and afterwards, the 
patient should take a light diet, avoiding meat and wine (7).   
One can imagine that, at any stage of this process, the doctor will make an error about 
the proper positioning of the arm in the bandage, the tightness or looseness of the 
bandages, the decision when to apply the splint, and the length of time during which the 
splint should be on the arm.  The doctor’s assessment, moreover, will depend on the 
patient’s report of his own condition (“Does it feel as if the bandage is getting 
increasingly tight over two days time?”).  Any number of mistakes can be made along the 
way.   
Hence, the writer acknowledges, we cannot say for certain how long it will take the 
forearm to heal, and the claim is meant quite literally.  The rate at which the bone heals 
could take any length of time.  Thirty days is an estimate.  But the author also makes 
clear that his aim in composing the treatise on fractures is not to give precise estimates of 
the length of time it take bones to heal, the number of wrappings which should be made 
around a broken limb, the tightness with which the bandage should be applied, and so on.  
Rather, the author states his aim simply as: 
This discourse (logos) gives a sort of normal rule (nomos dikaios) for the treatment of 
fractures, how one should handle them surgically, and the results of correct handling 
(7.28-30).  
 
If anything goes wrong, moreover, the author cites lack of care in the bandaging.  While 
the beginning of the treatise gives an overview of the proper treatment for a broken limb, 
the rest of the treatise provides specific information about the way to treat certain kinds 
of injuries.   
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We have just seen that Hippocratic doctors might justifiably have believed 
that the complexity of patient’s cases – along with complicated paths of diseases – made 
medicine an inexact science.  This point is also reflected in the broader historical trends 
in medical treatment of the time. Techniques of regimen became increasingly complex in 
the late fifth and fourth centuries, ultimately requiring that a doctor master a large range 
of information about particular patients and their environments in order to administer 
successful treatment. 
Originally, regimen was not a philosophical or theory-laden science.  It had 
consisted exclusively in the administration of food and drinks.137  However, in the late 
fifth century, the doctor Herodicus of Selymbria communicated his medical findings to 
intellectuals and philosophers (Rep. 405d-406c).138  Afterwards, there was a flurry of 
interest in spelling out the details of regimen in a more theoretical and systematic form.  
Several treatises on regimen date from this period of burgeoning theoretical inquiry: 
Regimen, Epidemics, Regimen in Health, Regimen in Acute Diseases, Airs Waters Places 
and Nutriment.   
Regimen was to undergo yet more significant developments later in the fourth 
century in the work of Mneistheus, Praxagoras, Dieuches and Diocles of Carystus.139  
These scientists conducted more sophisticated and detailed research on regimen than their 
                                                
137 Nutton 2004, 96.   
138 See also Regimen I.1, which reports that “many” have written on the subject of 
regimen.  Similarly, see Democritus, DK 58.   
139 For the full list:  Acron of Agrigentum, Philistion of Locri, Dieuches, Erasistratus, 
Galen (Health, 1-6; On the Faculties of Foods, 1-3).  Oribasius (books 1 and 4), 
Hierophilios 
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Hippocratic predecessors.140  For example, Mneistheus made observations of the 
effects of diets on children.  Praxagoras advanced the study of the various structures of 
the body and the effects of food upon these, including the womb, heart and blood vessels.  
Diocles wrote a long treatise on dietetics, Hygiene, in which he spoke not only to the 
treatment of illnesses, but to the maintenance of health through exercise and proper 
diet.141  Some fourth century doctors advanced regimen by writing extremely detailed 
studies of the effects of various foods upon the body.  While this kind of work had been 
attempted in the Hippocratic treatise On Regimen, there was more widespread pursuit of 
the project in the fourth century.  Diphilus of Siphnos, for example, gave a thorough 
catalogue of foods, dwelling on specific foods such as cherries, mushrooms, and mussels.  
He explains, in detail, the effects of green apples on the stomach, distinguishing between 
ripe and unripe green apples.  The unripe apple causes constipation and the production of 
bile.  The ripe apple, on the other hand, acts as a laxative.142   Dieuches also wrote at 
greater length than the Hippocratics about the preparation of food.  For example, he 
recommends that dry breads are good for treating illnesses associated with excess 
phlegm.  He also explains the way to make dry bread:  Make a dough from spelt, making 
sure that the flour is fine and thoroughly milled.  The dough must be softer than that 
which could be cooked in a earthenware vessel; it should be placed on the fire, in the 
ashes and covered with ashes, the embers on top in order that the surface of the bread is 
scorched.  
                                                
140 Nutton 2004, 125.   
141 See fragments: 176-7, 188, 191, 200, 222-3, 225, 228-9, 233.   
142 Diphilius’s views are preserved in Athenaeus’s Deipnosophists.  See Book 3 for the 
discussion of green apples.   
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One of the major developments of this time period was the view that regimen 
dealt not only with food, drink and their effects on the body proper.   Instead, as the view 
developed, the subject matter of dietetics included several other aspects of life as well.  A 
doctor must take any of the following into account:  the age of the patient, the season of 
the year, the disposition of the land (i.e. whether it is a typically arid or humid region); 
the patient’s habits (e.g. whether he tends to have two or three meals a day, how many 
baths, at what time, etc.); last, he must know the patient’s constitution (phusis).   For 
example, the author of Regimen in Health claims that, the doctor must know: “ age, 
season, habit (ethos), land, and physique” (2).  Similarly, in Regimen, the doctor is 
expected to be familiar with the following domains of expertise: the primary constituents 
of the cosmos, phusis, food, exercise, weather, geography, and astronomy.   
4  Diaphora 
In the current section of this chapter, I would like to examine this idea of 
categories of information with which the doctor should be familiar in order to treat a 
patient. During the period from which most Hippocratic treatises date, this idea was a 
topos of many medical texts.  Moreover, a semi-technical term was often used to convey 
the idea– namely, diaphora for ‘variation.’  I believe that this is the closest the medical 
corpus comes to giving a formal explanation of inexactness in medicine.   
In the previous chapter, I suggested that Aristotle uses diaphora in at least two, 
distinct ways.  First, there is the technical meaning of the term – i.e. the notion of 
diaphora as differentia, or the quality that distinguishes a species from other members of 
the same genus.  Aristotle also uses the term to capture the idea of relevant, individuating 
characteristics.  I suggested that this notion of diaphora was used in the Nicomachean 
 
 
118 
Ethics to explain the inexactness in political science.  There, diaphora is a property of 
the subject matter of political science, such that it refers to important individual variations 
from case to case.143   
In the Hippocratic Corpus, diaphora is less precisely defined.  Like our notion of 
‘variation,’ the term takes on several everyday meanings.  For example, diaphora can 
refer to the substantive ‘variation’ – as in a variation in a quality   for example, length.  
Hence, Herodotus writes that there is a small ‘variation’ in the stadia from the 
Mediterranean Sea to Heliopolis and from Athens to Pisa (2.7).  Diaphora can also refer 
to variations as in ‘it makes a variation.’ Hence, in On Joints, the author writes, “it makes 
a great ‘variation’ if the patient lies down, and fourteen days suffice if he keeps at rest” 
(14).   
But diaphora also crops up as a semi-technical term in methodological 
discussions.144  A claim will take the form of: (a) multiple variations among patient’s 
cases; and (b) the variations introduce inexactness in treatment or knowledge of patients.  
For example: 
Some patients that have the diseases of this kind and from these factors, succumb 
within a short time, others drag on much longer.  For one body differs (diaphora) 
from another, one affection from another, and one season in which to be ill from 
another; some patients are more able to endure the stress of diseases, while others 
are totally incapable of enduring. It is certainly not possible to know precisely 
(akribes) and to state correctly the period within which a patient will die, not even 
whether it will be long or short. (Morb. I.16. 1-9).145   
                                                
143 Passages not mentioned below, but relevant, include: Airs Waters and Places, 13, 24; 
Prorrheticon 2; On Foods, 25.   
144 For pre-Aristotelian accounts of categories, see the Pythagorean table of principles 
and Plato, esp. Sophist (being, rest, motion, same and other); Philebus (infinte, finite, 
mixture, unity and cause of unity);  
145 Ou{toi o(ko&soi toiouto&tropa noush&mata i1sxousi kai\ a)po_ tou&twn, e1nioi me\n di' 
o)li/gou a)po&lluntai, e1nioi de\ poulu_n xro&non e3lkousin: diafe/rei ga_r sw~ma 
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The author’s claim is that there are variations (diaphorai) among patients in terms of 
affections, seasons, bodies and capacity for endurance.  Because there are such variations, 
it is impossible to know exactly when a patient will die.  We see that phusis refers here to 
the individual constitution (“one body differs from another”).  A second individuating 
feature of the case is the individual’s capacity for endurance, and this is probably a 
consequence of the strength of his constitution.  The phusis of the disease is relevant as 
well.  Just as the human body follows a path of development delineated by its phusis, a 
disease, too, might have a phusis, and thus a certain path of development. 
Other passages introduce additional categories of variation, as I mentioned earlier:  
the age of the patient, the season of the year in which the disease was contracted, the 
season of the year in which the patient is being treated, the disposition of the land, the 
patient’s habits and constitution (phusis).   Relevant categories of variations may even 
include weather patterns, geographical location, and patterns of stars during contraction 
of the illness. 
These accounts invite some comparison with an Aristotelian doctrine of the 
categories, which also proposes that ‘things that are said’ (ta legomena) can be analyzed 
according to a set of ten categories including: substance, quantity, quality, relations, and 
so on.  A more natural comparison is the group of categories in Aristotle’s doctrine of the 
mean.  In order to hit the mean in being angry, for example, the decision maker must 
                                                                                                                                            
sw&matoj, kai\ h(liki/h h(liki/hj, kai\ pa&qhma paqh&matoj: kai\ oi9 me\n talaipwro&teroi/ 
ei0sin e0n th|~si nou&soisin, oi9 de\ panta&pasi talaipwre/ein a)du&natoi. Ou1koun e0sti\ to_ 
a)kribe\j ei0de/nai  (5)kai\ tuxei=n ei1panta tou~ xro&nou, e0n w|{ a)po&lluntai, ou1te ei0 
pollo_n, ou1t' ei0 o)li/gon: ou)de\ ga_r ou{toj o( xro&noj a)kribh_j, o4n e1nioi le/gousin, 
w(j ta_ polla_, ou)de\ au)to_ tou~to e0kpoie/ei: diafe/rei ga_r kai\ e1toj e1teoj, kai\ w3rh 
w3rhj, e0n h|{ a2n nose/wsin: 
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consider a number of features of his situation: e.g. how long to be angry? To what 
degree to be angry? Towards whom to be angry?  But the tendency among medical 
writers to classify the various items relevant to a patient’s case might equally be part of 
the classifying tendencies that we see most of all in the Hippocratic school of Cos 
(Regimen in Acute Diseases, 1; cf. Diseases II.A).   For example, according to Regimen 
in Acute Diseases, the Cnidians were responsible for categorizing twelve diseases of the 
bladder and four diseases of the kidneys.   
In the medical case, the most important instance of diaphora is phusis, or ‘bodily 
constitution.’  In the Hippocratic Corpus, phusis encompasses a set of features of a being, 
and in particular, those associated with it by birth.  It refers also to the idea of the path of 
development of a being from birth to death.  As Heinrich Von Staden suggests, phusis is 
the idea of a “regularly recurring cluster of characteristics by which one can always 
recognize a thing as what it is.”146  
In some cases, phusis is construed as a cause and contrasted with ‘thought’ as a 
cause.  Hence, in Epidemics, the author writes that the various activities associated with 
the phusis of the human being proceed ‘not from thought,’ but automatically and ‘without 
instruction,’ which makes nature a good doctor in that it corrects itself:   
The body’s nature (phusis) is the physician in disease.  Nature finds the way for 
herself, not from thought.  For example, blinking and the tongue offers their 
assistance, and all similar things.  Well trained, readily and without instruction, 
nature does what is needed.  Tears, moisture of the nostrils, sneezing, ear wax, 
production of saliva in the mouth, the intake of breath, exhalation, yawning, 
coughing, hiccoughing, in a variety of ways” (6.5.1).   
 
                                                
146 Von Staden 2007.  Cf. Schiefsky 2005,  69-70. 
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The metaphor here is that the phusis acts as a physician.  By controlling bodily 
functions that speed recovery – e.g. tearing, sneezing, coughing, etc. – phusis acts, in 
effect, as a physician.  Some of the other examples in the passage – exhalation, yawning, 
and blinking – are less obviously associated with recovery from illness, but rather refer 
more directly to the day-to-day maintenance of the body.   
In some cases, phusis refers to a specific individual’s nature.  We can see this 
contrast between the individual phusis and the study of nature (peri phuseôs) in the 
following passage from On Ancient Medicine.   
…It is impossible to have any clear knowledge about nature (peri phuseôs) from 
any other source than medicine….I mean this science that consists in knowledge 
of what the human being (anthrôpos) is and by what causes it comes to be and all 
the rest, with precision.  For this I think is what it is necessary for a doctor to 
know about nature (peri phuseôs) and to make every effort to know, if he is going 
to do any of the things that he must: what the human being is in relation to foods 
and drinks (20.2-3).   
 
This passage uses phusis in two ways.  First, there is the mention of a study peri phuseôs. 
Peri phuseôs here may refer to the study of nature in the sense that the Presocratics 
studied nature.  In this case, it means an account of human nature “from the beginning, in 
terms of what the human being is and how it originally came to be and from what things 
it was compounded” (20.1).  These aspects of the study of human nature can be 
summarized as the study of: (1) the origins (ex archê) of the human being; (2) the ‘what’ 
of the human being; and (3) the material of which the human being is composed.  We 
lack only the notion of a final cause in order to have an Aristotelian-looking account of 
the four causes.   
But there is another use of phusis in the same passage, and this use should be 
interpreted as a notion of phusis of the individual:    
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Hence, the natures (ai phuseis) of these people differ, and the variation 
concerns the very thing in the body that is hostile to cheese and is stirred up and 
set in motion by it (20.6).   
 
In this passage, the author argues that no simplistic theory of regimen will be sufficient 
for making patients healthy.  For example, one cannot simply adopt the principle that 
cheese or wine is harmful if taken in too much quantity. Instead, one must say that the 
extent to which cheese or wine can be harmful depends on the constitution of the patient.  
But the constitutions of people differ from one another.  Hence, the doctor should say not  
‘simply’ (haplôs) that cheese is harmful if one eats too much. Rather, he should explain 
‘what trouble, and why, and which of the things in the human being it is inimical to.’147  
Why?  Foods and drinks affect the human being ‘differently.’  
The notion that cheese affects people differently requires a notion of the 
individual nature – i.e. some structure that each person has such that he does not share it 
with others.  At the same time, however, there is certainly grounds for the claim that, in 
general, cheese eaten in too great a quantity tends to have a negative effect on health.  
Hence the author claims that ‘cheese is a harmful food’ (2.3).  Similarly, he claims that it 
is true that large quantities of unmixed wine are unhealthy.  It is true in the sense that “all 
who see this state would recognize that this is the power of wine and that it alone is 
responsible” (2.4).  Nevertheless, the author claims, the idea is incomplete.  For wine – 
though it is generally bad when consumed in large quantities – is bad to different degrees, 
depending on the drinker.148   The conclusion of this line of thought is that the right 
theory of medicine is one that studies the relationship between food and people’s bodies 
                                                
147 ti/na te po&non kai\ dia_ ti/ kai\ ti/ni tw~n e0n tw|~ a)nqrw&pw| e0neo&ntwn a)nepith&deion. 
148 Lloyd 1979; Lloyd 1991; Von Staden 2007; Schiefsky 2005, 226, 237, 261-2, and 
304.  
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The doctor should be in the position to state the relationships that hold between kinds 
of foodstuffs and individual natures. 
A second individuating feature of a case is the season. The seasons are typically 
divided into four: winter, spring, summer and fall.  But they might also be divided by 
solstices: i.e. winter solstice, spring equinox, rising of the Pleiads, summer solstice, 
autumn equinox and setting of the Pleiades (Diocles of Carystus, fragment 183a.6, trans. 
Van der Eijk).149  The seasons were regarded as having an effect on the development of a 
disease both in terms of treatment and contraction.  Recovery might be easier in some 
seasons as opposed to others – e.g. the winter rather than the summer.  A disease might 
also be contracted only during certain seasons.   
But there were also common changes to regimen for each season – in very much 
the way that, during the hot summer months, people eat lighter meals.  For example, 
Diocles recommends that, during the winter solstice, one should drink hot liquids, but 
diluted; one should have unmixed wine (wine without water) and decoctions of oregano; 
finally, one should have sexual intercourse (6).  This course of regimen is recommended 
not merely because of the season.  Rather, the more immediate cause is that, during the 
winter solstice, an increased amount of moisture flows downward into the lower regions 
of a person’s body.  Diocles prescribes allopathic remedies (remedy through opposites):  
hot drinks and undiluted wine to counteract the effects of increasingly cool and watery 
moisture in the lower parts of the body.  
 Medical advice for the seasons sometimes sounds as if it were more appropriate to 
a gourmet’s cookbook.  For example, in the Hippocratic Corpus’s Regimen, there is a 
                                                
149 The passage is possibly spurious.   
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detailed list of the various properties of food and the seasons during which to take the 
food.  Similarly, the fourth-century writer Diocles of Carystus wrote extensively about 
food, seasons, and their effects on health.  For instance, Diocles observes that, in the 
winter, the following practices should be observed: 
Garlic and onions and dried fish and thick soups and especially lentil soup are 
appropriate to that season, and of the other dishes roasted rather than boiled food, 
and in general dryer ones rather than wet ones.  More [appropriate] to the winter, 
too, are cardamom and mustard.  As for drinking during dinner, one should take 
dark, thin wine, moderately soft, not young, mixed just a little.  Appropriate to 
that season are roasted almonds, myrrh, roasted acorns, filberts, both boiled and 
roasted.  
 
Mention is made of the food, the preparation of the food, and the appropriate wine and 
spices.  One gets the sense that the focus of this sort of advice is less geared towards 
individual patients as much as towards gourmet season-specific meals.  Indeed, as 
Diocles remarks earlier in the passage: “a bunch of white grapes is good for everyone 
during dinner” (7).   
The focus on living well in these passages – rather, say, than treating diseases 
with food – reflects the fact that regimen was not solely about restoring health, but rather 
about living well too.   We can see this preoccuption both in Diocles’ writings, but also in 
treatises of the Hippocratic Corpus (e.g. Regimen III).    While the term for ‘regimen’ 
diatae, i.e. ‘diet’, has a medicine-specific connotation, it has a broader meaning as well.  
In its medicine-specific context, it refers to a prescribed manner of life, regimen, and in 
particular, diet.  For example, in the Republic, Socrates remarks that the guardians should 
not copy the diet (diêtae) of athletes, since it will make them to drowsy, like athletes who 
have eaten too much (cf. Lovers, 132), and it will be bad for their health, since even a 
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small departure from the prescribed diet has serious effects (Rep. 404a).150  But diêtae 
has a broader meaning as well: a way of living or mode of life.  For example, in the 
Cyropedia, Xenophon describes the Median ‘way of life’ (diêtae) as tacky.  The Medians 
favor makeup and wigs; they wear purple tunics and jewelry.  The Persians, on the other 
hand, lead a plainer life (Cyropedia, 1.3.2).151   The passage above deals with diet in this 
latter sense – namely, as a way of life.   
Another kind of diaphora is the age of the patient.  Time of life affects health.  
Regimen in Health represents the idea as follows.  The younger a person is, the drier and 
hotter his constitution.  The older a person is, the wetter and colder his constitution 
(Regimen in Health, 2).  In many cases, prescriptions are made for specific times of life: 
infancy and old age, for example. Regimen in Health recommends that infants be washed 
for a long time in warm water and be administed well-diluted wine (6).  Diocles 
recommends that old people seldom wet their heads; and instead, that they content 
themselves with anointing themselves occasionally.  In the summer, the liquid to use is 
olive oil mixed with water; in the winter, olive oil mixed with wine (Fragment 182.6, van 
der Eijk).   
Gender should also be taken into account when recommending a regimen to a patient.  
There are four main treatises dealing with women in the Corpus:  Diseases of Women 1 
and 2, Barren Women, and Nature of Women.  Women were recommended to have a diet 
that induced drying properties, since their constitutions were regarded as being naturally 
soft and moist.  (See, for example, Regimen in Health, 6).  Vivian Nutton notes that the 
                                                
150 For the food/exercise specific notion of diêtae, see also Regimen,. 1.1.   
151 For the use of diêtae as a way of life, see : Hdt. 1.36.136  Th. I.6  Euripides. fr. 5.25.5 
Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus, 352, 751 (as in ‘beggarly way of life’).   
 
 
126 
special affordances made for women were especially noticeable where pharmacology 
was concerned.  Substances used to treat women’s ailments were markedly different from 
those of men, containing far more exotic and disgusting materials – for example, 
excrement.  Nutton suggests that the symbolic function of these substances is important.  
If a woman is polluted – for example, by menses – then only a suitably polluting 
substance can be used to treat her.  Another treatment reserved for women was “odor 
therapy,” designed to treat uterine displacement.  The therapy was the placement of either 
sweet or fetid smelling substances near the women’s vagina or nose.  The operative 
assumption, as it is described in the Timaeus (91ad) (the womb is an animal in the 
woman’s body), is that a woman’s womb is a sentient being.152  As a result, it is repulsed 
by bad smells and attracted to good ones.  One might, for example, waft the smell of 
sulphur under an ailing woman’s nose (Morb. Mul. 2). 
Last, there are a number of subjects which might be generally grouped as 
geographical.  These include: soil, waters, winds, and the location of the patient’s city.  
First, for example, region, affects the state of the body.  In general, southern locations are 
said to be dry and hot, thus promoting dryness and hotness in the body.  Similarly, 
northern locations are said to be moist and cold, thus promoting a preponderance of those 
qualities in the body.  Second, winds affect patients.  This can be seen in the following 
ways.  Regimen II, for example, opens with a discussion of the way a doctor may relate 
winds to the patient (38).  All winds, the author claims, have a cooling and moistening 
effect, since all winds are from cool and moist places.  But there are variations because 
there are northerly versus southerly winds.  There are also winds that have passed over 
                                                
152 For discussion of this treatment, see Hanson 1991.   
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the seas, snow, lakes, rivers, land, etc.  All of this changes the degree to which the 
wind possesses qualities of moistness and coolness.  The southern winds which effect 
Libya, for example, are hot and dry for two reasons.  First, the wind has passed under the 
influence of the sun for quite a while as it made its way up from the southern hemisphere.  
Second, the wind does not pass over water as it makes its way.  
The discussions of the effects of geography on health are most famous, perhaps, in 
the Hippocratic treatise Airs, Waters and Places. The treatise, thought to have been 
composed roughly in 430 B.C. is written for the traveling physician who needs to know 
what sorts of diseases to expect in various regions he visits.  The first part of the treatise 
presents a theory of the causes of disease.  The second part develops an account of the 
relationships between region and the physical and mental characteristics of its 
inhabitants. The prologue or epangelma to the piece argues that, to practice medicine, one 
ought to learn the basic principles of environmental theory.  In addition to factors already 
named, these include:  properties of water, position with respect to winds and the risings 
and settings of the sun and soil (e.g. bare, dry wooded, watered).   
Conclusion 
Chapters 3 and 4 of the dissertation have shown that important parallels can be drawn 
between Aristotle’s account of politics and the Hippocratic Corpus.  Both politics and 
medicine are not exact.  Claims in both politics and medicine hold ‘for the most part’ or 
‘mostly’ (hôs epi to polu/ epi to pleiston/ polu/ de polu).  Only schematic accounts can be 
given of both politics and medicine.  Finally, both Aristotle and the medical writers 
appeal to ‘variation’ (diaphora) to explain inexactness in their respective studies.   
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 In the next chapter of the dissertation, I will try to draw some conclusions 
from these parallels. Recall from chapter 2 that the claims associated with inexactness 
have been used as textual evidence for the particularist reading of Aristotelian 
deliberation.  The next chapter establishes that, in the medical case, the claims associated 
with inexactness do not warrant the conclusion that medical deliberation calls upon no 
action-guiding principles.  Rather, we find the opposite – namely, that medicine is 
inexact, but medical deliberation calls on action-guiding priniples.  I make this argument 
by examining the Hippocratic treatise On Ancient Medicine, which shows that we cannot 
draw the particularist’s conclusions from the claim that medicine is inexact.  
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Chapter 5 
Principles in the Hippocratic Corpus 
 
Aristotle claims that politics is not an exact science, and he expresses this idea in a 
number of ways.  For example, the “account of matters of conduct” has to be written in 
outline form (tupôi). Similarly, matters with which politics is concerned – namely, 
conduct and questions of human good or advantage - “have no fixity.”153 Both the general 
account of politics (tou katholou logou) and the account of particulars lack exactness, the 
latter even more so.  Accounts of politics do not “fall under any art or set of precepts.”  
Rather, agents must determine, on a case by case basis, what is appropriate in each case 
(ta pros ton kairon) (NE II. 2, 1104a1-10).154 
On the basis of claims like those above, some commentators have inferred that 
Aristotle is particularist about deliberations.155  That is, the claim that politics is inexact 
                                                
153 ta_ d' e0n tai=j pra&cesi kai\ ta_ sumfe/ronta ou)de\n e9sthko_j e1xei. 
154 o( peri\ tw~n praktw~n lo&goj tu&pw| kai\ ou)k a)kribw~j o)fei/lei le/gesqai, w3sper 
kai\ kat' a)rxa_j ei1pomen o3ti kata_ th_n u3lhn oi9 lo&goi a)paithte/oi: ta_ d' e0n tai=j 
pra&cesi kai\ ta_ sumfe/ronta ou)de\n e9sthko_j e1xei, w3sper ou)de\ ta_ u(gieina&. toiou&tou 
d' o1ntoj tou~ kaqo&lou lo&gou, (e1ti ma~llon o( peri\ tw~n kaq' e3kasta lo&goj ou)k e1xei 
ta)kribe/j: ou1te ga_r u(po_ te/xnhn ou1q' u(po_ paraggeli/an ou)demi/an pi/ptei, dei= d' 
au)tou_j a)ei\ tou_j pra&ttontaj ta_ pro_j to_n kairo_n skopei=n, w3sper kai\ e0pi\ th~j 
i0atrikh~j e1xei kai\ th~j kubernhtikh~j. 
155 See Martha Nussbaum 1990, 68.  Similarly, John McDowell famously argued in 
McDowell 1979 that deliberation does not resemble deductive reasoning – i.e. reasoning 
from determinate moral principles.  In later works, he allowed that principles might play 
some function in deliberation.  However, following Nussbaum, principles are allowed to 
play only a heuristic function.  The are “rules of thumb.”  See McDowell 1996.  David 
Wiggins argues for a particularist interpretation in Wiggins 1975.   
See also Sherman 1996. Sherman writes: “while “for the most part” rules can be thought 
of as giving some common or characteristic examples of the circumstances in which 
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just means that there are no true action-guiding principles according to which an 
agent might deliberate.  
I want to suggest that Aristotle’s claims about inexactness do not merit this 
inference.  The Hippocratic treatise On Ancient Medicine proposes that medicine is not an 
exact science.  But it also aims to provide action-guiding principles through which the 
doctor can deliberate about patient’s cases.  Thus, the treatise’s claim about inexactness is 
consistent with its endorsement of action-guiding principles.  I suggest that an analogous 
point might be made about Aristotle’s account of deliberation.  That is, Aristotle’s claim 
that politics is inexact is consistent with the endorsement of action-guiding principles for 
the deliberating agent.  The purpose of this chapter is to show that while On Ancient 
Medicine (1) argues that medicine is not exact, it also (2) endorses action-guiding 
principles in medical deliberation.  
The chapter has six parts.  The first three parts of the chapter make stage-setting 
points.  In the first part,  I contextualize the topic of exactness in 4th-century skepticism 
about medicine.  One of the skeptical charges against medicine is that medicine is 
inexact.  This historical background will help us understand why medical writers would 
have responded defensively to the claim that medicine was inexact.  In the second part of 
the chapter, I provide a summary of the textual evidence for lack of exactness in medicine 
and politics from chapters 3 and 4.  The third part of the chapter reviews the 
particularist’s interpretive claim about the textual evidence regarding inexactness.   
                                                                                                                                            
required ends can be finely realized, they don’t go substantially beyond that.  To say they 
are even presumptive rules seems to strong” (Sherman 1996, 270).   
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In the fourth part of the chapter, I show that the author of On Ancient 
Medicine claims that (1) medicine is not exact (akribês, atrekês).  The fifth part of the 
chapter shows that, far from acceding that medicine lacks principles for being inexact, On 
Ancient Medicine provides a robust account of the method by which the discoveries of 
such principles are made.  In the final part of the chapter, I describe the body of 
discoveries in question and show that they consist of a set of action-guiding principles 
that the doctor uses in deliberating about the best ways to ‘hit the mean’ in treating 
patients.  
1  Skepticism about Medicine 
Worries about the exactness of medical science are part of the larger problem of 
skepticism about medicine’s status as a technê in the fifth century.  Was precision of 
measurement and inexactness possible in medicine?  If not, was medicine nevertheless a 
science on other grounds?156  
Skepticism about medicine may have been prompted by the expansion of a medical 
education beyond the traditional class of those descended from Hippocrates. Originally, 
medical education was offered only to the descendants of Hippocrates.  However, the 
school was eventually opened to others – hence, the creation of the famous Hippocratic 
Oath, which ensured allegiance to the ideals of the Hippocratic family.157  The pool of 
those who could now be educated in medicine would have been enlarged by the 
                                                
156 For a discussion of these themes, see Hutchinson 1988. Hutchinson focuses on Plato’s 
response to a fourth-century debate about the nature of practical knowledge and those 
sciences which had only an “imperfect rate of success.”  As Hutchinson notes, skeptics 
doubted that sciences like medicine and rhetoric were forms of knowledge, and they 
thought that medical and rhetorical success were the product of luck (26-7).   
157 Jouanna 2001.   
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publication of manuals or handbooks, which allowed people to study medicine on 
their own, for the circulation of such treatises would have made it possible to learn 
medicine without being trained directly in the Hippocratic family or its associated 
schools.158  No qualification tests were required of medical practioners, and, as a result, 
anyone could advertise himself as a physician.159  Indeed, there were many groups 
involved in healing:  midwives, drug sellers, sellers of charms and incantations, temple 
physicians.160  The practice of medicine became increasingly deregulated, and the result 
may well have been skepticism about the extent to which medicine was, in fact, a technê.   
The most extended discussion of skepticism in any of the Hippocratic treatises comes 
from On Art. 161 It reports that there are four main skeptical arguments.  The first is that 
patients are cured through luck, not art (4).  Indeed, if medicine is truly a technê, it ought 
to achieve its aim in every case.   But some patients are cured, and some patients are not.  
So, we have to conclude that the patients restored to health are not cured through the 
technê, but through luck.  The second objection presents a variation of the first.  Patients 
are cured without the help of medicine (5).  Hence, the reason a patient has recovered has 
some cause other than the doctor’s care.  The third objection is that patients die under the 
care of physicians (7).  Finally, if medicine is a technê, it should be able to cure anyone.  
But some physicians refuse to treat some patients – the hopeless cases.   This shows that 
the physician acknowledges his powerlessness (8) (cf. On Joints, 58).   These objections, 
                                                
158 Dean-Jones 2003.  For the related story about rhetoric, see Kennedy 1959.  
159 Jones, 1931, xxxviii. 
160 Lloyd 1991b,  249-250. 
161 Several Hippocratic treatises raise the issue of skepticism about medicine:  On Art, 
Precepts 9, Regimen in Acute Diseases 8, and Ancient Medicine, for instance. For 
discussion, see Lloyd 1991b. 
 
 
133 
for the most part, concern the inefficacy of medicine: there is little evidence of a 
consistent relationship between the recovery of the patient and the efforts of a doctor.   
The same sort of argument can be found in On the Sacred Disease, but directed 
towards religious medicine, rather than medicine as a whole.  Medicine which is based in 
religion lacks the means (1.11) to cure patients for two reasons.  First, it operates without 
an accurate account the proper manner by which to treat disease.  For the treatments 
religious practitioners used included purifications and incantations.  More colorfully, they 
recommended: the meat of dogs, pigs, goat and deer; the wearing of black; and the 
avodance of baths (2). The author claims that religious practitioners impose these 
spectacular treatments because of the ostensible divine origin of the disease (2.27-8). The 
religious practitioner does not either know or admit that diet, rather than religious 
methods are the cures of diseases (2.44-6).  This point is established on the basis of 
observed correlation between recovery and change to diet.  The author claims: 
If these things give rise to the disease and increase it when they are eaten and brought 
to the patient, and when they are not eaten, there is a cure, no longer is the god 
responsible nor do purifications help, but the foods are what cure and harm, and the 
god’s power disappears (2.40-46).   
 
The second reason for the inefficacy of religious medicine is that it operates without 
knowledge of the nature of the disease, which is not divine.  Rather, it is caused by the 
brain (6.1)….. The author claims that every illness can be cured, provided that the doctor 
has knowledge both of the nature (phusis) and ability (dunamis) of the disease (18).  In 
order to do so, the doctor needs to know “how, judging the right moment (ton kairon) for 
each he will give nourishment to one thing and increase it, and take nourishment form 
another and reduce it” (18.4).   
 
 
134 
On Ancient Medicine is also an important source for reconstructing the skeptic’s 
position.  The author writes that medicine contended with the following objections: 
(a) it has no method and principle 
(b) its success is due to chance 
(c) it is not a comprehensive science 
(d) there cannot be sciences of inexact subject matter.  
 
First, there is the claim that empiricist medicine has no method and principle.    The 
author reports on the rationalist trend in medicine of making postulates concerning 
meteorology (1.23-4).  But, there is no criterion to establish whether the claims about 
postulates are true.  In fact, medicine has no need of the postulates.  It already has a 
principle and method of discovery.  The method has long allowed discoveries to be made, 
and will continue to foster discovery, until the point at which there will be a complete 
science.162  This is possible if inquirers are up to the task, and if they know what was 
discovered from previous research.163 
As The Sacred Disease shows, one source of skepticism was the commonplace 
quack doctor (2.3-4).  A high incidence of quackery among physicians – with its 
sensational claims about the power of healing – encouraged public cynicism about 
medicine. A discussion of quackery in Precepts, for instance, raises two problems.  The 
quack doctor is fine when the people in his charge are healthy, but when health takes a 
turn for the worse, the quack is in straits, having no medical abilities.  This is why the 
quack will not take difficult cases – because he cannot cure them.  He will take only the 
case where the patient is healthy to begin with (7; cf. Ancient Medicine 9; On Art).  
                                                
162 See also ch. 8 and 20 on complete science. 
163 See Lloyd 1991b, p. 256, for a similar reading. 
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Part of the problem of quackery stemmed from public susceptibility.  First, the 
public was apt to underestimate the expertise needed to administer regimen correctly.  
Hence, the author of Regimen on Acute Diseases remarks that, because regimen involves 
nothing more than adjustments to diet – as opposed to a battery of medicines, say – the 
public believes that they can master the art easily: 
… It is in the proper treatment of these illnesses that ordinary folk show their 
most stupid side, in the fact that through these diseases chiefly quacks get the 
reputation of being physicians.  For it is an easy matter to learn the names of the 
remedies usually given to patients in such diseases.  If barley-water be mentioned, 
or such and such a wine, or hydromel, laymen think that physicians, good and bad 
alike, prescribe all the same things.    
 
Since everyone knows something about diet and cooking, and this encourages the view 
that medical science – the old kind, at least – is not really a science at all (cf. On Ancient 
Medicine, 4).  A second problem is that patients requested strange and fantastic treatment.  
Thus, the author of Precepts explains that the patients “ask for what is out of the way and 
doubtful, through prejudice deserving indeed to be disregarded but not punished.  
Wherefore you must reasonably oppose them, as they are embarked upon a stormy sea of 
change “(5.1-2).  The writer of On Joints explains that patients, their friends and family 
express delight at elaborate techniques of bandaging, although he notes that the patients 
quickly tire of wearing the elaborate bandages.164  Other ostentatious props included the 
physician’s use of “luxurious headgear” and “elaborate perfume” (Precepts, 10).  A little 
perfume is alright, but just enough to be tasteful (10).  Finally, there was the practice of 
giving public lectures about medicine.  As Plato illustrates in the Gorgias, the physician 
                                                
164 Lloyd 1987, 67.   
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could compete in argument with a sophist masquerading as a physician and expect to 
lose (456bc).165 
Part of the physician’s challenge came from the fact that important points 
regarding treatment were disputed among physicians.  The author of Regimen On Acute 
Diseases writes that medicine has a bad reputation among the laypeople, so that “there is 
thought to be no art of medicine at all” (8.19).  The public sees so much difference of 
opinion among medical practioners about the remedies of diseases, that they liken 
medical practioners to diviners, who had an established reputation for disagreement.  The 
author of Precepts also remarks on argument among physicians.  The author claims that 
physicians should not be wary of calling in other physicians for consultation about their 
patients.  Indeed, when a patient’s case becomes difficult, there is the most potential for 
things to go wrong (8.9-10).  On those occasions, a physician really should call in other 
physicians.  But physicians should not argue with one another in consultation; those that 
do are banausic (8).   
 
2  A Summary of the Claims about Inexactness 
As we saw in previous chapters, both Greek medical science and Aristotle’s ethics are 
inexact sciences.  It is worth reviewing, in summary form, the claims that ethics and 
medicine are inexact (from chapters 3 and 4). 
 
                                                
165 This is perhaps an exaggeration, according to Lloyd (Lloyd 1987, 103).  But we can 
guess at the source of Plato’s antipathy to quacks.   Quackery in medicine is a larger 
problem than it may seem.  It was part of the culture of words rather than substance 
(Lloyd 1987, 103).   
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Associated terms, ideas Aristotle Hippocratic Corpus 
 
 
The subject matter is inexact 
 
akribês,  
  
 
akribês, atrekês  
 
 
 
The explanation of 
inexactness 
 
 
diaphora 
 
 
diaphora 
 
 
 
The account of the 
particular and its role in 
deliberation  
 
Deliberation concerns both 
universals and particulars 
(kath hekasta). 
 
Aristotle’s emphasis on 
practical perception of 
particulars.. 
 
The doctor must make 
decisions on the basis of 
assessments of particular 
features of a patient’s 
situation – i.e. the patient’s 
phusis, his age, his gender, 
his geographical location, 
the winds in his area, etc. 
(diaphora).   
 
Because the subject matter 
is inexact, the account is 
inexact.   
 
tupos, perigraphos, en 
kephalaion.  
 
 
 
en kephalaion, tupos 
 
3  Particularist Interpretations of the Evidence 
The evidence above, one might think, supports a particularist reading of deliberation in 
both the case of medical deliberation and Aristotelian deliberation.  For the claim that a 
science is inexact may seem like the claim that no principles hold in all cases with regard 
to that science, and this is exactly what both Aristotle and the medical writers seem to 
have in mind when they claim that politics and medicine are inexact.   
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Two sets of claims, in particular, suggest as much.  First, there are claims that 
(a) a science is inexact, (b) that the status of generalizations in the science are ‘hos epi to 
polu’ and that (c) its account must therefore be inexact.  All of this suggests the further 
claim that action-guiding generalizations cannot be made in that science.  This a core 
claim of the particularist.166  Second, there are the claims that scientific practitioners must 
pay attention to the particulars (kath hekasta) or to the particular features of a patient’s 
situation.  This has suggested to particularist interpreters that Aristotle endorses the 
second move of particularism – namely, the switch from a cognitivist account of 
deliberation to a sensibility theorist’s account of deliberation – i.e. one according to 
which the moral assessment of a situation consists in the uptake of the morally salient 
features of that situation – an assessment which is sufficient for moral decision making. 
A number of passages in the Ethics indicate that Aristotle thought perception 
plays two important roles, as far practical wisdom is concerned.167  First, Aristotle says 
that things appear differently to people, depending on character.168  Second, perception 
acquaints the agent with particulars.  As Aristotle claims in his cryptic discussion of nous 
from NE VI, phronêsis involves perception of the “last thing.”  This passage has widely 
                                                
166 There are many kinds of particularism.  I am referring here to particularism that casts 
moral generalizations as ‘action-guiding standards’ – following Sean McKeever and 
Michael Ridge.  ‘Action-guiding standards’ are generalizations that provide both 
explanatory truth conditions and that guide action.  Action guiding standards provide 
truth conditions for moral judgment in referring to features of the world that make those 
judgments true.  They also provide guides for action.  See McKeever and Ridge 2006, 6-
7, 9-11, 89-91 for discussion.  
167 II.9, 1109b20-4; III.5, 1114a31-b8; VI. 5, 1126b3-4; VI. 11, 1143a35-b5; VI.8, 
1142a18-30. 
168 III.4, 1113 a15-31; III.5, 1114 a31-b8; X.5, 1176 a3-30. 
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been interpreted as a reference to perception of particulars.169  Phronêsis, on this 
reading, involves perception of particulars.  The question is: how much so?  According to 
the particularist, Aristotle means to say that decisions (prohaireseis) issue solely from 
perceptual judgments.  No further processing – in the form of consultation of principles – 
is necessary.   
 
The particularist argues that, to make a decision about action, one does not need a 
theory or principles that guide action.170  That is, one does not need to subsume one’s 
situation under some moral law, theory, or principles.  Rather, perception of the salient 
features of any situation is sufficient for making a good decision.  The particularist’s 
point, however, is not merely about the tools of making good decisions.  Instead, her 
point is also that truth and falsity claims about generalizations in ethics simply cannot be 
made.  Granted, lying is wrong.  But it is wrong only given the circumstances, according 
to the particularist, and may sometimes be right.  Hence, the particularist endorses a 
ethical holism such that moral principles are correct only in light of a context.  Finally, 
the particularist can allow that moral principles play a role in deliberation.  But she is 
keen to establish that the role is restricted.  Moral principles can be rules of thumb, but 
only in the sense that they give summaries of actions that have been morally successful in 
the past in similar circumstances.  They are always defeasible. 
 It is worth contrasting the particularist’s model of deliberation with that of the 
moderate theorist.  A moderate theory position gives moral principles a more robust 
function in deliberation.  The moderate-theory position is in agreement with the 
                                                
169 VI.7, 1142a23-30; cf. 1141 b14-20. 
170 See the discussion of principle eliminativism in McKeever and Ridge 2006, 15.   
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particularist about the defeasibility of moral generalizations.  There are always 
circumstances in which a generalization does not hold true, and deliberation is, in part, 
the project of determining whether the situation is one in which the generalization does 
not hold.  However, the moderate-theory position is in disagreement with the 
particularist’s suggestion that the moral generalizations are, at best, summaries of 
statistical frequency.  For moral generalizations are not merely the claim that ‘lying tends 
to be wrong’ or ‘situations are often such that lying is wrong.’171  This makes the 
correctness of moral generalization wholly contingent on whether it has happened to be 
the case, empirically, that lying is often wrong.  That is a point about statistical 
frequency, and the moderate theorist would like to say, moral generalizations carry more 
import than that.  Instead, they represent normative claims that would be true, irrespective 
of their being stastically frequent.  
 The moderate theorist will also object to the particularist’s holism.  For ethical 
holism allows that any generalization, in principle, might have moral import.172  For 
example, it may be the case that drinking from red coffee cups is wrong just as lying is 
wrong.  For there are situations in which both can be wrong.  Drinking from a red coffee 
cup may be wrong (imagine something incredible) if it turns out to be the signal by which 
a housewife communicates to a contract killer that, yes, he should go ahead with their 
earlier plan to off the husband.  Imagining that ‘drinking from red coffee cups is wrong’ 
                                                
171 Maggie Little is helpful in identifying precisely what seems amiss in the particularist’s 
suggestion that moral generalizations are summaries of past phenomena.  See Little 2001, 
36.  My explanation of objections to a particularist conception of generalization draws 
closely from hers in this paragraph.  
172 Ibid.  
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in the same way as ‘lying is wrong’ seems to get something fundamentally incorrect 
about the status of moral generalizations.   
 Now that we have considered the distinction between the particularist’s and the 
moderate theorist’s approach to moral deliberation, let us move the discussion from 
ethics to medicine.  The same distinction holds in medical deliberation, if we think that 
medical deliberation can operate according to normative principles.  For the particularist 
will claim that medical principles are statistically frequent claims.  For example, ‘eating 
excessive amounts of sugar is bad for one’s health’ just means that ‘it has most often 
been the case in the past that eating lots of sugar is bad for the health.’  Or ‘around here, 
where we consider obesity and high blood pressure unhealthy, eating sugar is not 
condusive to health.’  On the other hand, the moderate theorist will think of medical 
principles as having normative punch.  It is, in fact, the case – given our natures as human 
beings – that eating sugar is bad for our health.   
Let us consider an example to illustrate the distinction between the two 
approaches to deliberation fully.  The example is: eating cheese.  Suppose that we adopt 
the principle ‘eating excessive amounts of cheese is bad for one’s health.’  The 
particularist will claim that this is a helpful generalization for the beginning doctor, who 
needs a set of rules to guide his treatment of a patient.  The rule just says: advise your 
ailing patients, as a matter of course, not to eat too much cheese.  Once you are good 
enough at discerning the cause of a patient’s ailment, you can dispense with the rules.  It 
is helpful to think of the analogy with the cook here.173  A novice cook may have learned 
the rule that you should not add sugar to standing yolks.  But by the time she becomes a 
                                                
173 Little 2001, 36.   
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master chef, she can dispense with the rule and invent dishes, if the time and audience 
seem appropriate, in which there are little bits of cooked egg yolks in one’s dessert, 
added for special texture.  The particularist doctor does not believe that excessive 
amounts of cheese is bad for everyone.  Rather, the value of cheese intake depends 
wholly on the circumstances: who is the patient? What is his internal makeup?  Does he 
have the enzyme count to process lots of cheese? 
By contrast, the moderate theorist argues that the syllogism represents a decision 
procedure, a representation of the process of reasoning that leads to the decision to 
perform an action.174 The major premise of the practical syllogism expresses the agent’s 
will.  It can also be codified in terms of a set of general prescriptions or universals about 
good actions.  For example, the major premise expresses the compassionate person’s 
commitment to help those in need.  Such a person might have as the major premise of a 
syllogism: ‘be kind to those in need’ or ‘atone for past wrongs.’  Knowledge of the major 
premise should be construed both as the disposition of the will and as an item of 
knowledge – or a content-filled disposition of the will.  For the will is required in 
addition to knowledge of the relevant reasons for acting.  
The minor premise of the practical syllogism merely acquaints this person with 
the information as to when there are opportunities for action - the “straightforward facts 
about the situation at hand.”175  For example, the minor premise might correspond to 
one’s seeing that there is an opportunity to be kind (by helping someone carry groceries) 
or that there is an opportunity to atone for past wrongs. 
                                                
174 Note Cooper’s disagreement.  I discuss this point in chapter 2.  
175 Ibid, 336.  
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There are two problems with the this account of deliberation, according to 
critics.176  First, Aristotle often claims that there are not universal truths in ethics 
(1009b12-23).  Second, the account cannot make sense of Aristotle’s remarks about the 
role that perception plays in phronêsis.  The moderate theorist will claim that the function 
of perception in phronêsis is to acquaint the agent with his surroundings and then to use 
the deliverances of perception to decide which rule to invoke.  As McDowell puts it, “ in 
the “rule-case” picture, the most obvious role for perception is to contribute awareness 
that certain conditions, which are in fact the conditions specified in a rule, are 
satisfied.”177  Notice that, according to this interpretation of the function of perception, 
perception functions this way for everyone.  Everyone, in other words, uses perception to 
determine his surroundings and to thereby to determine which rule to invoke.  One’s rules 
could be either the good or the bad sort; either way, he would still use perception in the 
same way. 
 
4  On Ancient Medicine and Exactness 
The Hippocratic treatise, On Ancient Medicine, a mid-fifth century treatise in the 
Hippocratic corpus, defends the view that the study of medicine is properly directed at 
the constitution of the human being (phusis) and its relation to food and drink. 178  To tell 
the story of the constitution of the human being is to describe the balance of four humors 
in the body and the structure of the body’s internal organs.  On Ancient Medicine argues 
                                                
176 McDowell 1998,  27-8. 
177 McDowell 1998, 28.  
178 For a discussion of its dates, see Schiefsky 2005, 63-4.  On Ancient Medicine is not 
included among the core group of Hippocratic treatises, thought to be composed by 
Hippocrates or some member(s) of his circle, ca. 460-370.  Rather, it is thought to have 
been composed outside of both the Coan and Cnidian schools (Jouanna 2001). 
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against the view that medicine should study the human being as the composition of 
the basic elements of the universe.  He must know, in other words, the ultimate 
constituents of nature and the manner in which they contribute to the makeup of the 
human being.179 On Ancient Medicine develops a polemic against the view that 
knowledge of the constitutive elements of human nature is necessary for medicine.  These 
primary elements coincide with those of the universe.  It criticizes the practice of 
explaining diseases and treatment of disease through appeal to hot, cold, moist and dry.  
The first section of On Ancient Medicine presents a polemic against philosophical 
medicine – i.e. the view that knowledge of the constitutive elements of human nature is 
necessary for medicine (chs. 1-2).  The author then turns to a discussion of the origins of 
medicine in cooking (chs.3-12).  Third, the author gives a detailed critique of 
philosophical medicine (chs.13-22), ending with his most sustained critique of 
philosophical medicine (chs.20-22).  Finally, he turns to a discussion of the structures of 
the organs of the human body (chs.22-24).  The treatise has been interesting to scholars 
for a number of reasons.  First, it presents not only the first, but the most sustained attack 
against philosophical medicine in the HC.180   Second, it presents the first history of 
medicine.181  Finally, it is also the first attempt to give an account of medicine as the 
product of observation and experience.182 
The author of On Ancient Medicine claims that medicine is not exact (trans. Mark 
Schiefsky):  
                                                
179 See Regimen, Fleshes and Sevens.   
180 See Lloyd 1963 and Cooper 2004. 
181 Zhmud 2006. 
182 Schiefsky 2005, p. 1.  For a more restrained account on this score, see Lloyd 1999,  
151-68.  
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…The doctor’s tasks are much more varied and require more precision 
(akribeiês).  For one must aim (stochazessthai) at a measure (metron); but you 
will find no measure – nor number nor weight besides– by referring to which you 
will know with precision (akribeiês), except the feeling of the body.  Hence, it is 
difficult to acquire knowledge so precise (akribôs) that one errs only slightly in 
one direction or the other.  And I would strongly praise this doctor, the one who 
makes only small errors; perfect accuracy (atrekes) is rarely to be seen (9; cf. 
Regimen 2).   
 
To see the author’s point, it is necessary to review some of the important terminology in 
the passage.  First, there is the term akribês itself.  While the term can refer to ‘precision’ 
or ‘exactness’ in the sense that information might be absolutely correct (Thucy. 
Peloponnesian War, I.22) or that generalizations might be always correct (Pl. Laws 
769d), it can also refer to precision in the sense that an organization or a body would have 
been well-ordered.  Hence, Thucydides says that the navy has ‘exactness’ (Historiae, 
VII.13.2).  In a similar vein, akribês can also have the connotation of ‘finished’ or 
‘masterful,’ as in ‘his skill is sculpture is masterful.’  In the passage from On Ancient 
Medicine, akribês seems to be used in both ways – namely, as a way of referring to the 
precision or orderliness of one’s mechanical skills, but also in the sense that one’s 
information is precise.   
To see the author identify akribês with precision as skill, note the opening line of 
the passage in which the doctor’s tasks are said to require precision: ‘the doctor’s tasks 
are much more varied and require more precision….’ This claim seems to be much like 
Thucydides’ remark that the navy has (and has lost) its ‘exactness.’  Note too that akribês 
is defined, at one point, in terms of number, weight and measure: ‘you will find no 
measure – nor, number, nor weight besides – by referring to which you will know with 
precision, except the feeling of the body.’  We get the sense here that the author is 
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referring to a measurable quantity, such as might have been associated with the tools 
of measurement that Greek scientists possessed at the time – the tornos or compass, for 
example (Pl. Philebus 51c).183  The trio of measure, number and weight was a standard 
locution for measurable quantities, if we can judge by Plato’s treatment.  As Plato writes 
in the Laws, one kind of equality is the sort we encounter in manipulating “measure, 
weight and number” (Laws 757b3-6; cf. Politicus 284ce; Gorgias, Fragment 11a196).184 
Hence, there are multiple cases in which the author identifies akribês with precision as 
skill. 
But akribês is used in the sense of ‘precise information’ in the passage as well.  
For example, the reference to aisthêsis pushes us in this direction.  The passage makes an 
association between akribeia and the ‘feeling of the body’ (aisthêsis): ‘you will find no 
measure (metron)… by referring to which you will know with precision (akribeiês), 
except the feeling of the body (aisthêsis).’  The reference to measure (metron) might 
seem to push in the direction of akribeia as measurement.  However, the term metron has 
a wide range of connotations, not least of which is its capacity to span the mathematical –
moral bridge that we associate with the Greek philosophical tendency to see the 
mathematical notions of orderliness, evenness and measuredness as indications of moral 
rectitude.  Metron need not mean measurement directly here, but rather something like: 
due measure or limit (Pl. Laws.836a); or measure – as in Protagoras’s claim ‘man is the 
measure of all things’ (Pl. Theatetus,183c).  According to one interpretation, the author 
means, if measurement is a criterion of exact science, then medicine, too, can make 
                                                
183 For an account of the various forms of measurement and counting in the Hippocratic 
Corpus, see Lloyd 1987, ch. 2.   
184 th_n me/trw| i1shn kai\ staqmw|~ kai\ a)riqmw|. 
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measurements by assessing the feeling of the body.185  However, it seems to me that 
metron might as easily have the connotation of ‘due measure’ here, in which case the 
author’s mean would be something along the lines of:  it is necessary that the doctor 
know how the patient feels – e.g. what degree or kind of pain – in order to procure 
precise information about the success of his treatment.  Given the reliance on patient self-
reporting of pain - as we saw in the discussion of Fractures from chapter four, such an 
interpretation seems viable.  Thus, I argue, the passage suggests that the doctor depends 
on the feeling of the body to procure precise knowledge, but the feeling of the body does 
not render precise enough information. It is likely that the author is referring to the sense 
in which patient self-reporting provides important information, but information that can 
be inaccurate (cf. 2.3).186   
The lack of perfect information about patients makes the doctor err with respect to 
the mean.  As is the case in Aristotle’s Milo example, the mean is expressed through diet.  
Just as the trainer can administer a weak diet to Milo and an overstrong diet to a 
beginning athlete, so too can the doctor miss the mark in giving a patient a diet that is too 
strong for his constitution (it ‘overpowers’ the patient’s constitution), or the doctor can 
undershoot in administering a diet, giving the patient a regimen that is too weak to sustain 
him.  Because a full determination of the extent to which the diet overpowers or 
undershoots a patient’s constitution depends on patient’s reports of his own states, it is 
“difficult to acquire knowledge so precise that one errs only slightly in one direction or 
                                                
185 For a fuller discussion of the various lines of interpretation of aisthêsis in this passage, 
see Schiefsky 2005, 187-190. 
186 For a comparable suggestion, see Schiefsky 2005, 185-193, 196-200.  His view on the 
meaning of metron in this passage is different from mine, since he reads it as a reference 
to the notion of measurement – as in ‘measurable quantity.’ 
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the other.”  While the notion of ‘erring’ in one direction or another is a marker of a 
the doctrine of the mean, the term ‘stochazesthai’ for ‘aim’ or ‘conjecture’ is also a 
marker of the doctrine of the mean.  For the doctrine of the mean is the idea that the agent 
aims mark in between excess and defect.  We see that knowledge plays an important role 
in determining the mean.  The clear suggestion of the passage is that, because the doctor 
lacks the requisite knowledge, he therefore misses his mark in treating the patient.  
5  Responses to Exactness 
At this point, let us take stock of the shape of the issue.  The particularist argues that 
to attribute inexactness to a discipline is to endorse the particularist position – namely, 
that deliberation does not employ principles.  As we have seen, the author of On Ancient 
Medicine claims that medicine is not exact.  According to the particularist, this would 
essentially the claim that medical deliberation does not proceed according to principles.  
As we have seen, this is an entirely reasonable supposition.  For there is a way to cash out 
the notion of exactness and exact science in such a manner so as to establish, 
conceptually, the connection between inexactness and lack of principles for deliberation.   
However, it is now time to consider whether this position has any merit as a historical 
claim.  That is, if we take off our philosopher hats and put on our historian hats, we can 
ask if the particularist interpretation is supported by the historical facts.  I argue below 
that it is seriously at odds with the historical trends.  The trend I have in mind is the 
burgeoning, but early development of non-mathematical sciences such as medicine.  We 
can chart their development by looking at charges that such disciplines failed as sciences.  
These charges were expressed in two related ways – through skepticism about medicine 
and through the claim that medicine was not exact.   
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In the fourth chapter, we saw that skepticism about medicine as a technê was 
common in fifth and fourth century Greece.  Numerous treatises of the Hippocratic 
Corpus respond to the skepticism, describing the various claims associated with the 
skeptic and the means by which defenders of medicine might respond.187  The central 
objections made to medicine’s status as a technê are that success in medicine is a matter 
of luck, rather than art, and that medicine has no curative power, as evidenced by the 
doctor’s refusal to take on serious cases and by the fact that patients sometimes died 
under their doctor’s case.   Quackery also abounds among so-called “doctors”; 
spectacular bandanging methods, healing contraptions, special doctor headgear and 
excellent speeches about medicine are no substitute for real healing powers.   
Medical writers made ready admission of the fact that medicine failed to meet 
scientific ideals represented by exact science.  Aristotle describes the paradigmatic exact 
science in the Posterior Analytics (I.27, 87a31-36).  Exact science provides explanations 
(di hoti) in addition to facts (hoti); it studies objects in abstraction from their matter and 
stripped of properties such as dimensionality.  By contrast, an inexact science does not 
provide full explanations.  It also studies objects as they are in the world – replete the 
messy properties like: matter, dimension and movement.  First philosophy, or theology, is 
the most exact science, since it studies the one property which cannot be stripped from 
any object – being (Met. XI.7, 1064a1-5).  Mathematics is a relatively exact science, 
since it studies under the aspect only of properties such as shape, line, and form.  By 
contrast, physics is a relatively inexact science, since it studies objects in motion – 
                                                
187 Among the treatises which present important discussions of skepticism are: On Art, 
On Ancient Medicine, and On the Sacred Disease.  See also: Precepts 9, De Loc. Hom 
46, and Regimen in Acute Diseases 8, 
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indeed, objects in non-uniform motion. The best sciences or the most scientific 
sciences are the exact sciences because they are concerned, most of all, with the first 
principles (Met. I.2, 982a25) and their principles are the most knowable (982b1-2).   
There was both skepticism about medicine’s status as a technê and admission by 
medical writers themselves that medicine failed to meet the scientific paradigm of exact 
science.  There is an interesting historical question to ask about all of this.  How did  
medical writers respond?  Did they admit that medicine was an irremediable failure by 
scientific standards?  Did they reject exactness as a criterion of good science?  Did they 
attempt to redefine scientific standards?  
The best way to describe the response made on behalf of medical science is to say 
that medical writers whole-heartedly rejected the idea that medicine somehow failed as a 
science.  Of course, this meant that the burden was on medical writers to explain that, 
despite the fact that medicine manifestly failed to meet some scientific standards, it 
nevertheless merited scientific status.  But this is the task taken up by writers in treatises 
such as On Art, On Ancient Medicine, Regimen and Places in Man.  In what follows, I 
would like to examine one such effort to respond from On Ancient Medicine.   
On Ancient Medicine makes two claims to which I will draw attention.  The first 
is that medicine may not have achieved exactness in one sense, but it has achieved 
exactness in another sense – namely, through careful reasoning (logismos).  I read this 
claim as an attempt to direct attention away from the ways in which medicine fails as a 
science and towards the ways that it has succeeded.  For logismos involves deliberation 
according to principles.  (Yet, this is precisely what the particularist denies.)  I note, in 
particular, the fact that the author reappropriates the terms akribês and atrekês in the 
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passage, redefining them so that medicine is very nearly exact.  Finally, I try to show 
that this new sense of exactness is connected with method (hodos).  That is, any 
discipline which has a well-established and honed method (hodos) succeeds in being 
exact and succeeds in being a technê.  Again, this point is significant because method 
(methodos) is associated with the use of principles.  Yet, the particularist denies as much.   
The argument of On Ancient Medicine is that medicine has attained a significant 
amount of exactness, even though it fails to meet the ideal of exactness fully.  Rather than 
marveling at the extent to which it yet fails to be exact, one ought to marvel at the extent 
to which it made progress towards exactness: 
It is difficult when such precision (atrekês) is required by art (technê) always to 
attain perfect accuracy (tou atrekestatou).  Yet many aspects of medicine….have 
arrived at such precision (akribeia).  So I deny that the ancient art should be cast 
aside on the ground that it does not exist or that it is not being investigated in an 
admirable way, if it does not possess precision in everything; rather, since it has 
been able to come, by means of reasoning (logismôi), from profound ignorance 
close to perfect accuracy (tou atrekestatou), I think it is much more appropriate to 
marvel at its discoveries as having been made admirably, correctly and not by 
chance (12).188   
 
As we saw in chapters three and four, the paradigmatic technê is the exact technê.  The 
author responds to that ideal in this passage when he writes:  ‘it is difficult when such 
precision is required by art….’  I take this to be another acknowledgment that medicine 
fails to meet the criteria for an exact science.  The term used for ‘exactness’ in this 
section of the passage is atrekês, which tends to refer to precision in measurement.  But 
                                                
188 Xalepo_n, mh_ toiau&thj a)kribi/hj e0ou&shj peri\ th_n te/xnhn, tugxa&nein ai0ei\ tou~ 
a)trekesta&tou: polla_ de\ ei1dea kat' i0htrikh_n e0j tosau&thn a)kribi/hn h3kei, peri\ w{n 
ei0rh&setai. Ou) fhmi\ dh_ dia_ tou~to dei=n th_n te/xnhn w(j ou)k e0ou~san ou)de\ kalw~j 
zhteome/nhn th_n a)rxai/hn a)pobale/sqai, ei0 mh_ e1xei peri\ pa&nta a)kribi/hn, a)lla_ polu_ 
ma~llon, dia_ to_ e0ggu_j, oi]mai, tou~ a)trekesta&tou o(mou~ du&nasqai h3kein logismw|~, 
prosi/esqai, kai\ e0k pollh~j a)gnwsi/hj qauma&zein ta_ e0ceurhme/na, w(j kalw~j kai\ 
o)rqw~j e0ceu&rhtai, kai\ ou)k a)po_ tu&xhj.  
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the author uses the term synonymously with akribeia in this passage, as the use of the 
pronoun tosautên suggests.  This passage also acquaints us with some of the common 
skeptical charges against medicine - for example: medicine ‘does not exist’: medicine 
arrives at its results ‘by chance’; and medicine ‘is not being investigated in an admirable 
way.’  
The author argues that, despite medicine’s apparent lack of exactness in one 
respect, it has nevertheless achieved exactness in several other important respects.  
Medicine has done so through ‘reasoning’ (logismôi), which allows it to come close to 
the “most accuracy.”  Note that, in making this claim, a bait and switch has occurred.  
The author’s initial move in the passage is to admit that medicine is not perfectly exact.  
However, only a line later, the author claims that medicine has come close to perfect 
exactness because it involves a process of reasoning (logismos).  This is an attempt to 
direct attention away from the way that medicine fails as a science – namely, in its 
reliance on patient’s reports of their own conditions.  Similarly, it is an attempt to draw 
attention to the way that medicine succeeds as a science – namely, insofar as it involves 
‘reasoning.’ 
But how is the term logismos being used in the passage? On Ancient Medicine 
does not provide much by way of illustration of the term logismos.  However, if we 
assume that logismos is used in On Ancient Medicine in the same way that it is used in 
On Art, where there is a sustained discussion of the term, then we should read logismos as 
a reference to the reasoning that the doctor uses to discern the nature of diseases that are 
internal to the body and which cannot, therefore, be perceived.  This makes logismos the 
process of reasoning that the doctor might exercise with respect to specific patient cases.  
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Through ‘reasoning,’ in this sense, the doctor discerns the nature of the particular 
patient’s internal disease.   
In the Hippocratic treatise On Art,  logismos is the process by which the doctor 
discerns with the “mind’s eye” the hidden diseases of a patient by reading signs about his 
or her condition. On Art introduces a distinction between diseases whose manifestation 
can be seen and those diseases which are internal and must consequently be discerned 
indirectly through signs (9.6-10).  Those diseases that can be seen manifest themselves by 
things that can be directly sensed – for example: color and swellings that can be felt as 
moist or hard, and so on.  But of the illnesses that cannot be directly observed, the doctor 
must take a different tact.  He must acquire knowledge of the various structures of the 
human body – e.g. cavities, muscles, interstices, vessels, veins, and sinews (10).  
Similarly, he must read signs (semeia)(10.10) such as: clearness or roughness of the voice 
(13.5-6) and rapidity of respiration (13.6-7).  A doctor cannot see these with his eyes, but 
he can learn to see them with the mind rather than the eyes – i.e. with the “mind’s eye” 
(tês gnômês opsei, 11.11): “the attendant in fact, as could neither see the trouble with his 
eyes nor learn it with his ears, tried to track it by reasoning (11.15-7).189 
The upshot for our passage from On Ancient Medicine is that, even though 
doctors rely on patient’s reports of their conditions and even though medicine is therefore 
not exact, medicine is nevertheless quite close to being exact.  For doctors can perform 
logismos in order to discern the hidden aspects of their patient’s internal conditions.  That 
is, they rely on the process of reading signs like raspiness of the voice and their 
                                                
189 o( me\n ga_r, e0pei\ ou)k h}n au)te/w| o1yei i0dei=n to_ moxqe/on, ou)d' a)koh|~ puqe/sqai, 
logismw|~ meth|&ei 
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knowledge of patients’ internal structures in order to gauge the patient’s internal 
states.  The presumption is that this process works quite well, making up for whatever 
loss of information taking place when a patient fails to self-report correctly.  Hence, 
medicine is “close to perfect accuracy.” 
The second and more important way that author argues for medicine’s status as a 
technê is to point out that medicine has a method (hodos).  Of course, method plays a 
very important role in Aristotle’s philosophy, where the notion of method is fairly well 
defined and always dealt with carefully at the outset of a treatise.  One such method is 
dialectic, a form of argument that proceeds deductively or inductively from premises that 
are common beliefs (endoxa) (Topics, 100a20-101b4).  (By contrast, demonstration starts 
with demonstratively certain premises.)  What it means for a premise to be ‘endoxon,’ is 
that the premise is generally accepted, that it is reputable, or that it is accepted by the 
most eminent philosophers.  Obviously false or perverse views do not count as dialectical 
premises, even though they may be held by eminent philosophers.  That is, we start by 
stating the commonly accepted views about a topic under debate, and we reject from 
consideration those views that are obviously false, even though they might have been 
held by eminent philosophers. 
The notion of method is far less universally defined in medicine. The term hodos 
can be used either in the concrete sense of ‘path’ or ‘way’ or as the more intellectual 
notion of method of reasoning.190  Hence, Epidemics defines method as a process of 
increasing generalization from experience:  
                                                
190 For discussion of the various meanings of hodos, see Schiefsky 2005, 149. 
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The summary comes from the origin and the going forth, and from the very 
many accounts and things learned little by little, one gathers them together and 
studies them thoroughly…This would be the road (hodos) (Epidemics VI.3.12).191  
 
The sense we get from the passage above is that the author is referring to the intellectual 
process by which one makes generalizations after encountering many instances or much 
experience of a certain kind of phenomenon.  The concrete sense of hodos, by contrast, 
means something more like the manner or mode of treatment – as in applying salts baths 
or administering oxymel (a honey and vinegar drink) to a patient. In this case, hodos can 
have ‘way’ (tropos) as a synonym.192 
In On Ancient Medicine, method should be understood in the former sense of 
hodos – namely, as the intellectual process through which discoveries are made in 
medicine.193 The method of medicine is an advanced form of dietetics and cooking.194 As 
the author claims, there is no difference between the physician’s art and method of 
dietetics and cooking.  For they use the same mode of reasoning and the same method of 
                                                
191 Kefa&laion e0k th~j gene/sioj kai\ a)formh~j kai\ plei/stwn lo&gwn kai\ kata_ smikra_ 
ginwskome/nwn suna&gonta kai\ katamanqa&nonta, ei0 o3moia& e0stin a)llh&loisin, au}qij 
ta_j a)nomoio&thtaj tou&toisin, ei0 o3moiai a)llh&lh|sin, w(j e0k tw~n a)nomoioth&twn 
o(moio&thj ge/nhtai mi/aou3twj a2n h( o(do&j: ou3tw kai\ tw~n o)rqw~j e0xo&ntwn dokimasi/h, 
kai\ tw~n (5)mh_, e1legxoj. 
192 For this point, see Elizabeth Craik’s commentary on Places in Man. (Craik 1998, 
191).  
193 For the same reading of hodos, see Schiefsky 2005, 144. Note that my representation 
of method in the Corpus is relatively sanguine.  Compare Lloyd, who claims that it would 
be a mistake to represent Hippocratic medicine as the result of accumulations of 
observation and data.  “The role of the data obtained from many tests is not so much to 
decide between theories judged antecedently to be of equal standing, as either to 
corroborate the author’s own view or to refute that of an opponent” (Lloyd 1991, 71). For 
a general discussion of the extent to which Greek medical science resembled the modern 
notion of an empirical science, see Lloyd 1991, ch. 3.  Lloyd claims that the virtue of 
Greek science was in its commitment to observation of particular cases – the sort of 
observation that one sees in the Epidemics, for example.   
194 Compare Plato’s views on cookery in the Gorgias.  
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discovery:…”their reasoning (logos) was identical and the discovery one and the 
same” (7.7-8). 
While medicine appealed to the same process of discovery as cooking, it was by 
no means unsophisticated.  In the initial stages of development in medicine, there was 
experimentation with diet among the peoples willing to curb their desires for the sake of 
health – i.e. the Greeks (5.2). First, the quantity of food consumed was simply lessened 
(5.3).  But this treatment proved to be unsuccessful in some cases (5.4).  Since some 
patients could take only the smallest quantity of food, it was thought that they needed 
milder food.  So began the process of mixing food with water and boiling foods.  Patients 
who could not even eat the slops or the boiled foods were put on liquid diets (5.5).  And 
so the process of developing foods in which humors were well balanced began.   
Method here is best understood in relation to discovery (heuresis) – since the 
method in question is a method through which medical knowledge is discovered (2.1-2).  
In technical treatises, the acquisition of knowledge, or learning (mathêsis), tended to be 
explained by one of two intellectual processes: imitation (mimêsis) or discovery 
(heurêsis).195 The idea of a first discoverer, or origintor of a field, was a common topos in 
scientific treatises.196  Prior to the fifth century, the first scientific discoveries were 
attributed to gods and to wise men of other countries.  Egypt, in particular, was thought to 
be a source of first discoverers.  During the fifth century, however, we see Greek writers 
shift towards attributing themselves with inventions and discoveries.  Aristotle, for 
example, attributes to himself the unique advancement of rhetoric (Sophistical 
                                                
195 See the excellent discussion of this and related points in Zhmud 2006, 64-69. 
196 Zhmud 2006, 23-29.   
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Refutations, 183b36). In particular, he is the first to discover the art of sophistic 
sullogismos, since such an art never existed before, despite the work of sophists such as 
Gorgias. 
On Ancient Medicine connects method and discovery so that method is the means 
by which discoveries are made in medicine:   
Medicine has long since had everything it needs, both a principle and a discovered 
method, by which many admirable discoveries have been made over a long period 
of time and those that remain will be discovered, if one who is adequate to the 
task and knows what has been discovered sets out from these things in his 
investigation (2.1).197  
 
In On Ancient Medicine, discovery is the product of methodical investigation, and it 
issues in a body of knowledge that the doctor can use in treatment.  Indeed, discovery 
seems to be synonymous with content of the science.198  The output of the 
methodological approach is a body of discoveries about the relationship between food, 
drink and the human being – in effect, the science of regimen.  In On Ancient Medicine, 
knowledge of regimen can be broken down into two domains or areas of expertise.  First, 
there is the subject of the effect of various foods, drinks, exercise, baths and other such 
things on the human body.  Second, there is the subject of the internal structures of the 
body.  Both domains of knowledge will be explained in greater detail in the last section 
of the chapter.  For now, it is sufficient to see that discoveries of medical knowledge are 
produced by a methdological investigation – one closely resembling experimentation – 
into types of foods, drinks, exercises, etc. and their relations to human beings.   
                                                
197 Ihtrikh|~ de\ pa&nta pa&lai u(pa&rxei, kai\ a)rxh_ kai\ o(do_j eu(rhme/nh, kaq' h4n kai\ ta_ 
eu(rhme/na polla& te kai\ kalw~j e1xonta eu3rhtai e0n pollw|~ xro&nw|, kai\ ta_ loipa_ 
eu(reqh&setai, h1n tij i9kano&j te e0w_n kai\ ta_ eu(rhme/na ei0dw_j, e0k toute/wn o(rmw&menoj 
zhte/h|. 
198 Cf. Schiefsky 2005, 132. 
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 How does all of this provide a response to the skeptic about medicine and to 
the point that medicine lacks exactness?  Recall a passage quoted earlier: 
I deny that the ancient art should be cast aside on the ground that it does not exist 
or that it is not being investigated in an admirable way, if it does not possess 
precision (akribeiên) in everything; rather, since it has been able to come, by 
means of reasoning (logismos), from profound ignorance close to perfect accuracy 
(tou atrekêstatou), I think it is much more appropriate to marvel at its discoveries 
as having been made admirably, correctly, and not by chance (12.2).199 
 
We are now in a better position to assess the depth of the author’s claim.  This passage 
follows the author lengthy description of the cooking method by which medical art has 
acquired information about types of food and drink and their typical effects on the human 
body.  It is with this body of knowledge that the doctor is able to engage in reasoning 
(logismos), the process by means of which he ascertains the illnesses that effect patients, 
even if they are hidden in the body or obscured by imperfect patient reports.  By 
reasoning in this fashion with this body of discoveries acquired through methodical 
investigation, medicine has approach nearly perfect accuracy. Rather than dwelling on 
the degree to which medicine fails to be exact or fails as a science, it is more appropriate 
to “marvel” at the discoveries made in medicine.  These discoveries were made through a 
method, the merits of which have been demonstrated.  They are admirable, correct and 
make it the case that medicine is opposed to chance.   
6  Principles and Theory in On Ancient Medicine 
It is time to describe in more detail the body of discoveries that methodical investigation 
has produced.  What follows is a brief review of the main points of that body of 
                                                
199 Ou) fhmi\ dh_ dia_ tou~to dei=n th_n te/xnhn w(j ou)k e0ou~san ou)de\ kalw~j zhteome/nhn 
th_n a)rxai/hn a)pobale/sqai, ei0 mh_ e1xei peri\ pa&nta a)kribi/hn, a)lla_ polu_ ma~llon, 
dia_ to_ e0ggu_j, oi]mai, tou~ a)trekesta&tou o(mou~ du&nasqai h3kein logismw|~, 
prosi/esqai, kai\ e0k pollh~j a)gnwsi/hj qauma&zein ta_ e0ceurhme/na, w(j kalw~j kai\ 
o)rqw~j e0ceu&rhtai, kai\ ou)k a)po_ tu&xhj. 
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discoveries.  It is important to see that the principles produced by the investigation 
both explain and guide the decisions that practitioners would make.  
According to On Ancient Medicine, food and drink are composed of a number of 
humors.  Each kind of food or drink consists of various combinations of humors and can 
be prepared in any number of ways (e.g. boiling, roasting, etc.) (14.1-6).  The result is 
that foods have different sets of capacities.  Substances can be mixed together without 
losing their distinctive capacities.200  Indeed, new capacities are gained in the process 
(13.3).  Foods have the power to cause disease if they contain powerful concentrations of 
any one humor (14.4-6).  The effect that the food has on a person depends on the 
interaction between the humors of the person and the humors contained in the food.  Food 
which is not well blended can cause disease, for the humors contained in the food have a 
tendency to “separate off” (apokrinesthai).  In particular, the patient’s constitution is 
unable to overcome the power of the concentrated humor in the unblended food, and he 
therefore becomes ill (14.1).  
Food needs to be well-blended.  It is best for the eater not to ingest pronounced 
amounts of any one humor in contradistinction to the rest.  Since the basic principle of 
health calls balance among the humors, it is best too that food preserve such a balance so 
as not to upset the body’s balance.  For example, it is better that bread be made from 
well-kneaded dough and from dough that holds adequate amounts of water, rather than 
from dry dough which has a disproportionate amount of drying properties of wheat to the 
moistening properties of water (14.1). Food which is not well-blended announces itself 
by the extremity and unpleasantness of its taste.  For example, the food which contains 
                                                
200 Anaxagoras DK 59 B; Empedocles DK 31 B;  Nature of Man, 3.   
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the most of the sweet humor also tastes the sweetest (14.4). It is no surprise, then, the 
the typical fare of the human diet tends to be well-blended– for human beings take less 
pleasure in the strong tastes of unbalanced foor, or so the author suggests (14.6). 
The account of food is extended by a discussion of the transformative powers of the 
humors in food (24).  Besides mixing and blending, the humors also transform into one 
another by exploiting their commonality or kinship.  For example, sweet wine turns to 
vinegar spontaneously (24.1).  The idea is that the sweet and the acid are closely related – 
not as opposites, but as having comparable constituents.  The author does not explain, but 
we can imagine that he refers to the sense in which sweet wine and vinegar both have 
acidic and sweet properties, but in different proportions.  Hence, they have different 
compositions, but are closely related to one another.  The result is that, if one is called for 
in a remedy, its counterpart is comparably effective.  For example, if giving a patient a 
sweet thing is best, giving him an acidic thing is second best (24.2).     
Ultimately, On Ancient Medicine never tells us exactly what is in any of our food.  
Unlike other Hippocratic treatises on regimen, it does not present a mini-rule book of the 
various foods one should eat in the different seasons and the various exercises that one 
should take in the different seasons.  On Ancient Medicine only refers obliquely to such 
texts when it discusses the status of rules like ‘do not allow patients to eat too much 
cheese.’  The work of the treatise is to examine the status of those claims, rather than to 
present a battery of them.   
Other treatises in regimen offer far more specific accounts of individual foodstuffs.  
The stated purpose of Regimen, for example, is to provide a detailed account of food and 
its properties – both according to nature (kata phusin) and according to art (dia technês) 
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(39.2)  The author writes that he is forced to give an account of each food seperately.  
“….it is impossible to set forth these things in general, I will show what power each one 
has in particular” (39.14-7).201 What follows is an account of the various kinds of food: 
for example, grains such as barley, wheat and “cyceon” – usually prepared as a mixture 
of barley, cheese and wine, but also to be combined with honey or milk (Regimen, 41.5-
9).  Similarly, there is an account of vegetables and fruit, lentils and beans, and meats 
ranging from pig to dog (46.23) are discussed.  So, too, does the author discuss the 
various properties of dairy products, wines and vinegars, spices and herbs.  Coriander, for 
example, is said to be hot and astringent and to prevent heartburn (54.22-23).  The 
author’s assessment of cheese is not terribly different from ours today: cheese is strong 
and nourishing (51; cf. De Diatae Acutorum, 18. 38 on the flatulent properties of cheese).   
But what is the human being made of such that he reacts poorly to this element of the 
cheese? On Ancient Medicine develops an account of human nature (phusis) in answer to 
such questions. For  the doctor should say ‘simply’ (haplôs)(20.3) that cheese is harmful 
if one eats too much.  Rather, the doctor must say ‘what trouble, and why, and which of 
the things in the human being it is inimical to’ (20.3).202   
Like food, human beings consist of a blend or krâsis of humors such as sweet, 
bitter, salty, acid, astringent, insipid, etc. (14.4).  It is unclear just how many of these 
humors might be in the body.  The author claims that there are many (14.4).  His view 
may be likened to that of de Morbis, in which it is claimed that plants and human beings 
are compositions of powers manifested as humors. According to de Morbis, these are 
                                                
201 peri\ me\n ou}n a(pa&ntwn ou)x oi[o&n te dhlwqh~nai o(koi=a& tina& e0sti: kaq' e3kasta de\ 
h3ntina du&namin e1xei dida&cw 
202 ti/na te po&non kai\ dia_ ti/ kai\ ti/ni tw~n e0n tw|~ a)nqrw&pw| e0neo&ntwn a)nepith&deion 
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identical to the humors which can be found in food and drinks.  The powers are 
reducible to four substances: bile, water, blood and phlegm, each of which has its own 
seat in the body.  (The heart is the seat of blood, the head of phlegm, the spleen of water, 
and the liver of bile.)  Whenever any food or drink enters the body, it is collected in the 
stomach, and from there, each humor in the body draws the like humor in the food.  If 
this is the type of view that the author of On Ancient Medicine has in mind, we can 
expect that he envisions the various dunamei in question – sweet, salty, bitter, etc. – as 
being reducible to basic humors.  
The author used the method of analogy, rather than empirical observation, to 
arrive at his account of the human being as a composition of humors.  As we saw earlier, 
the healthiest food is that which has been well-blended. The powerful dunamei of food 
are made healthy through blending with other dunamei, But the same seems to be the 
case of the human being (14.1-2).  Namely, the healthiest human being seems to be he 
whose dunamei are well-blended. 
Disease and health are explained through mixture.  When the humors in the body 
are balanced well against one another, the person is healthy.  But if one of the humors 
becomes excessively concentrated, it seperates off  and the person becomes diseased.203  
On Ancient Medicine gives a qualtitative description of what constitutes a good balance 
of the humors.  The humors are in good balance when they are “cooked” 204 or “blended” 
                                                
203 A similar account can be found in Aristotle’s Physics.  “Bodily excellences such as 
health and fitness we regard as consisting in a blending of hot and cold elements in due 
proportion, in relation either to one another within the body or to the surrounding (VII. 3, 
246b5-6).  Interestingly, Aristotle goes on to claim that the same principle applies to 
hexeis and arete of the soul (247a1-3). 
204 Aristotle, Meteorology IV. 379 ff.  
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(19).  The blend (krêsis) can be destroyed either by the predominance of a humor or 
by the the failure to nourish the humors properly.205  When one of the humors has 
‘separated off’ from the mixture, it becomes concentrated, and in this way, it causes 
disease (20.6).206  
Part of this general account of the human phusis is a discussion of the structures 
(schêma) of the human body.  The author deals with this topic in a few brief chapters at 
the end of the treatise.  The structures in question are both internal organs and external 
forms such as the head and the neck.  The author’s guiding premise in the discussion is 
the idea that shape has an effect on the processes of blending in the body.  He focuses on 
shapes such as: tapering and hollowness.  The tapered structures, for example, are better 
for drawing up liquids; the author uses the analogy with a straw to induce as much.  
(There is widespread appeal to the method of analogy in the discussion of structure.)207 
We have now seen a brief description of the body of medical discoveries that 
methodical investigation produced.  I have been assuming all along that the doctor would 
have to apply this body of discoveries.  How does this work?  This answer is quite 
simple.  Medical discoveries consist of a body of principles that constitute the types of 
relationships between food and drink.208  For example: an excessive amount of unmixed 
                                                
205 But perhaps we can draw from the account of balance in Nature of Man, where good 
balance is said to be one of ‘due proportion,’ the absence of which is indicated by pain 
(4). 
206 Note that the author sometimes uses the term ‘dunamis’ to refer to the humor itself, as 
in: the dunamis has the capacity effect x (14.6).  For discussion, see Schiefsky 2005, 232.   
207 For a comparable use of the method, see On Art, where it is claimed that the method 
of analogy is the only means by which to ascertain the nature of phenomena that is 
‘unseen’ – namely, what is going on inside the body.   
208 Note Lloyd’s position on the material.  He claims that the conclusions of the research 
are general but qualified, and that writers were not dogmatic in representing the 
 
 
164 
wine has harmful effects.  Or: an excessive amount of cheese has a harmful effect.  In 
deliberating about the case of a patient who is prone to drinking wine or a patient who 
reports digestive problems and a great love of cheese, the doctor will consider the fact 
that cheese and wine have these known harmful effects.  The first step of his deliberative 
process will be the thought: some cut-backs are necessary.  This patient will have to drink 
less wine or eat less cheese.  But the deliberative process does not end there, for the 
doctor must consider who the patient is, such that he or she is effected in such and such a 
way by wine or cheese. 
In chapter four, we saw that there were several categories of questions that a 
doctor should ask about his patients.  These included: constitution, age, gender, and 
geographical location, to name a few.  Thus, the second stage of deliberation involves the 
asking of all these questions about the particular patient.  One might establish, for 
example, that patient x is a young woman from the cold, dry and arid regions of the 
North.  Her constitution is relatively strong.209  She is not easily overcome by a strong 
diet and can manage two meal a day.  If there is any disruption to this pattern, her 
digestive cycles are not much disrupted.210  With this kind of information, the doctor is 
                                                                                                                                            
conclusions of their research.  “It is not the case that the writers conducted their 
observations merely to confirm rules that they had already formulated in detail. Rather 
those detailed rules are, in the main, generalizations which they arrived at on the basis of 
their particular observations including, no doubt, many others besides those recorded in 
the case-histories as we have them” (Lloyd 1999, 155).  
209 Note that Airs, Waters, Places draws a connection between the strength of phusis and 
geographical location.  The people of the North, from the dry, cold and arid regions, are 
said to be hardier than most people (12).  See also Aristotle’s Politics VII.7 for discussion 
of the character of peoples of different regions.   
210 I draw inspiration for this example from On Ancient Medicine, 10. 1-12.1.  The text 
contains a discussion between the various manifestations of and problems associated with 
a weak constitution.   
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able to complete a second stage of deliberation in which he assesses more precisely 
the amount to which the young woman should cut back on her consumption.  As a hardy 
young woman, perhaps she does not need to limit herself to half a glass of mixed wine a 
day.  Rather, she simply needs to stop drinking five glasses of unmixed wine a day.  In 
his effort to hit the mean, the doctor recommends that the patient have two glasses of 
unmixed wine a day, or some such comparable amount.  Similarly, the doctor may 
recommend that, if the woman suffers from excessive cheese intake, that she limit herself 
not completely, given her hardy constitution.  If she were to eat no cheese, she might fall 
ill from “depletion,” as we saw earlier.  Rather, she should eat four ounces of cheese a 
day, rather than her customary ten.  Again, the doctor is aiming for the mean in 
recommending that the woman neither undershoot nor overshoot the appropriate amount 
of cheese, given her constitution.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a counterexample to the particularist’s claim that (1) if a 
science is not ‘exact,’ then (2) the science does not offer action-guiding principles for 
deliberation. In the Hippocratic treatise On Ancient Medicine, it is argued that (1) 
medicine is not exact.  Nevertheless, the author endorses action-guiding principles for 
medical deliberation.   
 
We saw this in two ways.  First, the author provides a rigorous account of the 
method through which such principles are discovered.  This account of method, 
moreover, is meant to counter skeptical objections to medicine’s status as a science.  
Though medicine is not perfectly exact, the author claims, it nevertheless approaches 
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exactness very closely by having a rigorous method of discovering principles.  
Second, we saw that the method of discovery renders a substantial body of action-guiding 
principles - principles like ‘excessive amounts of wine are harmful.’  
I will venture to speculate a bit in conclusion.  Particularist readings of Aristotle – 
those of McDowell and Nussbaum – for example, are enchanted with the idea that 
Aristotle embraced the context sensitivity needed for apt practical reasoning.  There is no 
doubt that Aristotle is an advocate of the importance of context-sensitive reasoning.  
However, this emphasis in his account is not supported by the texts on akribeia and 
related terms and ideas.  Rather, we get Aristotle’s emphasis on context-sensitive 
reasoning by considering his doctrine of the mean “in relation to us.”  This is the topic I 
take up in the next chapter.   
In the meantime, it is important to see that, if the acknowledgment that a science 
is inexact in medicine does not mean that the scientist, therefore, refrains from seeking 
principles – but, in fact, the very reverse.  It is worth considering whether the same might 
be true of Aristotle’s acknowledgment that politikê is not exact.  Indeed, if Aristotle 
pursues the strategy that we have seen in On Ancient Medicine, the admission that 
politikê is not exact is only a prelude to a determined effort to seek principles for politikê.  
And is this not the very thing that we should expect Aristotle to mean when he claims 
that, though exactness is hard to achieve in giving an account of politikê, “we must do 
what we can” (NE IX.2, 1165a35)? 
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Chapter 6 
 
The Doctrine of the Mean in the Hippocratic Corpus 
 
 
Aristotle argued that virtue is a mean relative to us (pros hêmas).  It is not obvious 
how we ought to interpret this mean.  But according to one reading - a particularist 
reading – Aristotle’s mean relative to us requires that the standard (horos) in light of 
which an agent selects the mean (NE VI.1, 1138b18-24) not be constituted by principles.  
Rather, it is constituted by a contentless conception of the good that becomes determinate 
only with regard to specific people in specific situations.  We might say, in effect, that 
this reading of the mean relative to us is a ‘to each his own’ reading of the mean.   
Once again, On Ancient Medicine presents guidance about the interpretation of 
Aristotelian practical science, for it provides a counterexample to the particularist reading 
of the mean relative to us.  On Ancient Medicine offers an account of the mean very much 
like Aristotle’s mean relative to us.  It argues that doctors should determine the mean for 
the man in relation to food, drink and exercise.  Like Aristotle’s mean ‘relative to us,’ this 
mean should be determined relative to patients’ particular cases.  However, contra the 
particularist reading, the mean should also be determined in light of action-guiding 
principles.  These principles provide general, but specific, rules for treating patients (e.g. 
treat x symptoms with y substances), and in turn, these rules are derived from wide-
ranging principles like the allopathic principle (i.e. treat an ailment with its opposite).  
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Thus, in the Hippocratic Corpus, we can find support for the idea that action-guiding 
principles are used in deliberation, for they are used in the selection of the mean. 
The chapter has two parts.  It begins with an introduction to the doctrine of the 
mean in Aristotle’s ethics.  The second section of the chapter gives an analysis of the 
mean in On Ancient Medicine, explained in terms of the contrast between the mean 
determined according to ‘what the man is’ and ‘what the man is in relation to food, drink 
and exercise.’  (On Ancient Medicine endorses the latter formulation of the mean.)  As I 
will show, the mean for man in relation to food, drink and exercise was determined 
relative to the individual patient’s constitution (phusis).  However, doctors were also 
instructed to adapt general action-guiding principles to particular patient’s cases.   I will 
show as much by discussing two kinds of action-guiding principles:  the general and 
wide-ranging sort and the specific, but general, sort.  My examples are the allopathic 
principle (treat an ailment with its opposite) and specific principles that are derived from 
the allopathic principle (e.g. treat a fever, which has hot properties, with kammaron, 
which has cooling properties).  The invocation of these general principles in the treatment 
of individual patients shows that, at least in the case of medicine, it is incorrect to adopt 
the particularist reading of the medical analogue to Aristotle’s mean relative to us. 
1  Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean 
The doctrine of the mean is the familiar idea that moderation is best, that excess is 
to be avoided, and that there is a right time for things. Indeed, the idea is more familiar to 
us than we necessarily realize.  Consider the famous Byrds’ song: ‘Turn, Turn, Turn.’  
The song was adapted from the Book of Ecclesiastes.  The Bible passage expresses the 
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idea that there is a time for everything: a time to be born, to die, to kill, to heal, to 
laugh, etc. 
The doctrine of the mean is commonplace in Greek literature and philosophy.  It 
was expressed by a number of Greek dictums.  For example, there are the phrases: 
“nothing too much”; “”know thyself”; “observe due measure” (kairos), and “measure is 
best” (metron) (cf. Protagoras 343ab).  The dictums were initially thought to be the 
sayings of the Seven Sages, a group of wise men in Greece.  However, they came to be 
associated with the cooperative virtues appropriate to living in a city.211  Indeed, in 
keeping with the bent of the cooperative virtues, the doctrine of the mean captures the 
idea that one should err on the side of mildness.  Hence, Isocrates remarks in a speech to 
an aspiring leader that the “happy mean is to be found in qualities of defect rather than in 
those of excess.” 
Keep a watch continually on your words and actions, that you may fall into as few 
errors as possible. The best thing is to hit the exact course which the occasion 
(kairos) demands, but when that is difficult to discover, choose to fall short rather 
than to do too much; for the happy mean (metriotêtes) is to be found in qualities 
of defect rather than in those of excess (To Nicocles, 33).212   
In this remark, we can detect the same thought that probably drove Aristotle to surmise 
that erring on the side of one extreme may be better than erring on the other side.  As 
Aristotle claims, one of the extremes is more erroneous than the other.  Since hitting the 
                                                
211 I.e. as opposed to the competitive virtues appropriate for the agonistic Homeric world.  
See Charles Kahn’s discussion of the two sets of virtues in Kahn 1998, 30-31.   
212 Episko&pei tou_j lo&gouj a)ei\ tou_j sautou~ kai\ ta_j pra&ceij, i3n' w(j e0laxi/stoij 
a(marth&masin peripi/pth|j. Kra&tiston me\n ga_r th~j a)kmh~j tw~n kairw~n tugxa&nein, 
e0peidh_ de\ duskatamaqh&twj e1xousin, e0llei/pein ai9rou~ kai\ mh_ pleona&zein: ai9 ga_r 
metrio&thtej ma~llon e0n tai=j e0ndei/aij h2 tai=j u(perbolai=j e1neisin. 
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mean is difficult, a second best alternative is to err on the side of the less harmful of 
the extremes (NE 1109a33-35).  
The doctrine of the mean is not merely a moral dictum.  For it refers more 
generally to the idea of opportuneness, whether meant in a temporal or spatial sense.   For 
example, in the following passage from the Hippocratic Corpus, ‘mean’ (metria) is used 
to refer to the proper length of time with which one should use a part of the body: 
Speaking generally, all parts of the body which have a function, if used in 
moderation (metria) and exercised in labors to which each is accustomed, become 
thereby healthy and well-developed, and age slowly (On Joints 58).  
In this passage, the mean is used to express the idea that there is a right length of time.  
However, the mean can also express the idea of the ‘right moment’ or point in time.  For 
example, there may be opportuneness in the sense of a ripe moment for action (e.g. ‘it is 
time to act’).  But there may also be opportuneness in the sense of the right place.  For 
example, an early use of the mean from the Iliad referred to an unguarded place in a 
person’s armor into which one might stick a spear – i.e. a particularly vulnerable spot. 
In Aristotle’s philosophical writing, we find two distinct notions of the mean.  
Aristotle  distinguishes between the mean relative to us (pros hêmas) and the mean 
relative to the deed (pros tou pragmatos, kath auto to pragma) (NE II.5, 1106b7; cf. 
1106a31, a28, a36).   
In everything continuous and divisible, we can take more, less and equal, and each of 
them either in the object itself (kath auto to pragma) or relative to us (pros hêmas); 
and the equal is some intermediate between excess and deficiency.  By the 
intermediate in the object, I mean what is equidistant from each extremity; this is one 
and the same for everyone.  But relative to us the intermediate is what is neither 
superfluous nor deficient; this is not one, and is not the same for everyone (my italics) 
(1106a26 ff.) 
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The mean relative to the deed – also referred to as the ‘arithmetical mean’ - counts as 
a mean irrespective of the circumstances (1106a35).  A simple example of such a mean is 
a mean between two quantities – say, ten and two.  The mean or the halfway point 
between these two numbers is six (1106a33-34).  Four is always the mean between two 
and six, regardless of the context or circumstance in which one assesses the mean.  
Another such mean might be that between two points.  The halfway point on a foot-long 
ruler, for example, is the six-inch mark, and this will always be the case, irrespective of 
the context in which one assesses the mean. 
There is another kind of mean that changes according to the circumstance, and 
this is the mean ‘relative to us.’  Diet provides a good example of such a mean.  The right 
calorie intake for an average, young adult male is approximately two thousand calories.  
However, for a professional male althlete of comparable weight, age and constitution, the 
right daily calorie intake is much larger.  A professional athlete might need twice as many 
calories per day.  Indeed, Michael Phelps made headlines when it came out that he 
ingested more than 12, 000 calories per day.  Aristotle uses the Greek wrestler Milo to 
illustrate this very point about the mean relative to us.  Suppose a trainer considers how 
much food his athletes should take.  He does not prescribe the same amount of food for 
everyone.  For the beginner in gymnastics, a relatively smaller amount of food may be 
appropriate.  But for Milo, who is a well-trained, big, strong athlete, a small diet will not 
be enough.  The right diet for Milo may require much more.   
The mean ‘relative to us’ is importantly related to Aristotle’s conception of virtue.  
According to Aristotle, virtue is a disposition to choose the mean ‘relative to us.’  Virtue 
was thought to be a skill-like or art-like.  The skills associated with discernment or good 
 
 
172 
judgment – e.g. rhetoric, medicine - were characterized as dispositions to select the 
mean.  For our purposes, we might think of this as a way of capturing the idea that skills 
associated with rhetorical or medical ability require judgment or discernment.  For 
example, Isocrates characterizes rhetorical ability as the skill of judging the type of 
speech – main point, mode of delivery, allusions – needed for a certain audience.  Why 
should virtue be this sort of mean rather than the arithmetical mean?  It is obvious that, to 
the extent that virtue is a form of discernment or judgment, it bears a a stronger 
relationship to a mean that needs to be discerned rather than mechanically generated, as 
does the mean between two numbers.   
As a disposition to select the mean relative to us, virtue is both affective and 
intellectual.  It is affective insofar as one desires and takes pleasure in the attainment of 
certain kinds of ends.  It is intellectual, or rational, insofar as selecting the mean requires 
determining the specific things that count as instances of the general kinds of things that 
one aims to select.  It is also intellectual insofar as selecting the mean requires 
determining the means by which one might attain one’s specific goals.  Aristotle’s way of 
phrasing the point that virtue is an intellectual state is to claim that the mean is 
determined, in part, by orthos logos: 
Excellence, then, is a state concerned with (1) choice, (2) lying in a mean (3) 
relative to us, (4) this being determined by reason and (5) in the way in which the 
man of practical wisdom would determine it (1107a1-3). 
 
There is a relationship between the affective and rational aspects of virtue.  The non-
rational part of the human being can share in (metechein) reason (NE I.1).  This 
relationship, in turn, explains how the affective aspects of virtue can be subject to praise 
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in blame. (For one might argue that dispositions over which we have no control – like 
the emotions - should not be the subject of praise and blame.)   The affective dispositions 
associated with virtue are regarded as admirable only insofar as they are consistent with 
and “obey” reason.   
The sense in which the affective and rational parts of the soul are related is also 
expressed in the idea that virtue is concerned with choice (prohairetikê).  Choice, or 
prohairesis, is both affective and ration.  It is the psychological state of an agent as he or 
she performs an action.  More specifically, it is the agent’s reasoned intention to perform 
an action in a specific situation.  Choice is affective insofar as it is an intention or desire 
to perform a certain action.  It is rational insofar as the intention is the product or 
deliberation or reasoning about what is good or right to do.  Choice entails opting for the 
action with deliberation - i.e. as opposed to choosing on the spur of the moment (b9) or 
out of spirit (thumos) (b18-9).  
Because selection of the mean is an intellectual process as much as an affective 
one, Aristotle sometimes describes the intellectual part of virtue – phronêsis, or practical 
wisdom – in terms of its relationship to the mean.  Aristotle claims, for example, that the 
mean is determined in the manner that the phronimos would determine it.213  He also 
notes that there is a close relationship between phronêsis and the selection of the mean 
(NE 1138b18-34; II.6, 1136b36; cf. EE II.5, 1222b7-8).  
It is helpful to contrast the idea of virtue as a mean relative to us with two 
competing notions of virtue.  The Stoics claimed that virtue was a state of apatheia – 
namely, a state in which one does not respond to situations with emotion.  Apatheia refers 
                                                
213 w(risme/nh| lo&gw| kai\ w|{ a2n o( fro&nimoj o(ri/seien 
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to the view that the passions have no place in the moral life and that it is best to 
eliminate them entirely.  Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean should also be distguished from 
the metriopatheia, which is the view that the passions have a place in the moral life, but 
only if they are moderate.  This is essentially the idea of the arithmetical mean or the 
mean relative to the deed that we just saw.  This is the idea that one gives a response that 
is moderate in every respect in all situations.  In any situation, one ought to respond with 
a moderate amount of anger, grief, joy, exuberance, etc.  In response to a rude action, for 
example, the metriopathic response is a moderate amount of anger.  Similarly, in 
response to a generous action, the metriopathic response is moderate amount of 
appreciation.  This position about the role of the emotions in the moral life can be 
criticized on the grounds that, in some cases, a extreme response seems to be in order.  
For example, a terribly rude or harmful action might require not moderate anger in 
response, but an very angry response. 214  
From the viewpoint of the person choosing, there appears to be complexity in the 
possible actions or feelings he can opt for.  This point is best illlustrated with an example.  
Suppose that someone has done something wrong to you, and you are inclined to be 
angry in response.  But, how long ought you to be angry?  In particular, this is a question 
one asks when confronted with any temptation to be angry for a extended amount of time.  
For the question arises: is it appropriate for me to be angry for this long, or am I holding a 
grudge?  You can contemplate being angry for any amount of time: anger for one day, 
two days, three days…. Similarly, you choose one of these options (anger for one day, 
two days….) by implicitly assigning value judgments to each option: e.g. too long, right 
                                                
214 See Urmson 1973 for discussion of the doctrine of the mean and this criticism.  
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amount of time, too short.  Of course, you may be wrong.  Being angry for five years 
is not appropriate - even though you have deemed it appropriate, given your tendency to 
implacable resentment.  A person without this character flaw will assess the matter 
correctly.  That is, she will better determine what counts as too long, just right, or too 
little for any given situation. 
The need to take into account the particular features of a situation (e.g. time, 
objects, persons) introduces the requirement of ‘aiming’ (stochazesthai) at the mean 
(1126b29).215 Aiming is the activity of assessing particulars in light of a goal. 
The process of aiming works as follows.  One bears in mind the goal – e.g. the kalon or 
sumpheron.  One also considers the particular features of the situation in light of that 
goal.  But the particulars introduce an element of contingency into the process.  For 
example, it is not always clear how long one ought to be angry, at what sorts of actions 
one ought to be angry, or with whom one ought to be angry and to what degree.  As 
Aristotle claims, these sorts of particulars make the process of deliberation range over 
matters about which generalizations hold only ‘for the most part.’  
There are several categories or dimensions the agent must consider in selecting 
the mean in a particular situation. Two of the most important categories concern actions 
                                                
215 The term ‘aim’ carries the connotation both of aiming – as in using a bow to aim at a 
target  - but also of conjecturing or guessing.  Aristotle uses the term in a variety of ways 
(1128a6;1129b15;1109a30; 1127a8;1160a13; 1126b29; 
1106b15;1106b28;1109a22;1141b13).  Sometimes, it means ‘aiming’ at the mean 
(1109a3).  Sometimes, however, Aristotle refers to a specific goal at which one aims – for 
example: common advantage (1129b15), pleasure (1127a8), surviving and flourishing 
(1160a13).  In still other cases,  the goal is something one keeps in mind while making 
specific decision.  Hence, Aristotle claims that we should ‘aim’ at experiencing pleasure 
or avoiding pain while keeping in mind the noble and expedient (1126b29). Note that this 
construction typically takes the form: while keeping in mind x (visual verb + pros x), one 
aims + genitive case of substantive infinitive (e.g. 1126b29; 1160a13).    
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and feelings.  For example, one can choose to be very angry or only moderately 
angry.  Similarly, one can choose a vengeful action or a mildly retributive action.  There 
are also several other categories to consider when making a decision about how to act or 
feel.  These include (NE IV.5, 1225b31-2):   
1. Length of time: for how long (hoson chronon) ought one to be angry? 
2. Objects: for what (epi hois) ought one to be angry? 
3. Persons: towards whom (hois) ought one to be angry? 
4. Manner: in what manner (hos) ought one to be angry? 
5. Time at which: when (hote) should one get angry?  
6. For the sake of what: why (hou heneka) should one get angry? (II.9, 1109a25-
9) 
 
Aristotle tends to give other lists of categories as well.  He names hos, houtou, epi toutois 
and epi tousouton chronon (NE IV.5, 1125b34-6); he also names hoi, hoson, hote, hou 
heneka, and hôs, II.9, 1109a25-9.  Our most complete list, therefore, is represented 
above. 
Interpreters have thought Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean –the idea that virtue is a 
disposition to select the mean relative to us - works in in one of two ways.  The first view 
is that one perceives the mean.  That is, the practically wise person has an insight or 
intuition of the mean.  This insight has no communicable content, for it rather like the 
idea that the person has a sense of what it means to be good, such that she cannot state 
what the good is in terms of a set of principles to which she adheres.  (It is not merely the 
case that she cannot state the principles, but rather that there are none.)  She nevertheless 
consistently finds the mean in every situation through perception.  Thus, we might think 
that, by ‘relative to us,’ Aristotle has a relativist position in mind.  That is, if (1) a the 
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mean is determined relative to us, (2) the agent does not determine the mean in light 
of shared moral principles of deliberation.’216  
According to the second view, the mean is determined through deliberation, by 
appeal to some action-guiding principles.  Deliberation does not proceed along the lines 
of hard and fast rules.  But there is some set of principles that the person of practical 
wisdom consults in attempting to determine the mean. Correct deliberation requires 
acquiring the right principles of the good; assessing the non-moral facts of particular 
situations correctly; and making the right deductions from the right theory of the good in 
light of the particular facts about the world.  In order to do this, one must possess a 
correct set of moral principles – say, a sort of blueprint or plan according to which 
various goals are represented and ranked in order of importance.   
The difference between these two interpretations can be seen by considering the 
readings of the practical syllogism associated with each.  According to the generalist,  the 
practical syllogism represents a decision procedure in which the major premise of the 
expresses the agent’s will –e g. ‘be kind to those in need’ or ‘atone for past wrongs.’  The 
major premise should be construed a knowledge-cum-desire state – i.e. a content-filled 
disposition of the will.217  The minor premise of the practical syllogism conveys the 
“straightforward facts about the situation at hand.”218  For example, the minor premise 
might correspond to one’s seeing that there is an opportunity to be kind (by helping 
someone carry groceries).  In deliberation, one puts together the major and minor 
                                                
216 For a review of related positions, see Brown 1997.  
217 See Irwin 2000.  
218 Ibid, 336. 
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premise, so she thinks: (1) I am committed to ‘be kind’ and (2) there is an opportunity 
before me to be kind right now.  She concludes that she should (3) do the kind thing.  
The particularist interpretation of the doctrine of the mean presents an alternate 
account of the practical syllogism.  The practical syllogism represents an explanation of 
action, rather than a decision procedure. There is no cognitive operation that corresponds 
to the putting together of the major and minor premises on the former interpretation.  
Rather, we are to think of the practical syllogism as corresponding to two ways of 
describing the psychological state of the practically wise person, both of which are 
needed to account for the fact that the agent is successfully motivated to perform an 
action.  The major premise of the practical syllogism is conceived as an expression of the 
agent’s general conception of the good life – something like Aristotle’s notion of 
eudaimonia or eu prattein.219  The minor premise expresses the agent’s awareness of the 
morally salient features of a situation.  
As we have just seen, Aristotle claims that virtue is a mean relative to us (pros 
hêmas) rather than a mean ‘in the object itself’ (kath auto to pragma) (NE II.5, 1106b7; 
cf. 1106a31, a28, a36), and there are two interpretations of his point.  Which of these 
interpretations of Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean is correct?  In the next section, we will 
canvas some reasons to think that the generalist reading of the doctrine of the mean is the 
correct reading.  I will show that another presentation of the doctrine of the mean relative 
to us appeals to action-guiding principles.  This presentation can be found in the 
Hippocratic Corpus’s On Ancient Medicine.  If intellectual context is an indication of the 
                                                
219 For discussion of this idea, see Nussbaum 1990, 73 and 93.  
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way we should read Aristotle, then this presentation of the mean relative to us should 
point us in the direction of reading Aristotle as a generalist.   
2  The Doctrine of the Mean in On Ancient Medicine 
On Ancient Medicine offers an account of the mean that is analogous to 
Aristotle’s mean relative to us.  Like Aristotle’s mean ‘relative to us,’ according to On 
Ancient Medicine, the mean should be determined relative to patient’s particular cases.   
But before considering how this is so, it is worth pausing to show that, like 
Aristotle’s Ethics, On Ancient Medicine also presents us with the contrast between the 
arithmetical mean and the mean relative to us.  As we saw in the previous section of the 
chapter, the arithmetical mean involves choosing the halfway point with regard to two 
extremes, irrespective of the people for whom one chooses the mean or the actions to 
which one responds in choosing the mean.  For example, the gymnastic trainer would be 
choosing the arithmetical mean if he selected the same, moderate sized and medium 
strength diet for both the seasoned and the beginning athlete.   
On Ancient Medicine presents the same idea in a different guise.  For it presents 
the idea that all diets should be the same, irrespective of a patient’s specific constitution.  
All diets should err on the side of under-nourishment, since the rule in medicine is that a 
diet should not overpower a patient’s consitution.   
Now if it were as simple as has been suggested, and stronger foods harmed while 
weaker ones benefitted and nourished both the sick and the healthy, then things 
would be easy: for it would simply be necessary to lead a patient towards the 
weakest diet, and one could do so with a good deal of security (9.1) 
 
Hitting the mean as a doctor would be quite straightforward if it meant only that one had 
to prescribe a diet that would never overpower a patient’s constitution.  The doctor would 
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have to consider only how to make the diet weak or not overstrong.  He could 
prescribe everyone a medium sized diet of gruels and other medium strength foods, for 
example.  Such a diet would always work, and the doctor could operate with a ‘good deal 
of security.’  
While the operative principle here might seem obviously wrong, it corresponds to 
an important early stage in the development of medicine.  According to On Ancient 
Medicine, the early stage of medicine’s development was characterized by the project of 
making strong and raw foods suitable for the relatively delicate human digestive system.  
What the wild animals could eat unproblematically, the human being could not (3.3).  At 
this stage, medicine was the art of discovering how to make food and drink mild enough 
so as to be suitable for human beings.   
Of course, medicine cannot end with the project of weakening overly strong 
foods.  An overly weak diets can be as dangerous as an overly strong diet: 
But in fact, the error is no less, nor does it harm the human being less, if one 
administers food deficient in quantity and quality to what is needed; for the might 
of hunger penetrates forcefully into the human constitution to lame and weaken 
and kill.  And many other ills, different from those arising from repletion but no 
less serious, also arise from depletion (9.2).   
 
Thus, medical treatment is complicated by the fact that both overpowering and 
undershooting the strength of a diet are harmful.  The illnesses associated with depletion 
are as detrimental to health as those associated with overpowering of the patient’s 
constitution.  The result is that the doctor must “aim” for the mean in between 
excessively strong and weak diets.  (“For one must aim at a measure”) (9.3).  It is 
important to see that we have here something like the mean relative to the deed or 
arithmetical mean – namely, diets should be neither overstrong nor overweak.  They 
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should offer nutritional value that is somewhere in the middle of defects and excesses 
of strength. 
But, the text goes on to introduce the equivalent of Aristotle’s mean relative to us.  
For it suggests that the mean must be determined with reference to individual patients.  
As the following passage suggests, an individual’s makeup should determine the correct 
treatment for that patient:   
This I think is what it is necessary for a doctor to know about nature (phusis) and 
to make every effort to know, if he is going to do any of the things that he must: 
what the human being is in relation (pros) to foods and drinks, and what it is in 
relation to (pros) other practices, and what will be the effect of each thing on each 
individual (aph’hekastou hekastô)(On Ancient Medicine, 20.3). 220   
 
We must pay particular attention to the claim that the doctor must study ‘the effect of 
each thing on each individual.’  As the passage argues, the doctor must know about the 
nature or constitution of the human being (phusis).  The suggestion seems to be that the 
doctor should know the features of the human being in general (e.g. that humans have 
two arms, two eyes, a heart that works roughly as so….).  But in particular, the doctor 
must know what this constitution is in relation to (pros) food and drinks – hence, the 
important distinction between ‘what man is’ and ‘what man is in relation to foods and 
drinks.’  However, as the remark about ‘the effect of each thing on each individual’ 
shows, the doctor must know how this food and drink will effect each individual.  In 
other words, treatment (i.e. food and drink) should be adjusted to individual cases.  
This seems to be a recasting of Aristotle’s mean relative to us in medical terms.  
Like Aristotle’s mean relative to us, the mean determined in light of ‘the effect of each 
                                                
220 o3 ti/ e0stin a1nqrwpoj pro_j ta_ e0sqio&mena kai\ pino&mena, kai\ o3 ti pro_j ta_ a1lla 
e0pithdeu&mata, kai\ o3 ti a)f' e9ka&stou e9ka&stw| cumbh&setai 
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thing on each individual’ is a mean determined with respect to particular person’s 
cases.  In the case of ethics, this point is phrased as a relation between the individual and 
various features of action or praxis – namely: time, place, extent, manner, and so on.  In 
the case of medicine, the same basic point is phrased as a relation between food/ drink/ 
exercise and a particular person’s constitution or phusis.  In both cases, we have the same 
idea – that the mean should be determined with regard to a particular person’s case.  
The analogue between Aristotle’s mean relative to us and On Ancient Medicine’s 
mean can also be seen by considering On Ancient Medicine’s use of the term ‘phusis.’  
For the term is used so that it means both the human being’s constitution, generally 
specaking, and an individual’s constitution.  Because it can mean the latter – namely, an 
individual’s constitution – it helps us see how the text expresses the idea that treatment 
needed tailoring to specific cases.  
On the one hand,  the term phusis is used in the medical corpus to capture the idea 
of a recurring features or patterns that make the human being what he is.221  Hence, in 
Epidemics, the author writes of the various activities typically associated with the phusis 
of the human being: sneezing, blinking, breathing, yawning, etc.  These are activities that 
the body adopts ‘not from thought,’ but automatically and ‘without instruction,’ which 
makes it a good doctor in that nature corrects itself:   
The body’s nature (phusis) is the physician in disease.  Nature finds the way for 
herself, not from thought.  For example, blinking, and the tongue offers its 
assisstance, and all similar things.  Well trained, readily and without instruction, 
nature does what is needed.  Tear, moisture of the nostrils, sneezing, ear wax, 
                                                
221 Von Staden calls this “regularly recurring cluster of characteristics by which one can 
always recognize a thing as what it is” (Von Staden 2007). Cf. Schiefsky 2005, 69-70. 
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production of saliva in the mouth, the intake of breath, exhalation, yawning, 
coughing, hiccough, in a variety of ways” (6.5.1).222   
 
Phusis can often be construed as ‘temperament’ or ‘constitution.’  Thus, the author of 
Fractures writes that because “constitutions and ages differ greatly,” there is nothing 
exact (atrekes) about the length of time it takes the forearm to heal. (Fract. 7).  
In On Ancient Medicine, the term phusis is used to capture the idea of human 
nature, in this sense of the regularly recurring characteristics that define what it is to be a 
human.  We see this idea in the idea that the human being consists of a blend or krâsis of 
humors such as sweet, bitter, salty, acid, astringent, insipid, etc. (14.4), and that the 
human being is no different from food, in this respect.  Just as the healthiest food is well-
blended, so too is the healthiest person he who has a well-blended composition of humors 
(14.1-2).  Namely, the healthiest human being seems to be he whose dunameis are well-
blended.  By the same token, disease is explained by failure to mix well.  If one of the 
humors becomes excessively concentrated, it seperates off (apokrinesthai), resulting in 
illness.  Finally, knowledge of human phusis consists in knowledge of the internal 
structures (schemata) that make up human beings, in general.  All of these matters – 
which are essentially, the properties shared by all human beings – account for the sense in 
which phusis refers to a general notion of patterns or regularly recurring characteristics.   
                                                
222 Nou&swn fu&siej i0htroi/.  0Aneuri/skei h( fu&sij au)th_ e9wuth|~ta_j e0fo&douj, ou)k e0k 
dianoi/hj, oi[on to_ skardamu&ssein, kai\ h( glw~ssa u(pourge/ei, kai\ o3sa a1lla 
toiau~ta: a)pai/deutoj h( fu&sij e0ou~sa kai\ ou) maqou~sa ta_ de/onta poie/ei. Da&krua, 
r(inw~n u(gro&thj, ptarmoi\, w)to_j r(u&poj, sto&matoj si/alon, a)nagwgh_, pneu&matoj 
ei1sodoj, e1codoj, xa&smh, bh_c, lu_gc, ou) tou~ au)te/ou panta&pasi tro&pou. Ou1rou 
a1fodoj kai\ fu&shj kai\ tau&thj th~j e9te/rhj, trofh~j kai\ pnoih~j, kai\ toi=si qh&lesin, 
a4 tou&toisi, kai\ kata_ to_ a1llo sw~ma, i9drw~tej, knhsmoi\, skordinismoi\, kai\ o3sa 
toiau~ta. 
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But phusis is also used to capture the idea of a specific individual’s nature.  
We saw this in the author’s claim that ‘the nature of …people differ’ such that some are 
seriously affected by drinking large quantities of unmixed wine, and others less so.  
Similarly, we saw it in the idea that  relatively unaffected by large quantities of cheese or 
wine and those much affected. On the other hand, phusis is also in such a way that it 
refers to an individual’s constitution.  We can see this use in the On Ancient Medicine 
passage discussed above.  Reading phusis as the individual’s constitution is the only way 
to get purchase on the author’s claim that ‘the nature of these people differ’ – namely, 
those relatively unaffected by large quantities of cheese or wine and those much affected.  
The author’s explanation is that these people have different amounts of the same humors 
– i.e. ‘those in whom such a humor happens to be present in greater quantity.”  
We have also seen this idea throughout the Hippocratic Corpus.  In chapter four, I 
described several categories of questions that a doctor should ask about his patients, 
including: constitution (phusis), age, gender, and geographical location, and so on.  All of 
these categories concern particular features of patients that doctors must assess in order 
to apply rules of regimen to them correctly.  For example, as I explained in chapter five, a 
doctor might have to establish that a young woman is from the cold, dry and arid regions 
of the North in order to ascertain that she has a relatively hardy phusis, and thus will 
withstand a relatively substantial diet and fail to thrive with a small one.  In all cases, 
hitting the mean will not be a mere matter of giving a patient a medium-strength diet.  
Indeed, our hardy girl from the North shows as much.  She should not drink five glasses 
of wine a day, but she should not drink just one either.  A person of a weaker constitution 
would be better fit with a regimen of just one glass of wine a day – and perhaps watered 
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down at that.  The reason for differences in individual phuseis is that these people 
have different amounts of the same humors – i.e. ‘those in whom such a humor happens 
to be present in greater quantity” (20.4).  
 
We have just considered the idea that On Ancient Medicine presents a notion of 
the mean that is an analogue to Aristotle’s mean relative to us.   We have seen that On 
Ancient Medicine presents this idea with the claim that the mean should be selected with 
relation to a person’s phusis, or his individual constitution.   
Another way to explore the mean in On Ancient Medicine is to consider On 
Ancient Medicine’s contrast between ‘what man is’ (ho ti estin anthrôpos) and ‘what man 
is in relation to (pros) food and drink.’ At the heart of the contrast is the distinction 
between two ways of studying medicine – namely, as the study of nature in the tradition 
of the phusiologoi like Empedocles, or as the study of regimen.  In declaring its 
preference for the study of man in relation to food and drink, On Ancient Medicine 
declares its allegience to medicine as the study of regimen.  In seeing that On Ancient 
Medicine advocates that medicine be the study of regimen, we can helpfully connect On 
Ancient Medicine with other treatises on regimen.  This, in turn, will help us see that On 
Ancient Medicine’s commitment to tailoring treatment to specific patient cases should be 
understood in light of the widespread commitment in such treatises to the study of 
general principles that guide diet.   
On the one hand, the inquiry into ‘what man is’ is an inquiry into the basic nature 
of the human being – its constituent parts, its matter, and its origin.  On the other hand, 
the inquiry into ‘what man is in relation to food and drink’ is an inquiry into the nature of 
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man in relation to his environment – not only the food and drink he ingests, but the 
place in which he lives, the air he breaths and the kind of habits he keeps.  On Ancient 
Medicine argues for a focus on the latter notion in medicine, in contradistinction to the 
former - namely, ‘what man is in relation to food and drink’ as opposed to ‘what man is.’  
For the study of ‘what man is in relation to food and drink’ brings the doctor closer to 
effective and practicable treatments for patients, so the argument goes.  But, as the text 
suggests, the study of man in relation to food and drink is not merely the study of the 
general features of that relationship, but the study of the specific features of that 
relationship.  That is, the doctor’s work is to study not only the relationship between man 
and his environment, generally, but the relationship between a specific patients and food 
and drink.  In effect, the treatise calls for the doctor’s attention to the study of a patient’s 
specific or individuating features, in addition to those features that he shares in common 
with other human beings.   
Let us consider the first arm of the contrast – namely, the study of ‘what man is.’  
This is the study of origins, the constituent parts, the nature, and matter of the human 
being in general:  
Some doctors and sophists say that it is impossible for anyone to know medicine 
who does not know what the human being is (ho ti estin anthrôpos).  Anyone who 
is going to treat patients correctly must, they say, learn this.  Their account tends 
towards philosophy, just like Empedocles or others who have written about nature 
from the beginning (ex archês ho ti estin anthrôpos), what the human being is and 
how it originally came to be (hopôs egeneto prôton) and from what things it is 
compounded (hopôs sunepagê )(20.1).   
 
The study of ‘what man is’ can be characterized by a general concern to develop accounts 
of the origins of man (ex archês ho ti estin anthrôpos), how he came to be (hopôs egeneto 
prôton) and what he is made of (hopôs sunepagê)(20.1).  The inquiry into ‘what the man 
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is’ is associated with Empedocles and others who wrote about nature (alloi hoi peri 
phuseôs gegraphasin). This is the study of nature that was characteristic of a group of 
scientists or philosophers termed the phusiologoi.  Their interest was in the study of man 
in terms of his origin and his material makeup.  We can easily find examples of such 
inquiries.  For instance, when Plato writes of Socrates’early adventures in cosmology and 
the ‘inquiry into nature’ in the Phaedo, he is hypothesizing about a stage in Socrates’ life 
in which Socrates could be counted among the phusiologoi (97c-99b). 
To understand fully the study of ‘what man is’ in On Ancient Medicine, we must 
look at role of the phusiologoi in intellectual society.  The passage above is part of a long 
tradition of critique, according to which the study of nature was not relevant to the 
understanding of the nature of living well.  Cicero rehearses this critique when he writes 
that  “celestial phenomena [Socrates] regarded as beyond our comprehension, or at any 
rate, however well we might understand them, as irrelevant to the good life” (Academica, 
I.4,15).  Isocrates’ Antidosis also levels a critique of the phusiologoi.  While scientific 
knowledge disposes students to learn, nothing about its content helps a student along 
when it comes to praxis.  This is because the study of such matters demands “special 
subtlety and refinement.”1  These studies have no connection with other forms of learning 
and particularly with the useful kind of rhetorical abilities that Isocrates claims to teach 
(263-4).  If anything, such studies isolate a student from the normal life of the polis – the 
normal political life implicitly identified by Isocrates as the quintessential activity of the 
Athenian people.  
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The critique of the phusiologoi also enters the medical corpus.  On Fractures 
epitomizes the hostility towards impractical and excessively learned doctors.  Not only 
are such doctors ineffective, they even harm their patients.  
The theorizing (sophismenoi) practitioners are just the ones who go wrong.  In 
fact, the treatment of a fractured arm is not difficult, and is almost any 
practitioners job.  But I have to write a lot about it because I know wise (sophos) 
doctors who, out of a schematon…  have got credit for wisdom by putting up 
arms in positions which ought rather to have given them a name for ignorance.  
And many other parts of the art are judged thus.  They practice the outlandish, not 
knowing if it is useful, and take the customary to be good… (On Fractures, 1) 
 
First, these doctors believe that they are capable.  Second, they base their analyses of 
patients on theories. The author of On Fractures takes such theories to be misguided 
since they favor false analogies and spectacle. Finally, the lay public are impressed by 
such shows of apparent wisdom.  The opening chapters of On Fractures develop several 
criticisms of other doctors on the basis of their “wisdom” (the term is used 
provocatively). The so-called ‘wise’ doctor, in the grip of a schêma, falsely reasons about 
the method by which to cure a broken arm.  As we discover later, the source of the 
misguided reasoning is a false analogy to archery.  The bad doctor reasons that – because 
archers hold their arms in a certain position – one ought to bandage the arm so as to favor 
the archer’s position.  While the practice of drawing analogies gives the bad doctor the 
appearance of wisdom, it does little to help the broken arm. 
This is not to suggest that all the treatises of the Hippocratic Corpus are uniformly 
aligned against the phusiologoi’s inquiry into nature. Treatises such as Fleshes, Regimen 
and Sevens treat the human being as if it were made up of the constitutive elements of the 
cosmos.  For example, Fleshes uses three elements (air, earth and aether) to give an 
account of the formation of the various parts of the human body.  Regimen explains the 
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nature of the body in terms of two elements: water and fire.  It presents a view of man 
as a microcosm of the cosmos, with the consequence that the anatomy and physiology 
developed in the treatise show the way in which the body looks like the cosmos.  The 
belly, for example, is supposed to be enveloped by three “circuits,” on the model of the 
three revolutions of moon, sun, and stars about the earth.  There is a second group of 
Hippocratic treatises which treat medicine as an autonomous discipline, rather than an 
offshoot of cosmology.  In this camp, we find the treatises Nature of Man and Ancient 
Medicine. The Nature of Man criticizes the monists who held that human nature is 
constituted by the elements fire, air, water, and earth.  Ancient Medicine criticizes 
physicians who explain diseases by means of postulates such as the hot, cold, moist and 
dry.  
Let us return to On Ancient Medicine and the specific complaint there about the 
phusiologoi.  A first complaint is a point about the usefulness of theories of the cold, hot, 
wet and dry.  In using such theories, a doctor will not cure his patients.  He will drive 
them to an early death.  If a person follows a regimen based on this theory, “he will suffer 
many terrible things: for he will experience pains, his body will be weak, his digestion 
will be ruined, and he wil not be able to live for long” (13.1).  This objection follows 
from a second one – according to which the theory of disease and human constitution in 
question is simply wrong.  Doctors who operate according to the method ex hupotheseôs 
have the wrong theory of properties.  They believe that the only things which exist are: 
hot, cold, wet and dry.  These are the properties, in turn, which explain health and disease 
in the human body.  Since health consists in a balance of those properties, disease is the 
imbalance of the same properties and it is treated by rectifying the balance. 
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Now that we have considered the study of ‘what the man is’ and the critique 
of this sort of study, let us consider the contrasting idea - namely ‘what man is in relation 
to food and drink.’ The following passage, a part of which was quoted earlier, provides 
the core of the view: 
…This is what it is necessary for a doctor to know about nature and to make every 
effort to know, if he is going to do any of the thing that he must: what the human 
being is in relation to foods and drinks, and what it is in relation to other practices, 
and what will be the effect of each thing on each individual – not simply that 
‘cheese is harmful food’, for it causes trouble to one who has eaten too much of 
it’, but rather what trouble, and why, and which of the things in the human being 
it is inimical to. (20.3-4).   
 
Medicine ought to provide an account of the effects of food, drinks, and exercise on 
human beings and an account of the reasons or causes of those effects.  That is, the doctor 
should know “what the human being is in relation to foods and drinks” and “in relation to 
other practices” (e.g. exercise, bathing, etc.).   
In effect, this passage argues that the doctor’s body of knowledge should be 
constituted by an account of regimen. Regimen, or dietetics (diêta) is the science of 
managing the body’s humors in order to maintain and restore health. 223  The science 
developed in fifth and fourth century Greece, having been imported – mythically, like 
many other technai – from Egypt.  Regimen is a holistic science; it deals with all aspects 
of life: one’s sleeping, eating, exercise and sexual habits.  It prescribes times of day 
during which to eat and activities with which to occupy oneself between meals.  It makes 
instructions regarding best partners, education, and – in general – what one ought to 
believe about the world.  But fundamentally, regimen is a science dealing with food and 
                                                
223 For discussions of pre-Galenic dietetics, see:  Craik 1995,  387-402; Edelstein 1967;  
Nutton 2004,  96-8;  Smith 1980 and Wilkins 1995,  343-50. 
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drink.  It explains how much of what sort of thing one ought to eat or drink in order to 
keep his health.      
Techniques of regimen changed in the late fifth and fourth centuries.  Originally, 
regimen was not a philosophical or theory-laden science.  It had consisted exclusively in 
the administration of food and drinks.224  However, in the late fifth century, the doctor 
Herodicus of Selymbria communicated his medical findings to intellectuals and 
philosophers (Rep. 405d-406c).225  Afterwards, there was a flurry of interest in spelling 
out the details of regimen in a more theoretical and systematic form.  Several treatises on 
regimen date from this period of burgeoning theoretical inquiry: Regimen, Epidemics, 
Regimen in Health, Regimen in Acute Diseases, Airs Waters Places and Nutriment.   
3  Rules in the Hippocratic Corpus 
We have seen that On Ancient Medicine is a treatise that argues for medicine as 
the study of regimen. We should now consider the fact that it is also commonplace in 
treatises on regimen to invoke general principles in the determination of the mean and in 
determining how best to restore the patient to his mean state.  In this section of the 
chapter, we will see several kinds of principles that the doctor would have used to 
determine the mean in relation to a specific patient.   
Before considering these principles, a note about terminology is in order.  By the 
term ‘principle’ or ‘rule,’ I have in mind an idea that is not always translated in the Greek 
text as such, but which is implicit in the giving of the sorts of rules that will be discussed 
below.  However, if the Greek does have a term for ‘rule,’ then it is ‘nomos’ or ‘logos.’  
                                                
224 Nutton 2004, p. 96.   
225 See also Regimen I.1, which reports that “many” have written on the subject of 
regimen.  Similarly, see Democritus, DK 58.   
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Nomos is most familiar to us in its translation as ‘law.’ In the Hippocratic Corpus, it 
is used – primarily in the singular – to capture the idea of a doctor’s protocol – as in ‘rule 
of law’ (i.e. as opposed to ‘rules of procedure’).226  Logos is also used to express the idea 
of a rule or a principle that the doctor ought to follow (e.g. Regimen in Acute Diseases, 
7).  
 The Hippocratic doctor would have used a wide swath of principles in treating 
patients, and we can see this well by taking the Hippocratic work Places in Man as an 
example.  One of the earliest or the earliest treatise in the Hippocratic Corpus,227 Places 
in Man is wide ranging in themes, dealing with all aspects of the doctor’s art.  In 
particular, it deals with the physiology of the human being, the aetiology of diseases, 
treatment of patients, general principles of medicine and gynaecology.  Moreover, the 
treatise was probably written for the instruction of neophyte doctors,228 so it presents a 
clear picture of the basic knowledge that the doctor would have been expected to possess.  
On all counts, then, the treatise will provide us with a good sense of the principle to 
which the doctor would have appealed in treating patients.  In what follows, I will 
proceed as if asking: what must the doctor know in order to treat his patients?   
 First of all, the doctor would have had an account of the patient’s physiology.  
Places in Man operates with a rudimentary and standard account of humors – an account 
very much like the one found in the seminal Nature of Man, but far less detailed and 
rigorous in exposition.229  According to humoral theory, the human being is composed of 
                                                
226 E.g. Articulus 18, 10 
227 Craik 1998,  29 and 33.   
228 Ibid, 18-20.   
229 Ibid, 14-5.   
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four basic qualities – hot, cold, wet and dry.  However, in Nature of Man, this group 
includes phlegm rather than water.  In turn, phlegm has a wide range of roles in the body, 
for it can be associated with both health and illness.  As evidence of health, phlegm is 
associated with the swelling of sexual organs.  As evidence of illness, on the other hand, 
phlegm takes the form of pus or ichor.230   
Besides the humoral theory, a second aspect of patient physiology in Places in 
Man is the theory of flux (rheuma).  The flux is a movement of a moisture-like substance 
that flows from various parts of the body, such as the head or the belly.  While typically 
manifested as phlegm, the moving agent can be blood or bile.231  The process of sweating 
is a relatively simple example of a flux.  When the heat of the body increases, the vessels 
of the body expand, giving way to increased flow of blood through the vessels (9).  This 
flow is the flux.  There are seven fluxes, all of which start from the head.  (These can 
conveniently be thought of as pathways starting from the head and leading to various 
parts of the body through which the various forms of moisture could course.)  The fluxes 
terminate in places such as the nose, ears, eyes, belly and back.232   
In addition to knowledge of physiology, the doctor would have also possessed an 
understanding of the aetiology and nature of disease.  In Places in Man, disease is caused 
primarily by the imbalance of humors in the body.  This imbalance, in turn, would have 
caused a disruption to the fluxes.  Disruption might have taken many forms: aggregation, 
corruption or exceedingly fast flow.233  One such form of disruption was fixation, the 
                                                
230 Ibid, 14-5 and 177-8.   
231 Ibid, 131-3.   
232 Ibid, 137-9.   
233 Ibid,  234-5.   
 
 
194 
state in which one of the moisture-like substances would have become lodged 
somewhere in the body.  Angina, for example, was the condition in which blood became 
fixed in the vessels at the back of the neck (30).  The disrupted fluxes might manifest 
themselves in the form of various liquids and stuffs secreted or emitted from the body’s 
various orifices – e.g. pus and vomit.   
As for treating disease, the doctor might ascertain the nature of a patient’s illness 
by making note of these kinds of signs.  For example, an improper flux to the spinal 
marrow can be recognized by the dryness of the head, nose and eyes.  The patient’s 
vision becomes weak.  The patient himself becomes pale and has difficulty coughing up 
mucus.  The front of the patient’s body will be dry, while the back will be moist (10.3).  
There are signs for improper flux to other parts of the body as well.  For instance, a 
patient with a flux to the eye will have phlegmatic and swollen eyes (13.1).  If the flux 
comes from the patient’s flesh and bones rather than his head, the skin on the head will 
swell; sores will develop and erupt; and the patient will shed tears.  However, he will not 
feel pain or experience blurred vision.  The liquid expelled through his eyes will be salty 
(13.3)  Again, flux to the chest can be detected by ascertaining whether the patient feels 
pain at his side and near his collar bone.  Flux to the chest is also accompanied by fever 
and a greenish color on the tongue.  The patient will cough up thick sputum (14.1).  One 
last example:  excess of bile can be detected through the following signs: bright or livid 
hues in the eyes and nails; sores and livid area around the sores; sweating on just one part 
of the body; and green colored expectorant (16.1).  These are the signs of pleurisy.   
With these signs in mind, the doctor should decide how to treat his patient.  
Therapies were directed at restoring the proper fluxes to the body, which often meant 
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manipulating of the amount of wetness or dryness in the flux, since disease was 
caused by excess or deficiency of moisture in the flux.  Take, for example, the case of 
flux just discussed.  If the doctor sees the signs of pleurisy, Places in Man directs him to 
treat the patient in the following manner.  First, the doctor should let the fever progress 
for seven days.  During this time, he should prescribe vinegar water or vinegar-and-honey 
water.  The patient should be encouraged to drink as much of these as possible.  (The aim 
is to increase the amount of moisture in the body so as to dislodge or break up the matter 
obstructing the flux.)  The patient should take warming drugs and have a bath on the 
fourth day of his illness.  On the fifth and sixth days, the patient should be anointed with 
olive oil. Finally, on the seventh day, the doctor should attend carefully to the state of the 
fever.  It should begin to slack starting on the seventh day.  If the patient does not seem to 
be recovering, he should be bathed in warm water so as to induce sweating – in turn, to 
let off some of the heat his body has been accumulating (17.1). 
For flux to the eye, Places in Man recommends the following therapy.  First, the 
patient should receive a drug.  If the patient experiences only slight flux and irritation, the 
drug should both dry the eye and make it moist.  That is, it should dry the eye, but induce 
watering (13.2).  Along with the medication for the eye, a drug ought also to be 
administered to the nose, and this should be done every day or every other day, its dosage 
increasing little by little.  The drug for the nose should have drying properties in case any 
of the excess moisture in the direction of the eyes changes course and travels to the nose 
(13.2).    
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Therapy for illness could be accomplished either through diet or more extreme 
measures such as surgery and cautery.234  For example, an enlarged spleen would have 
been treated initially with drugs – the sort of drugs that evacuate water from the body – 
and with foods that are moist or phlegmatic in nature (24.2).   However, if these were to 
fail, Places in Man recommends ‘gentle’ cautery, since the cautery will be a more 
aggressive means of drawing water from the body: ‘cauterize around the cricle of the 
navel, and no on the navel itself, and drain it every day’ (trans. Craik)(24.2).  Similarly, 
surgery was sometimes called for as a last resort.  (In general, the Hippocratic treatises 
are cautious about the need for surgery.)  For example, Places in Man recommends 
trephinning for skull injuries, but only in cases in which there is danger of pus 
accumulating beneath the skull.  This dangerous procedure involved boring a hole into 
the head, which would have allowed the pus and other noxious substances to escape from 
the wounded area.  After the trephinning has been completed, the patient should be given 
drying drugs and be bathed (32.1).   
Most of these treatments follow the allopathic principle – namely, illnesses caused 
by imbalance among the humors can be rectified by applying the opposite quality to the 
offending humor (e.g. excessive moisture can be treated with a drying agent).235 The 
                                                
234 Kosak notes that the main therapeutic alternatives to allopathy in the field of regimen 
were: change (metabolê) and expulsion (apostasis) (Kosak 2004, 114 ff.).  Whereas 
allopathy involved the administration of substances that had opposing forces, change 
involved the alteration of a patient’s diet and environment to restore the balance of forces 
within his body.  Many doctors warn against the dangers of rapid or radical change (e.g. 
Nature of Man, 10).  Clearly, change as form of therapy was closely related to allopathy.  
A third form of dietetic therapy is expulsion, which involves the expelling or purging of a 
dangerously excessive substance within the body.   
235 What motivates the desire for such principles?  One might suggest that a desire for 
abstraction does so.  According to Hankinson, for example, such principles evidence a 
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allopathic principle is a reflection of a scientific model of the human being according 
to which the human being exhibits a balance of different or opposing humors, such that 
disease is a manifestation of imbalance between or among these humors.  This sort of 
picture of the human being is symptomatic of a more general tendency in Presocratic, 
Platonic and Aristotelian science to see the natural world in terms of opposing forces.  
However, it is important to note that Places in Man does not give its unmitigated 
support to the allopathic principle.  The treatise presents two sorts of cases designed to 
challenge the merits of allopathy (42.1-3).  The first case is that of illnesses that have at 
least two causes.  For example, fever can be caused by either excessive moisture or 
excessive dryness in the body.  Dryness was often associated with declining health or 
advancing age (e.g. Aristotle, HA II.2). Hence, the author of Places in Man writes that 
‘what is more dry is inclined to contract illnesses and suffer more…for an ailment in a 
dry situation is fixed and does not let up” (I.1).  Notice the consequences for the doctor 
attempting to treat the fever.  If he is uncertain of the cause of the fever, he will also be 
uncertain of the proper treatment. If the fever is caused by dryness, it is cured through 
moisture – e.g. baths and drinks.  On the other hand, if the fever has been caused by 
excessive phlegm, it ought to be cured by substances with drying properties.   
Earaches also have two kinds of cause and, therefore, two kinds of treatment. 
Earaches are caused by flux from the ear, characterized by an overabundance of either 
                                                                                                                                            
desire to explain and control physical phenomena on the basis of an abstract causal theory 
(Hankinson 2003, 54).  “Both the structure of the pathological theory and the insistence 
upon the intelligibility of disease and bodily function and dysfunction are products of the 
same intellectual attitudes as those which nourished Presocratic speculation” (Hankinson 
2003, 53) – namely a desire to explain physical phenomena on the basis of an abstract 
causal theory.  
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hotness or coldness.  One method of treatment is to administer a drug with heating 
properties (12.1).  “For the patient who is gripped by pain, the treatment is to warm up a 
drug with heating properties, dilute it with butter almond oil, insert it in the ear and apply 
a cupping vessel behind….” (12.1).  But if the heating properties do not work, the doctor 
should switch treatments and attempt to cool the area (12.2).  In all cases like that of the 
fever or the earache, the practical reality is that the doctor should try administering one 
sort of thing; if this does not work, the doctor ought to try the opposite.  “Always change 
the treatment from a method which does not effect a cure; and if a method makes things 
worse, try the opposite.  If the treatment tends to bring improvement, change nothing at 
all in the treatment applied; do not desist from it and do not add anything further” (42.2; 
cf. 12.2, 34.1).  
A second case also raises problems for the allopathic principle – namely, the 
allopathic treatment sometimes harms a patient.  That is,  the treatment that would 
typically work for a patient actually harms the patient.  Such patients have weak 
constitutions.  As a result, the treatment overpowers their constitution, harming rather 
than helping.  Indeed, as the author claims, ‘the very things which make the body strong 
dominate the body and thereby effect the opposite (43.1; cf. 44.2-3; VM 6-9). For 
example, a hot bath weakens the body if one’s health is not up to the bath.  If it is 
stronger, the bath is good for the body (43.2). We have seen this idea in On Ancient 
Medicine as well.  For there, too, the idea is that regimen is healthy for the patient 
provided that it is neither too strong nor too weak, given the patient’s constitution.  
Similarly, the operative principle in Places in Man is the idea that health follows from a 
diet that is neither too strong nor too weak, depending on the particular body in question.  
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Given these problem cases, the author concludes bombastically that the only 
principle in medicine is that there is no “fixed principle” (42.4).   
Medicine is a matter of fine balance.  If a man understand this, he has a fixed 
principle, and he understands the presence or absence of inherent qualities, 
knowledge of which is balance in medicine: that is, that loosening agents may 
become non-loosening and that other things are (similarly) contraries; and that the 
most contrary things are not most contrary …. (Loc. 44.1) 
 
The only fixed principle is the need for flexibility.  For the doctor must know the strength 
of the patient’s constitution relative to the strength of the regimen or treatment 
administered.  The relative strength of the two determines what kind of effect treatment 
will have on the body.  The consequence is that, in many cases, the doctor has to be 
attentive to the effect of the treatment on the body – and switch to its opposite, if need be 
(34.1).  For the allopathic principle does not always result in the increasing health of a 
patient.  The patient’s individual consistution and response to a treatment is decisive. We 
have seen this point made elsewhere.  As On Ancient Medicine suggested, the doctor 
must also know how food and drink will affect individual patients (20.4-6).  Some people 
are invigorated by cheese, find it nourishing and filling.  Others find that it causes 
digestive difficulty and weakness.  Similarly, some people can drink three glasses of 
unmixed wine without batting an eye; yet for others, the dose would be overwhelming.  
Places in Man recommends the same attention to the individual in noting that, at base, 
medicine has “no fixed principle.”  
But does the lack of a “fixed principle” mean that the doctor employs no 
principles or generalizations in determining the best way to balance the patient’s humors?  
This does not seem to be the case.  We can see this by considering an imaginative 
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reconstruction of a treatment session with a hypothetical doctor trained through 
Places in Man.  Suppose that an ill patient visits this doctor.  The doctor must first 
ascertain the nature of the person’s illness.  Initially, this involves reading the signs or the 
symptoms of illness.  We encountered several such descriptions of signs above.  For 
example, the signs of flux to the spinal marrow are: dryness of the head, nose and eyes; 
weak vision; pallor, moist backside, dry frontside, and difficulty expectorating. The signs 
of flux to the eye are: swollen eyes, erupting sores, shedding of tears and salty pus 
through the eyes.   
The diagnostic process may be complicated by the many relevant details about the 
patient’s life.  While Places in Man does not dwell on this point, closely related treatises 
such as Regimen suggest that a doctor might have to inquire about many facets of a 
patient’s life and situation in order to complete the diagnostic process.  He must ask about 
matters such as: the patient’s habitual eating patterns (one or two meals a day); the 
patient’s exercise and bathing habits; and the geographical location of his home.  Does 
the patient live close to brackish water?  Does he live in a valley or in an area that has 
winds that characteristically bring certain illnesses during certain parts of the year?  Of 
course, the doctor must also ask about the progression of the illness so far: how long have 
you had this?  How did it start?  How severe was the pain on that day?  These details help 
the doctor to establish the progression of the disease so far.  As we saw above, the 
Hippocratic also knew that diseases manifested certain patterns of development.   
In the diagnostic stage of the doctor’s treatment, we see in the doctor’s 
deliberation the interplay of general and particular considerations  On the one hand, the 
doctor knows the various signs of flux to the spinal marrow.  But the signs that the patient 
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manifests might be consistent with another illness as well.  For example, flux to the 
spinal marrow is accompanied by pallor.  But pallor may also be a sign of the enervation 
associated with pneumonia.  Thus, the doctor has to go back and forth between what he 
knows about the general patterns of disease, on the one hand, and about the particular 
history of the patient.  He will have to inquire about the patient’s recent history: do you 
also have a pain in your chest?  Are you also sometimes feverish?  Does anyone in your 
household have a similar ailment?  By going between knowledge of the general 
characteristics and patterns of particular diseases and the specific symptoms of the 
patient, the doctor is ultimately able to arrive at a hypothesis about the nature of a 
patient’s condition.236   
Once the doctor has established a first-round diagnosis of the patient’s condition, 
he turns to the treatment of the condition.  Again, as we saw above, the doctor employs 
principles to arrive at such a treatment.  For example, as Places in Man instructs, pleurisy 
should be treated according to a set schedule: the patient’s fever tolerated for seven days, 
during which time the patient should be administered a battery of remedies including 
vinegar water and honey-vinegar water, warming drugs, a bath, and anointment with 
olive oil.  Similarly, flux to the eye should be treated with drugs that have drying 
properties, and these should be administered to both the eye and the nose, their dosage 
increased little by little each day or every other day.  Some diseases required more 
aggressive treatments.  An injury to the skull, for example, might require trephinning, and 
this procedure, too, would have been completed according to a set schedule.  Once the 
trephinning is complete, the patient should receive drying drugs and a bath.   
                                                
236 There is an excellent description of this process in Montgomery 2006,   90-1.   
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There is need for sensitvity to a change in a patient’s fortunes.  A doctor may 
do everything right, and still the patient’s health declines.  In such cases, the doctor must 
be vigilant about the path of the patient’s recovery if he is to change a patient’s therapy or 
reverse a therapy that is causing harm.  Thus, the doctor continues to be involved in the 
patient’s case long after the intial stage of diagnosis and treatment. It is probably for 
reasons such as these that the author of Places in Man remarks that 
…It is not possible to learn medicine quickly…. It is impossible for any fixed 
expertise to come about in it…. [for] medicine now and at other times does not do 
the same thing; and does opposite things to the same individual….(41.-2). 
 
Does any of this speak to a lack of principles in determining the best way to 
restore the humoral balance of a sick patient? If anything, we see quite the contrary.  
From the stage of diagnosis to the stage of treatment, the doctor appeals to principles that 
express medical knowledge about the various clues that diseases leave for diagnosticians 
and to principles that express medical knowledge about the best way to treat those 
ailments, once their nature has been determined.  These principles included claims about 
the signs of illness (e.g. pallor, fever, shedding of tears, and so on).  They also included 
claims about the way to treat illness – claims that were quite specific in some cases (e.g. a 
drying drug should be administered to the eye in increasing doses, little by little, every 
other day).   
In my view, these principles are the helpmates to the doctor’s determination of the 
mean for a patient.  That is, they help the doctor determine the nature of the patient’s 
failure to have a balanced set of humors.  They also help the doctor to determine how best 
to re-establish that balance among the humors.  As we have seen many times already, the 
Hippocratics were committed to the idea that such helpmates could be useful only to a 
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degree.  For, at some point, the doctor must use his judgment to determine just how 
much of a drug was appropriate for a patient – given his or her constitution – and just 
how much of change to diet that patient could sustain towards his or her health.  Thus, the 
Hippocratics acknowledge that general knowledge is very important in the treatment of 
patients, but that they are also not sufficient for making a patient healthy.  In addition, the 
doctor must get to know the patient – who he or she is, in particular; what makes the 
person different from all others, and what course of treatment might, therefore, best 
restore this patient to health.  
Conclusion 
Aristotle argues that the virtuous mean in determined “relative to us” (pros hêmas).  
Recall that the particularist argues that the standard (horos) in light of which an agent 
selects the mean (NE VI.1, 1138b18-24) is not constituted by principles.  Treatises on 
regimen presents a counterexample to the particularist reading of Aristotle’s doctrine of 
the mean. First of all, one such treatise on regimen – namely, On Ancient Medicine – 
offers an account of the mean that closely resembles Aristotle’s virtuous mean.  For it 
argues that doctors should determine the mean relative to patient’s particular cases.  
Second, treatises on regimen like On Ancient Medicine endorse a role for action-guiding 
principles in the selection of the mean.  The doctor must know about phusis in both the 
general and particular sense in order to deliberate successfully about a patient’s 
treatment. We got that idea by seeing that a correct application of the doctrine of the 
mean involves adjustment of general rules of diet to particular patient’s constitutions.  If 
we were to transport the same lesson to Aristotle’s virtuous mean, we would say that the 
mean is determined with reference to particular cases, but also in light of general action-
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guiding principles.  Thus, on this score, too, the particularist reading of Aristotle is 
problematic.    
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